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NEILSON, JAMES J., Ph.D. Warring Fictions: Cultural 
Politics and the Vietnam War Narrative. (1995) 
Directed by Prof. Lee Zacharias. 279pp. 
In the narrative prose of the Vietnam War--specifi-
cally Graham Greene's The Quiet American, Tim O'Brien's 
The Things They Carried, Philip Caputo's A Rumor of War, 
and Bobbie Ann Mason's In Country--as well as in the 
critical responses to this prose, two vital facts about 
the war have been overlooked. (1) Concentrating on the 
American experience, authors and critics have demonstrated 
an ignorance of and indifference toward the suffering of 
the Vietnamese; and (2) by focusing on the individual ex-
periences of veterans, these writers have failed to place 
the war within the framework of u.s. imperialism and glo-
bal capitalism. Despite critics' frequent assertions 
about its radical aesthetics and anti-war politics, the 
narrative prose of the Vietnam War has consistently ne-
glected both the commercial/geopolitical motivation behind 
and the dreadful consequences of the Vietnam War. 
Far from neutral, these omissions have occurred dur-
ing a time of right-wing political ascendancy and resur-
gent militarism (a period that has been witness to a con-
certed attempt to revoke the activist political legacy of 
the 1960s). Thus, American literary culture has not ef-
fectively challenged, and in many ways has reinforced, a 
conservative rewriting of the war, transforming a nearly 
genocidal war against the Vietnamese into an American 
tragedy. 
My aim in this dissertation is not only to demon-
strate the hegemonic workings of the dominant political 
culture within Vietnam War literature but to identify in a 
specific and detailed way some of the history that has 
been distorted and omitted from these texts. This disser-
tation, then, is as much an attempt to provide an alterna-
tive history of the Vietnam War as it is an examination of 
its literary representations. 
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In history, the man in the ruffled shirt and gold-laced 
waistcoat somehow levitates above the blood he has ordered 
spilled by dirty-handed underlings. 
--Frances Jennings 
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CHAPTER 1 
MANUFACTURING CANONS 
The function of criticism should have been, in our time, 
as in all times, to maintain and to demonstrate the spe-
cial, unique, and complete knowledge which great forms of 
literature afford us. 
--Allen Tate 
There is just no sense in pondering the function of lit-
erature without relating it to the actual society that 
uses it, to the centers of power within that society, and 
to the institutions that mediate between literature and 
people. 
--Richard Ohmannl 
Twenty years ago helicopters lifted off the roof of 
the u.s. embassy in Saigon, carrying with them the last 
American combat servicemen in Vietnam. Since then a gen-
eration has come of age without contemporaneous knowledge 
of the war. For this generation the war is understood 
through documentary footage, popular films and television 
shows, novels and personal memoirs and history texts. To 
the extent that a consensus understanding of the war ex-
ists, it has been shaped by the mass media. Literary rep-
resentations have been a minor (though not inconsequen-
tial) influence upon the shaping of American cultural 
memory of the war. Nonetheless, an examination of criti-
cally acclaimed Vietnam War narratives can serve several 
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purposes--it can identify something of the process by 
which contemporary literature achieves canonical status 
and, in showing the ideological constraints at work within 
this process, can suggest the manner in which ideological 
hegemony is reinforced by cultural artifacts. Considering 
that Vietnam War literature has appeared during an era of 
resurgent militarism and right-wing ascendancy and that it 
has developed simultaneously with the so-called culture 
wars (the struggle, between views like Tate's and Ohm-
ann's, over li·terary/cultural authority), such a critical 
examination can reveal the extent to which contemporary 
literature and revisionist literary culture have chal-
lenged prevailing views of American motive and policy in 
Vietnam. 
American Literary Culture 
When I began my undergraduate study of Amerlcan lit-
erature in the mid-1970s--at the same time that the U.S. 
was removing its last troops from Vietnam--there still ex-
isted a general agreement about the texts and the intel-
lectual currents that comprised ~~erican literature. This 
literature was understood through a rough narrative his-
tory that began with the Puritans, ran through Jonathan 
Edwards and Benjamin Franklin, continued with the tran-
scendentalists, realists, and naturalists, and concluded 
with the modernists--Frost, Stevens, Eliot, Pound, Fitz-
2 
gerald, Hemingway, and Faulkner. There were occasional 
courses covering works that did not fit this outline, but 
these were considered peripheral to an understanding of 
American literature and to the cultural literacy require-
ments of a general undergraduate education. 
The problem with this traditional canon, as has been 
frequently discussed in recent years, was that it en-
shrined not the best that had been written and thought, 
but those works best suited to examination by the dominant 
critical method--New Criticism. New Critics viewed their 
formalist methods as key to identifying and explicating 
great literature. When, for instance, David Daiches de-
clared he measured literary value by the "degree to which 
the work len[t] itself to [New Critical methods]" (303), 
he meant to suggest the inherent sympathy between formal-
ist literary criticism and literary value, not the spe-
cific and contingent nature of New Criticism. 
The problem with New Criticism was three-fold: 
first, its biases led to the creation of a literary canon 
that (in terms of race, class, and gender) was unrepresen-
tative; second, it denied canonicity to authors and texts 
that were overtly ideological since these did not fit for-
ma:List notions of literary value; and third, it down-
~layed the ideological content of those works that were 
granted canonical status. By concentrating on texts that 
fit their critical framework, New Critics often excluded 
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from serious consideration works that foregrounded social 
concerns. A text's ability to analyze, critique, and 
challenge social injustice and economic inequality, to de-
naturalize ideologically reaffirming myths, and to give 
voice to the powerless and the exploited was extraneous 
and non-literary. In the traditional American literary 
canon, genuinely radical or alternative discourse was un-
common. When such discourse was included, it was either 
misread or viewed (as in the cases of Thoreau and Mel-
ville) as idiosyncratic rather than as part of a radical 
literary and social tradition. The result of New Critical 
hegemony was "to denigrate the democratic content in Amer-
ican literature, to smother its traditional note of social 
protest," and, writes Alexander Karanikas, "to elevate in 
its stead new literary gods and canons more acceptable to 
the rightist tradition" (viii). 
This is not to suggest that American literary culture 
was uncritical of this nation's long history of intoler-
ance, exploitation, and violence. Criticism of these and 
other aspects of American life has been a dominant theme 
in American letters. But this critique has often over-
looked the systemic roots of social ills, collapsing into 
a celebration of individualism and American idealism. 
Given the nationalist mythos underlying the American lit-
erary canon, the cold war climate in which formalism 
flourished, and the cultural authority accorded New Crit-
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ics, it is not surprising that their critique was so cir-
cumscribed. After all, as Gerald Graff and Bruce Robbins 
ask, "how was culture ••• to be at once the essential 
expression of the national consensus and a profound cri-
tique of the national consensus?" (424). Truly, this cri-
tique has never been profound and has been little more 
than, in Nina Baym's words, a "consensus criticism of the 
consensus" ("Melodramas" 69). Barbara Herrnstein Smith 
likewise asserts the narrow range of critique within main-
stream literary culture: 
However much canonical works may be seen to "ques-
tion" secular vanities such as wealth, social posi-
·tion, and political power, "remind" their readers of 
more elevated values and virtues, and oblige them to 
"confront" such hard truths and harsh realities as 
their own mortality or the hidden griefs of obscure 
people, they would not be found to please long and 
well if they were seen to undercut establishment in-
terests radically or to subvert the ideologies that 
support them effectively. (51) 
The critique of American culture found in canonical lit-
erature has been uncritical of numerous ideological pre-
suppositions, has been made from within a framework of 
liberal capitalism and U.S. nationalism, and has itself 
regularly denied sanction to those works that make a more 
radical critique of establishment beliefs and practices.2 
Nonetheless, during the past several years the liter-
ary canon has been recognized as elitist and exclusionary, 
and much effort has been devoted to transforming it 
5 
through the incorporation of previously marginalized writ-
ers. Likewise, the themes and literary aesthetics of 
these writers and the traditions out of which they wrote 
have become familiar concerns for teachers and scholars. 
However welcome the broadening of the American literary 
canon may be, though, it does not represent the challenge 
to ideological hegemony alleged by its proponents and be-
moaned by its detractors. By "hegemony" I mean what Rich-
ard Ohmann (after Antonio Gramsci) describes as 
a whole way of life including culture and ideas far 
more subtle and effective than naked force • • • 
which effectively enlists almost everyone in the 
'party' of the ruling class, sets limits to debate 
and consciousness, and in general serves as a means 
of rule--that is, of preserving and reproducinq class 
structure. ( 8) 
Such hegemony is not seriously challenged by multicultur-
alism, since its proponents invoke familiar and ideologi-
cally reaffirming notions of liberal pluralism and u.s. 
nationalism.3 Thus for Henry Louis Gates multiculturalism 
"represents the very best hope for us, collectively, to 
forge a new, and vital, common American culture" (Loose 
xvii) Although the broadening of the canon and the ques-
tioning of canonicity itself represent long overdue chal-
lenges to an unrepresentative body of literature and a 
narrow concept of literary value, such radical-sounding 
projects have led to a more inclusive discussion of cul-
ture without examining how this more diverse culture sup-
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ports the prevailing American ideology of liberal plural-
ism. For all its ostensible radicalism, the social cri-
tique made by revisionist American literary studies fails 
to address the systemic causes of social injustice and 
economic exploitation and thus reproduces, albeit in the 
marginal realm of literary studies, an individualist (and 
sometimes essentialist) ethos and a nationalist ideology. 
Rather than a neutral means by which ideology is con-
veyed, American literary culture is itself an ideological 
structure. The two arms of literary culture--the publish-
ing industry and the education system--are embedded within 
the capitalist system and, although perceiving themselves 
to be open to multiple and competing viewpoints, actually 
function to perpetuate class inequality.4 Which is not to 
say that canonical literature has been valued for how 
closely it parrots capitalist/nationalist/liberal plural-
ist ideologies. On the contrary, texts that uncritically 
promote these beliefs often are considered crass and na-
ive. To be canonized a text instead must criticize the 
dominant culture. The apparent paradox here--that canoni-
cal literature is both an embodiment and a critique of the 
dominant culture--is central to liberal pluralist ideol-
ogy. The freedom and willingness to be self-critical, to 
challenge one's own convictions, is thought a hallmark of 
liberalism. This perception ignores the limited nature of 
liberalism's self-critique--its failure to examine under-
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lying presuppositions such as individualism, capitalism, 
and American exceptionalism. So while it is true that in 
order to be canonized literary works must be critical of 
the dominant culture (and it is for this reason that lit-
erary culture often is attacked by the right), this criti-
cism must be modest and ultimately ineffectual; it must 
not seriously challenge the basic beliefs upon which lib-
eral pluralism rests. 
In recognizing both this liberal hegemony and the in-
herent bias of the traditional canon, and in attempting to 
revise the canon, current scholars have sought to influ-
ence and perhaps refashion American culture itself. In-
spired by contemporary theory's recognition that truth and 
knowledge are contingent, are socially and linguistically 
constructed, these scholars have viewed culture in its 
many forms as relatively autonomous (as opposed to the de-
terminist base/superstructure model of classical Marxism), 
as a site of struggle for representation by various groups 
and subcultures. This "contemporary theoretical revolu-
tion" is grounded in, according to Stuart Hall, "the no-
tion that the arena or medium in which ideology functions 
is one of signification, representation, discursive prac-
tices" (qtd. in Berube, Public Access 142). Many contem-
porary literary and cultural scholars thus see a correla-
tion between the dominant culture's sanctioning of previ-
ously excluded literary works and traditions and its com-
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mitment to social justice. The underlying belief of canon 
revision seems to be that if the canon can be made to give 
voice to the broad variety of American culture, so may the 
society at large be refashioned. 
Seeking to revise American literary culture without 
attempting to overturn its economic configurations or its 
structures of power, revisionist literary studies does 
little more than put a representative gloss on an unrepre-
sentative and exploitative system. For the writers and 
texts included within the revised canon and the critical 
approaches sanctioned by the academic establishment have 
endorsed an identity politics and have seen resistance in 
terms of cultural or gender difference rather than ideo-
logical solidarity. The problem with this position, ac-
cording to Peter Osborne, 
is that it tends to reduce radical politics to the 
expression of oppressed subjectivities, and thereby 
to lead to the construction of moralistic, and often 
simply additive, 'hierarchies of oppression,' whereby 
the political significance attributed to the views of 
particular individuals is proportional to the sum of 
their oppressions. Such a tendency both positively 
encourages a fragmentation of political agency and 
harbours the danger of exacerbating conflicts between 
oppressed groups. It also makes group demands 
readily recuperable by the competitive interest-
group politics of a liberal pluralism (216-17). 
Also, the revision of literary studies, which views knowl-
edge as a discursive practice, equates the textual with 
the social and in so doing underestimates the practical 
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impediments to social cha.r.ge. And while multiculturalism 
may seem to defy the homogenizing effects of accultura-
tion, it has done so largely within the framework of the 
American literary canon and thus attempts to maintain cul-
tural integrity without systematically challenging--and 
often through supporting--the very force that has margin-
alized and exploited minority cultures: U.S. nationalism. 
However discrete and heterogenous, these marginalized 
texts, traditions, and cultures are set within an American 
context. The criticism of American culture made within 
these texts is reminiscent of the narrow and uncritical 
self-criticism of liberal pluralism. The ease with which 
these previously marginalized works have been embraced by 
the publishing industry5 and incorporated into school cur-
riculums suggests their modest critiques and reformist 
aims. 
That revisionist study and reconstruction of the 
American literary canon falls within the pa1:ameters of 
liberal pluralism is to be expected. Academic literary 
study, after all, is itself a bourgeois institution and 
part of a larger structure meant to reproduce existing 
social relations through the training of an educated 
class. For Richard Ohmann, 
bodies of knowledge and the people (professionals) 
who mediate them work through institutions designed 
to serve in part the self-interest of the practitio-
ners, and ••• these institutions and practices must 
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respond to the power and needs of dominant groups in 
the society at large. (5) 
Ultimately, to be sanctioned by the academic literary es-
tablishment, the canon must not offer a consistent and se-
rious challenge to the ruling ideology. 
In this chapter I will discuss the process by which a 
small number of novels are distilled from the vast body of 
contemporary fiction and granted pre-canonical status. 
And I will show how this process functions systematically 
to exclude or obfuscate counter-hegemonic discourse. In 
so doing, I am building upon a concern that has recently 
gained currency in literary and cultural theory. As Jane 
Tompkins argues, 
The recognition that literary texts are man-made, 
historically produced objects • • . suggests a need 
to study the interests, institutional practices, and 
social arrangements that sustain the canon of classic 
works. (37) 
While literary critics have examined the construction of 
the traditional canon, Tompkins for instance focusing on 
the development of Hawthorne's reputation, there has been 
little discussion of how contemporary literary reputations 
are developed and contemporary novels canonized. The most 
complete examinations of the process by which contemporary 
fiction is accorded cultural sanction are Richard Ohmann's 
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"The Shaping of a Canon, 1960-75" in Politics of Letters 
and Michael Berube's Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers.6 
Ohmann lays out the process that determines the 
critical fate of contemporary novels. To reach pre-ca-
nonical status a novel must be selected by an agent and an 
editor, promoted by a publishing house's publicity depart-
ment, chosen by a review editor (especially the one at the 
Sunday New York Times Book Review), read by New York met-
ropolitan book buyers (whose patronage is necessary to 
commercial success), written about by critics at gate-
keeper intellectual journals,? analyzed by academic crit-
ics and taught by college teachers. This model, of 
course, is neither a permanent nor an all encompassing de-
scription of how novels become pre-canonical. The vagar-
ies of the market (the fate of the Times Book Review, the 
increasing marginalization of literature, the development 
of new technologies, etc.) can change the specifics of 
Ohmann's model; likewise, literary reputations can de-
velop outside of this scheme.8 Nonetheless, Ohmann's out-
line remains an accurate model of how in general contempo-
rary novels are granted cultural sanction. 
In Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers Berube examines 
the critical neglect of Melvin Tolson and the critical 
fascination with Thomas Pynchon and in so doing discusses 
the process by which contemporary literary reputations are 
developed. Like Ohmann, Berube suggests this process be-
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gins when texts are printed and thus are "'given' an au-
thor who remains current (and who remains an item of cur-
rency, in the temporal and economic senses)" (59). This 
process continues with a small number of books that are 
assigned an aesthetic function--i.e., are authorized to be 
read as literature. These works are further reduced to 
those few granted pre-canonical status. And it is from 
this latter that the literary canon is culled. Although 
he draws extensively upon Ohmann's work, Berube differs 
from Ohmann in stressing the increasing importance of aca-
demics in the development of literary reputation and can-
on-building. For Berube "the academic activities of the 
past fifteen years positively require modification of Oh-
mann's thesis" (31) because of the creation of newly pre-
canonical works that were not discussed in influential 
journals and because of a "newly formed competition be-
tween academic and non-academic critics for the right to 
represent contemporary and noncanonical authors." Berube 
also suggests that this competition "is perhaps one reason 
for the vehemence of recent journalistic attacks on the 
profession of literature" (32). I agree with Berube that 
the importance of academic critics has increased within 
the admittedly marginal realm of literary culture. In 
this dissertation I will examine the role critics have 
played in the development of a canon of Vietnam War fic-
tion. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I will 
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look more closely at how the process identified by Ohmann 
and Berube encourages a literature that coheres with the 
dominant ideology. 
The Propaganda Model 
Although they present convincing accounts of how con-
temporary novels are culturally sanctioned and although 
they suggest the biases and sympathies inherent in this 
sanctioning process, neither Ohmann nor Berube explains 
how this fragmented and unstable process promotes a lit-
erature that is broadly sympathetic to the interests of 
capital. They do not identify the specific mechanisms 
that constrain and marginalize oppositional discourse 
within contemporary literature. Analysis of how the domi-
nant ideology is systematically reproduced in a society 
that seemingly encourages open debate is explained most 
cogently in Manufacturing Consent, Edward s. Herman and 
Noam Chomsky's examination of the mass media. To Herman 
and Chomsky the media function as a propaganda system that 
"inculcate[s] individuals with the values, beliefs, and 
codes of behavior that will integrate them into the insti-
tutional structures of the larger society" (1). Informa-
tion conveyed by the media is effectively censored because 
it must pass through a set of news filters: (A) the size, 
concentrated ownership, and profit orientation of mass 
media firms; (B) advertising as primary income source; 
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(C) reliance upon information provided and "experts" 
funded by government and business; (D) "flak" used to 
discipline the media; and (E) anticommunism. Since the 
academic literary establishment functions within the same 
social strata as the mainstream media and since much of 
the process that shapes literary reputation--especially 
contemporary fiction--occurs within the mass media and is 
thus subject to similar institutional beliefs and stric-
tures, Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model can help ex-
plain how the contemporary literary canon is constructed. 
(A) Size, ownership, and profitability. This model 
does not precisely describe the process by which literary 
reputation develops. For one thing, unlike the mass me-
dia, whose success is determined by audience size and 
profit margin, an author's critical reputation does not 
rest on immediate or large-scale commercial prosperity. 
In fact, broad popularity may hinder as much as promote an 
author's scholarly acclaim.9 The elite nature of literary 
studies and its privileging of refined categories of aes-
thetic judgment and esoteric theories of critical evalua-
tion have often precluded from serious consideration works 
of mass appeal. For example, in attempting to achieve a 
critical distance from the crassness and ugliness they 
found in the burgeoning consumer culture of the early 20th 
century, literary modernists, who themselves were, accord-
ing to Marcus Klein, a "dispossessed social aristocracy" 
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[qtd. in Berube, Marginal Forces 311]), endorsed a defa-
miliarizing aesthetic that often made their literature ac-
cessible only to an intellectual elite. For the educated 
middle class who felt similarly alienated from the commer-
cial vulgarism of contemporary culture, it was this very 
marginality--its ironic distance and its sensitive evoca-
tions of alienation--that made literature vital. "In its 
ability to redescribe displacement from centrality as a 
revolutionary form of freedom and potency," writes Gerald 
Graff, "advanced culture furnishe[d] a model by which so-
cial powerlessness [could] be experienced as gratifica-
tion" ( 92). 
Marginalization, then, can be an effective strategy 
for canonization within literary culture. By marginaliz-
ing themselves, the modernists appeared free of commercial 
taint, free therefore to explore their independent vi-
sions, free as well to offer unsparing critiques of mass 
culture. Although the literature now championed by multi-
culturalists was not self-marginalized, scholarly rhetoric 
often focuses on the insights this literature gains from 
its outsider status. As Berube asserts, "to claim to 
speak from the margin is paradoxically to claim to speak 
from the position of authority, and to describe a margin 
is to describe an authoritative challenge to hegemony" 
(16-17). 
Yet for all of the anti-elitist rhetoric of multi-
culturalism, the examination of marginalized literature 
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requires that texts be published, distributed, and evalu-
ated. The manner in which contemporary novels are deemed 
worthy of serious attention, then, systematically rein-
forces the underlying and often unacknowledged presupposi-
tions of liberal pluralism. This systematic reinforcement 
is accomplished because contemporary novels almost without 
exception must pass through a process that involves being 
published and achieving some prominence--usually through 
being published by a major firm (thus being reviewed in 
mainstream journals and newspapers) and through act.ieving 
sales consistent enough to r•3main in print. The stric-
tures inherent in the size, ownership, and profitability 
of publishing firms, therefore, affect the construction of 
a literary canon. "It is painfully apparent today," 
writes Michael Norman, "that technology, demographics and 
particularly the interest in increasing dividends and 
profits seen in the last two decades have had a profound 
impact on American literature" (22). 
Like so much else in American commerce, the publish-
ing industry has been increasingly corporatized and has 
seen a greater concentration of ownership.lO A 1981 re-
port in Forbes declared, "it's hard to find an industry 
that has been picked cleaner by the conglomerates than 
book publishing" (qtd. in Coser 37~-73). Although defend-
ers of the current state of publishing claim 25,000 pub-
lishers in the u.s., a more realistic figure, according to 
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Ben Bagdikian, "is closer to 2,500 if one counts only 
American firms that regularly issue one book or more in 
any one year" (19). Bagdikian goes on to explain that 
more than half of the book business is held by six firms11 
and that if these six were equal in strength they would 
each have revenues of more than $500 million while the re-
maining 2,494 firms, if equal in strength, would have less 
than $3.5 million apiece. This discrepancy in wealth 
leads to numerous advantages for the larger firms, includ-
ing, according to Bagdikian, 
credit from big banks for expansion and acquisitions, 
bidding for manuscripts, negotiating and paying for 
shelf space and window displays in bookstores which 
increasingly are owned by national chains, mounting 
national sales staffs, buying advertising, and ar-
ranging for author interviews in the broadcast media. 
(19) 
This concentrated ownership and market dominance and this 
decrease in independent publishing houses (by 1981, ac-
cording to Thomas Whiteside, of the major independent 
hardcover book publishers, only w. w. Norton; Farrar, 
Strauss & Giroux; Houghton Mifflin; and Crown were not 
corporate-owned) make the marginalization of dissenting 
views in general, not to mention anti-capitalist and anti-
nationalist views, more likely. 
Such marginalization occurs not through overt censor-
ship but through the inevitable institutional sympathy be-
18 
tween publishing houses and their corporate owners. As 
Bagdikian argues, 
In any field, whether the media or detergents, when 
most of the business is dominated by a few firms and 
the remainder of the field is left to a scattering of 
dozens or hundreds of smaller firms, it is the few 
dominant ones who control that market. With deter-
gents it means higher prices and lowered choice. 
With the media it means the same thing for public 
news, information, ideas and popular culture. 
(19-20) 
Said an anonymous publishing company employee in 1994, 
"all the jobs seem to be residing in three companies, and 
even that is so uncertain now." This source was unnamed, 
according to the New York Times, because employees "were 
forbidden to speak disparagingly of the company in public, 
or they would forfeit their severance packages" (Lyall). 
In such a climate editors will be even more circumspect 
about what they publish and will be more aware of the 
risks they run when publishing books critical of the lib-
eral pluralist consensus. 
For-profit publishing firms do not seek books that 
critique the dominant culture; rather, they seek to make 
profits and so attempt to anticipate and reflect public 
sentiment. Commercialism itself, then, is a significant 
filter, marginalizing and excluding books that are thought 
not sufficiently reflective of popular interests. For in-
stance, Carole Gallagher speaks of the difficulty she had 
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in finding a publisher for American Ground Zero: The Se-
cret Nuclear War, an examination of the effects of nuclear 
testing upon soldiers, test site workers, and the popula-
tion living downwind from nuclear tests in six western 
states. Gallagher says, with only slight hyperbole, "I 
went to every publisher in the Western world and they 
turned my book down because, until MIT Press [a non-com-
mercia! publisher], they said it was a bummer, too expen-
sive, or just too depressing" (qtd. in Hennelly 60). We 
can only speculate about the many books that meet with 
such resistance and that are either not published at all 
or published by obscure presses--and thus effectively si-
lenced. As Jason Epstein, former Random House vice-presi-
dent and founder of the New York Review of Books, asserts, 
"there is finally a point beyond which a publisher cannot 
go against the tide. Eventually he risks drowning" (qtd. 
in Kostelanetz 68). Due to their devotion to the bottom-
line, corporate-owned publishing houses are even more 
likely to respond to mainstream opinion. Such opinion is 
not static; at times, particularly in the early 1930s and 
late 1960s, the public zeitgeist shifted leftward, and the 
publishing industry reflected this shift. As Chris Faatz 
notes, 
During the sixties and seventies, corporate publish-
ing was rife with books on the New Left, the civil 
rights struggles of African-Americans and other 
peoples of color and the rise of the women's move-
ment. (915) 
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These historical moments were short-lived, however, and 
were followed by long periods of attack, revision, and re-
crimination. Because the publishing industry is dominated 
by media conglomerates, and because there exists an inevi-
table sympathy between a publishing firm and its products, 
we are unlikely to see a renewed interest in leftist dis-
course on any significant scale within the publishing in-
dustry. Additionally, if in their attempts to reap prof-
its publishers strive to reflect popular sentiment, books 
that question popular sentiment, books that make unfamil-
iar and challeng1ng critiques of the status quo (as left-
ist books do almost by definition), will be judged unprof-
itable, will have difficulty getting published, and if 
published will be unlikely to receive widespread distribu-
tion. 
I am not suggesting large firms will not publish 
leftist books, merely that such books will be published 
infrequently. Nor am I suggesting a conspiracy to shape 
public discourse. I am sure that most book editors would 
assert they had never been told what they could or could 
not publish. Thus Richard Snyder, president of Simon & 
Schuster declared, 
I know what the truth is, whether I'm owned by Gulf & 
Western or not. I know that not one book we've put 
out has been tampered with as far as the content of 
the book is concerned. I know that we are totally 
independent. (qtd. in Whiteside 121) 
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Snyder's assertion of total independence would seem to be 
questioned, however, by Simon & Schuster's cancellation of 
Corporate Murder, in which author Mark Dowie examined cor-
porate decision-making generally, notably Ford's design of 
the Pinto, with its notoriously dangerous gas tank. Ac-
cording to Bagdikian, although senior editor Nan Talese 
and her staff supported the book, 
neither the title nor the book was acceptable. Ta-
lese reported • • • that the president of Simon & 
Schuster, Richard Snyder, was vehemently opposed to 
the manuscript because, among other reasons, he felt 
it made all corporations look bad. (30) 
Bagdikian does not suggest that direct pressure was ap-
plied by Gulf & Western; instead, he argues that corpo-
rate influence occurs "without any pressure, it is natural 
and inevitable that important people in a media subsidiary 
will be conscious of who their owners are" (qtd. in Wiener 
750).12 
This understanding of the ideological limits of main-
stream publishing firms is not speculation. There have 
been instances in which books were refused publication for 
strictly ideological reasons. Such was the case with 
Counter-Revolutionary Violence, a critique of U.S. foreign 
policy by Herman and Chomsky that was to be published in 
1973 by Warner Modular, Inc., a subsidiary of Warner Com-
munications. According to Warner Modular publisher Claude 
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McCaleb, after William Sarnoff, president of Warner Pub-
lishing, read an advance copy, he 
immediately launched into a violent verbal attack • . 
• saying, among other things, that [Counter-Revolu-
tionary Violence] was a pack of lies, a scurrilous 
attack on respected Americans, undocumented, a publi-
cation unworthy of a serious publisher ••.• He then 
announced that he had ordered the printer not to re-
lease a single copy • • • and that the • • • [book] 
would not be published. (qtd. in Bagdikian 33-34) 
Sarnoff had the ads for this book cancelled and the Warner 
catalog listing the Herman/Chomsky book and the entire 
10,000 copy press run destroyed. Similarly, in 1979 Mc-
Graw-Hill published Countercoup: The Struggle for the 
Control of Iran, an account of the overthrow of Iranian 
premier Mohammed Mossadegh written by former CIA officer 
Kermit Roosevelt. Roosevelt asserted that the coup had 
been undertaken at the behest of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Coiitpany. Upon complaints from British Petroleum, succes-
sor to AIOC, McGraw-Hill recalled the book from all stores 
and reviewers (Bagdikian 39). Another example of corpo-
rate pressure affecting a book's publication is Marc El-
liot's Walt Disney: Hollywood's Dark Prince, signed by 
Bantam in 1989 and dropped in 1991. (It was eventually 
published by Birch Lane Press/Carol Publishing.) Jon Wie-
ner speculates that Eliot's book was killed because Bantam 
had contracted with Disney to publish children's book ver-
sions of Disney movies (744).13 
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One should not be surprised by the rarity of such in-
stances of overt censorship. There are many steps a manu-
script must follow, each one of which may prevent its 
eventual publication. Many if not most radical books will 
have been eliminated from consideration by a major pub-
lishing house long before contracts are agreed to or manu-
scripts edited. Also, it takes only a few such prominent 
incidents to reveal the bounds of acceptable public dis-
course. The persistent affirmation of the dominant ideol-
ogy by the mainstream publishing industry is due not to 
commands issued by media moguls or cultural commissars but 
to the editors and officers of publishing houses having 
internalized the values of the corporations for which they 
work. As for the absence of works of fiction from the 
above discussion, I suspect fiction is thought less seri-
ous and therefore less in need of such drastic interven-
tion. Part of the reason fiction may be perceived as less 
serious is that literary tradition and prevailing critical 
orthodoxies have pro1aoted a model of fiction that privi-
leges the individual imagination and denigrates as polemi-
cal fiction that identifies specific social ills and that 
encourages social activism. This model has engendered a 
form of self-censorship--authors shaping their writings, 
consciously or unconsciously, to fit what they perceive 
are the ideological parameters of mainstream publishing. 
As Russell A. Berman writes, 
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no matter how literary production and consumption may 
be reciprocally determined, the nature of production 
has its own definite consequences: authors who un-
derstand themselves as employees dependent on pub-
lishing houses with precise marketing strategies will 
choose to write in certain ways. (56) 
And these certain ways will not seriously challenge the 
liberal pluralist ideology endorsed by the publishing in-
dustry. 
Another way that the concentrated ownership and 
narrow ideology of large publishing firms influence the 
critical reception of contemporary novels is through the 
New York Times Book Review, which remains the most impor-
tant determinant of a book's commercial fate--especially 
the fate of books with serious literary pretensions. Its 
influence is clearly recognized by the publishing indus-
try: more than half the advertising budgets of the main 
publishing houses are spent for space in the NYTBR. Ac-
cording to Ohmann, 
The New York Times Book Review had about a million 
and a half readers, several times the audience of any 
other literary periodical. Among them were most 
bookstore managers, deciding what to stock, and li-
brarians, deciding what to buy, not to mention the 
well-to-do, well-educated east-coasters who led in 
establishing hardback best-sellers. The single most 
important boost a novel could get was a prominent 
review in the Sunday New York Times. (Politics 71-72) 
Although there is not a direct connection between favor-
able reception in the NYTBR and a book's lasting critical 
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reputation, the public and critical prominence that is 
gained from such reception is an important initial step in 
defining what in contemporary literature is worth serious 
scholarly attention--according to Julie Hoover and Charles 
Kadushin, 75% of elite intellectuals read the NYTBR (Ohm-
ann, Politics 74). If agents, editors, and publishers are 
the obstacles a book must negotiate in order to be pub-
lished, the NYTBR is the most significant early test of a 
book's critical worth, of its potential to reach pre-can-
onical status. Praise from the NYTBR is not a prerequi-
site for critical respect, considering other newspapers 
and journals and academic critics help determine a book's 
reputation. It is not praise so much as it is recognition 
by the NYTBR that contributes both to a book's sales and 
to its being considered worthy of review by others. The 
recognition a book gains from a review in the NYTBR also 
helps its subsequent publication as a paperback. Since 
hardcover fiction quickly goes out of print, a work must 
be printed in paperback in order to be available for crit-
ical evaluation and possible canonization. According to 
Ohmann, "the single most important boost a novel could get 
was a prominent review in the Sunday New York Times--bet-
ter a favorable one than an unfavorable one, but better an 
unfavorable one than none at all" (Politics 72). 
As a kind of cultural clearing house, then, the NYTBR 
serves an important function. Its role is to sort through 
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the approximately 45,000 books published yearly in the 
u.s., 4,000 of which are works of fiction (Norman 22), and 
to identify those worthy of serious attention. Such a 
comprehensive evaluation, though, is impossible. What the 
NYTBR actually does, therefore, is concentrate on books 
from major publishing houses. In so doing, the NYTBR nat-
uralizes the values of the mainstream publishing culture; 
in other words, the NYTBR reaffirms and gives cultural 
sanction to the world-view of the professional-managerial 
class that dominates American book-publishing. Because 
books published by the larger houses are more likely to 
fall within the dominant ideological frame and because the 
NYTBR concentrates on books from these larger firms, the 
process by which contemporary novels are granted cultural 
sanction is ideologically constrained and reproduces a 
broadly consensual politics that does not seriously or 
consistently question capitalism and U.S. nationalism. 
(B) Advertising. Unlike the news media, book pub-
lishers do not depend upon advertising revenue. Nonethe-
less, advertising can directly affect the kinds of books 
that are published and the manner in which they are re-
ceived. For although book publishers may not depend upon 
advertising revenue, related companies within media con-
glomerates do. Thus when Prentice-Hall arranged to have 
Gerard Colby Zelig's Du Pont: Behind the Nylon Curtain 
made a selection of the Fortune Book Club (which belonged 
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to Time, Inc. and "YThich was administered by the Book-of-
the-Month-Club), DuPont complained to Time, the Fortune 
Book Club cancelled its contract, and Prentice-Hall 
stopped promoting Zelig's book. According to Richard H. 
Rea, a representative of DuPont, Prentice-Hall general 
counsel William Daly revealed that the Book-of-the-Month 
Club 
had notified Prentice-Hall that, after further pres-
sure from Du Pont, they were cancelling their agree-
ment. Daly said the pressure consisted of threats of 
litigation and cancellation of all of Du Pont adver-
tising in Time, Life and Fortune. (qtd. in Bagdikian 
~{)l .. -.J, 
Similarly, in 1968 Reader's Digest Association was pre-
pared to publish a book critical of the advertising indus-
try--The Permissible Lie--through its subsidiary Funk & 
Wagna1ls. Reader's Digest Association cancelled this 
book, according to Bagdikian, because "the association 
presumably felt threatened by loss of advertising from its 
magazine if its book subsidiary offended the advertising 
industry" (163). 
But incidents such as these are infrequent. For a 
more telling instance of advertising's effect upon pub-
lishing, we need again to examine the New York Times Book 
Review. The sympathy between reviewers and editors at the 
NYTBR and the mainstream publishing industry, as I have 
already suggested, is due to their shared class and cul-
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tural backgrounds, but it is due as well to the Book Re-
view's dependence on advertising revenue. A 1968 study 
concluded that there was almost a direct correlation be-
tween the amount a publisher advertised and the review 
space accorded its books by the NYTBR.14 Advertising, 
then, affects what will and will not be reviewed in the 
New York Times (and most lik~ly in other newspapers as 
well). Newspaper reviews, especially the NYTBR, establish 
a book's initial reception and thereby help determine its 
sales (thus keeping it in print) and help develop its 
critical reputation. That a book's being reviewed depends 
in part on advertising, therefore, is one more instance in 
which the size and wealth of publishing firms and the dom-
inance of a market economy influence the shaping of the 
literary canon. 
(C) ExEerts. The creation of a canon and the devel-
opment of literary reputations depend upon two sets of ex-
perts: those who construct and market books (agents,l5 
editors, and marketing staff) and those who evaluate books 
(reviewers, critics, and academics.) I have already dis-
cussed many of the ideological constraints imposed upon 
and by this first group. Reviewers, critics, and academ-
ics--who define the formal characteristics that determine 
literary merit, explicate such features, and place liter-
ary works within various genres, conventions, and tradi-
tions--likewise may function as an ideological barrier. 
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By privileging image patterns and repetition, experts can 
downplay a text's social dynamics; by showing how these 
formal devices encourage multiple and often contradictory 
meanings, experts can suggest the naivete of political 
formulas and the richness and complexity of the individual 
imagination; and by focusing on a few, exclusive tradi-
tions, experts can marginalize counter-traditions and 
their potentially alternative ideologies. Reviewers and 
critics, then, can hinder a book's political import by 
downplaying its social commentary and praising its formal 
qualities or by forthrightly criticizing its ideology. To 
demonstrate how reviewers function as an ideological fil-
ter, I will discuss the critical reception of two recent 
novels: Richard Powers's The Gold Bug Variations and Op-
eration Wandering Soul. 
The Gold Bug Variations was accorded ample praise by 
the literary-critical establishment; it was a finalist 
for the National Book Critics' Circle Award and v;as chosen 
book-of-the-year by Time. The praise given GBV was di-
rected almost exclusively at its intellectual breadth and 
linguistic and structural inventiveness, with virtually no 
discussion of the book's social critique. USA Today de-
clared GBV "both a homage to high art and an intricate 
mystery," Kirkus Reviews spoke of "the mysteries of love 
and the passionate pursuit of knowledge," while for the 
New York Times it "carries us on a cerebral quest for a 
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philosophical heffalump" (Jones 9). Yet in GBV Powers 
forthrightly demonstrates how market-determined social re-
lations thwart community. The novel's central characters 
are alienated from the culture at large, their social con-
tact consisting of little more than "checkout clerks, the 
muffled sadism from upstairs and a host of cheerful, lim-
ited-time phone offers" (228). They must ignore the "fif-
teen million adjacent catastrophes," must "consign entire 
boroughs to misery beyond addressing," and must stE.'P "gin-
gerly over a baseball-batted body at the top of the subway 
stairs" (291). The novel's central metaphor, which re-
volves around the similarities between Bach's Goldberg 
Variations and the genetic code, is meant to make us aware 
of the interdependence of life--a vital concern at a time 
when "the whole community is about to go under, pulled in 
by our error. Why," Powers asks, "do we want to revoke 
the contract, scatter it like a nuisance cobweb, simplify 
it with asphalt?" (325). In GBV Powers attempts to pro-
vide us with a vision of the world that is grounded in bi-
ology and genetics, one that may help us overcome apathy 
and ignorance and lead us to revere natural creation. It 
is his hope that "anyone who once adds up the living 
number must act ecologically, commensually forever" (326). 
While its politics can be criticized for being oblique and 
too focused on individual action, GBV does make a sus-
tained argument for social change. Critical praise for 
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GBV, however, has focused on its structural and linguistic 
inventiveness and has paid scant attention to its politi-
cal urgency. Such formalist priorities are commonplace in 
the assessing of literary merit, particularly within the 
culture of book-reviewing. By endorsing a formalist meth-
od of literary evaluation and by downplaying the political 
merit of literary texts, reviewers and critics promote 
fiction that emphasizes the figurative over the social and 
thus further diminish whatever small potential literature 
may have to effect social change. 
Operation Wandering Soul, although a finalist for the 
National Book Award, received far more mixed reviews than 
did The Gold Bug Variations. While some of this criticism 
stemmed from this book's failings, as well as its daunting 
complexity, some also stemmed from Powers's more overt so-
cial critique. For OWS is an indictmen~ of the harmful 
effects of consumer culture, particularly upon a group of 
children at a charity hospital in contemporary Los Ange-
les, of the lethal consequences of U.S. imperialism in 
southeast Asia, and of the brutal treatment of children 
throughout history. As an example of Powers's often frank 
social critique, here is his description of Bangkok: 
a skylined, sprawling, runaway, AIDS-infested needle 
nest. It had become a child-peddling shambles. Some 
hundred thousand juvenile whores of both sexes made a 
living in the place, the murder capital of the exotic 
East, the Golden Triangle's peddler, catamite to the 
slickest of tourist classes, gutted by CarniCruze 
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junkets and semiconductor sweat shops, glistening in 
fat postcolonialism, clear-cutting its irreplaceable 
upcountry forest to support its habit. (309) 
OWS has many similar passages that brutally and specifi-
cally critique the suffering wrought by capitalism. To 
repudiate this critique, Bruce Bawer in the Washington 
Post asserts that 
Powers divides people too neatly into good and bad, 
and does so along crude, politically correct lines, 
aligning himself throughout with . • • the received 
ideas of today's academic establishment. 
For Lee Lescaze in the Wall Street Journal, 
Mr. Powers decries the brutalization of children by 
man and disease. That is not a case that needs 
much arguing. It is hard to think of another novel 
in which such a sophisticated presentation wraps 
such a simple core. 
Lescaze also declares an "added--and cliched--burden" the 
notion that the central character's father "\vas a govern-
ment agent who wrought evil in Indochina and elsewhere on 
behalf of the U.S." 
According to these critics, then, to demonstrate the 
effects of social injustice in contemporary America is 
crude, to decry the brutalization of children is simplis-
tic, and to reveal the global terror brought about by U.S. 
foreign policy is cliched. Note that the ideological ob-
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jections raised by Bawer and Lescaze are presented in the 
guise of aesthetic judgment. Thus it is not Powers's cri-
tique of capitalism that Bawers objects to but the fact 
that this critique is too simplistic; it is not rich and 
complex and ambiguous as is, say, New Criticism or liberal 
pluralism. For Lescaze the brutalization of children is 
hardly worth discussing because it too is simple and unso-
phisticated. Likewise, Lescaze objects to Powers's criti-
cism of U.S. militarism not because of ideological differ-
ences but because this criticism is cliched. In the guise 
of aesthetic evaluation, Bawer and Lescaze make what are 
essentially political arguments that mean to discredit OWS 
and to discourage further production of such social criti-
cism. 
An emphasis on figuration by literary "experts" can 
also cause the texts of writers outside the dominant lit-
erary tradition to be further marginalized. Texts with an 
unfamiliar aesthetic may easily go unappreciated. Simi-
larly, whereas canonical literature is valued for its 
allusive and intertextual richness, a text from outside 
the white, male tradition--whose author may consciously 
wish not to associate him/herself with a literary tradi-
tion linked to social oppression and injustice--may be 
read as simple and transparent, its figurations remaining 
unrecognized because untraditional. Much recent criti-
cism, therefore, has been devoted to identifying alterna-
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tive literary aesthetics and traditions.16 These revi-
sionist critics share Rabinowitz's sentiment that we need 
to teach ourselves to read in new ways (not simply in 
~new way), ways that are self-conscious about how 
interpretation itself can be ideological, and ways 
that can thus help us to make the most of the rich 
literary heritage that has been passed down to us. 
(230) 
Dominated by a politics of identity, however, this revi-
sionism frequently recapitulates many of the problems of 
liberal pluralism. It diminishes the significance of 
class, since, as John Guillory writes, "class cannot be 
constructed as a social identity in the same way as race 
or gender because it is not, in the current affirmative 
sense, a 'social identity' at all" (13). It accepts the 
notion that group demands can be resolved by the interest-
group politics of liberal pluralism. And it alleges as 
primary and efficacious the politics of representation. 
Thus when evaluating literary texts, these experts, be 
they traditional or revisionary, often help sanction the 
view that although there may be a gap between democratic 
rhetoric and reality, this gap can be closed and the cur-
rent political structure revised to approximate America's 
egalitarian ideals. 
(D) Flak. Even the modest revisions that have been 
made within literary studies have generated flak from pol-
iticians, pundits, and journalists. A concern as trivial 
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as the make-up of the literary canon has in fact received 
considerable media attention, spurred on by conservatives 
like Alan Bloom and Dinesh D'Souza. Following their lead, 
William A. Henry, III in Time described universities as an 
upside-down world and asked us to "imagine a literature 
class that equates Shakespeare and the novelist Alice 
Walker" (66); Henry bemoaned the fact that "Western cul-
tural and social values [are] so out of favor in the 
classroom when so much of the rest of the world has moved 
••• to embrace them" (68). Newsweek ridiculed the no-
tion that the literary "canon perpetuates the power of 
'dead white males' over women and blacks from beyond the 
grave" (54) • For the New Republic, 
the "multiculturalist" criticism of the canon fails 
to grasp • • • that the canon is itself a cacoph-
ony, that it teaches not certainty but doubt, that 
it presents not a single Western doctrine about the 
true or the good or the beautiful, but an interne-
cine Western war between different accounts of 
those values, which will rattle the student more 
than it will reassure her. (6) 
To Fred Siegel, also in the New Republic, 
perhaps the most enabling fiction of multiculturalism 
is that there has been a single core curriculum com-
posed of the canonical texts of Western civilization 
that is widely forced, with great harm to minorities, 
upon students across the country. (36) 
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And Robert Hughes in Time derided multiculturalists' per-
ception of the canon as "that oppressive Big Bertha whose 
muzzle is trained over the battlements of Western Civ at 
the black, the gay and the female" ( 4 7). 
In a culture with increasing illiteracy, with little 
concern for literature and literary studies, with a per-
sistent under-funding of education, and with a widening 
gap between rich and poor, such media concern for the tra-
ditional literary canon is best understood as part of the 
broader public debate over "political correctness." The 
P.C. scare of 1991-92--with cover stories in Time, News-
week, the New Republic, New York, and the Atlantic; with 
stories on the nightly news and five consecutive nights of 
discussion on the "MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour"; with criti-
cism from N.E.H. chair Lynne Cheney, Secretary of Educa-
tion William Bennet, and President George Bush--functioned 
as flak, negative commentary encouraged and promoted by 
powerful individuals and institutions. The great P.C. 
scare, as conveyed by the media, served (and continues to 
serve) as a means of disciplining universities--and the 
humanities specifically--for making too public, too con-
sistent, and too radical a critique of status quo liberal 
capitalism, and for potentially hindering the e~ucated 
(i.e., professional-managerial) class's internalization of 
the dominant ideology.17 
(E) Anticommunism. Since anticommunism has been a 
consistent feature of American political rhetoric and a 
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means of disabling even vaguely leftist discourse, its use 
in the shaping of the literary culture should be no sur-
prise. Anticommunism has been used (1) to discipline the 
academy generally, (2) to critique individual texts, and 
(3) to shape and promote dominant critical methodologies. 
1. The academy has been a particular target of anti-
communism.18 In recent years this attack, although por-
trayed as a defense against the threat of "political cor-
rectness," has appropriated the totalitarianism-invoking 
rhetoric of anticommunism. Newsweek identified P.C. as "a 
totalitarian philosophy" that "one defie[d] • • • at one's 
peril" (Adler 51, 50); John Taylor in a notorious anti-
P.C. article in New York cited Hannah Arendt's The Origins 
of Totalitarianism and approvingly quoted Camille Paglia: 
"'It's fascism of the left •.•• These people behave like 
the Hitler Youth'" (35); George Will fantasized about an 
"academic constabulary" patrolling "campuses, pouncing on 
speech, films, teaching material, even parties that devi-
ate from approved ideology"; and an editorial in the Chi-
cago Tribune accused the professoriate of "crime against 
humanity" (qtd. in Berube, "Public Image" 31). Taylor's 
article in New York featured a photograph of Red Guards 
parading their dunces and Hitler Youth burning books (33). 
And Taylor quoted history professor Alan Kors: "In cer-
tain respects, the University of Pennsylvania has become 
like the University of Peking" (35). Similarly, Charles 
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Krauthammer saw university-sponsored sessions in racial 
sensitivity as a "middle-class take on Chinese reeducation 
camp[s)." Attacks such as these were designed to make 
left academics more circumspect about the content and 
methods of their instruction. Because the academy plays 
an important role in determining literary reputation, 
these attacks have the potential to limit examinations of 
leftist literature, as well as the implementation of left-
ist literary and social analysis. 
2. Since books that espouse a radical politics are 
not frequently reviewed by mainstream reviewers, and since 
there are more subtle ways to attack a book's leftist 
politics, anticommunism is not often employed by main-
stream book reviewers. Still, book reviewers in large 
circulation magazines and newspapers are likely to share, 
in broad outline, the ideology of the periodicals for 
which they write, and these periodicals are likely to fit 
within the spectrum of acceptable public discourse (a 
spectrum that excludes practical consideration of commu-
nism). For an example of how public scholarship reflects 
the prevailing ideology, consider the case of China schol-
arship in the 1950s. In response to the fall of China and 
the subsequent McCarthy backlash, there was, according to 
Peter Steinfels, 
a nearly complete change in the scholars reviewing 
China studies for the New York Times and the New York 
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Herald Tribune. At these two papers, the group who 
had done over 80 percent of the reviewing in this 
field between 1945 and 1950 reviewed not a single 
book after 1952. (6-7) 
A similar change occurred in the New York Review of Books. 
After a flirtation with left radicalism during the 60s, 
publishing essays by the likes of Noam Chomsky and Stokley 
Carmichael (and being red-baited for doing so),19 theRe-
view moved steadily to the right, until by the 1990s it 
could take a lead role in proclaiming the onslaught of 
P.C. 
Although anticommunism is not often used by book re-
viewers, it does sometimes still show its cold war face, 
particularly when a work threatens to expose in convincing 
fashion the falsity of some of the bedrock beliefs of lib-
eral culture. For example, in his review of Manufacturing 
Consent in the New Republic, Nicholas Lemann, a liberal 
writing in an establishment journal, used the familiar 
tropes and conceits of anticommunism. According to Le-
mann, Herman and Chomsky argue that "the big-time press 
knowingly prints falsehoods and suppresses inconvenient 
truths, the better to maintain the party line." Lemman 
also suggests that for Herman and Chomsky, "there isn't 
much difference between the New York Times and Pravda." 
Their argument, he writes, "is delivered in the leaden 
prose of a sectarian tract. . • • Though they use the word 
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'Orwellian' a lot, they write in exactly the ideological 
style that Orwell so perfectly parodied." 
Note that Lemann's ideological objections to Manufac-
turing Consent (like Bawer's and Lescaze's to Operation 
Wandering Soul) are dressed as aesthetic objections: it 
is not their politics, not their critique of the liberal 
media culture's systemic bias that Lemann objects to but 
their "leaden prose" and "ideological style." How, I won-
der, could Herman and Chomsky write a book that is overtly 
ideological, one that attempts to identify the hidden ide-
ology of the mass media, without employing an ideological 
style? In wishing for a less ideological style, Lemann 
actually wishes for less ideology. He wants the norma-
tive, ostensibly non-ideological "style" of liberal plu-
ralist discourse that Herman and Chomsky are at pains to 
show is ideological. Ironically, in employing the rheto-
ric of anticommunism in his review, Lemann reaffirms Her-
man and Chomsky's assertion that anticommunism is an ef-
fective tool for attacking information that threatens the 
bipartisan consensual limits of American mass media. 
3. Anticommunism has also been influential in pro-
moting specific critical methodologies. Two of the cen-
tral figures in the ascendancy of New Criticism, Allen 
Tate and Robert Penn Warren, for instance, initially sub-
titled the Agrarian manifesto I'll Take My Stand, "A Tract 
against Communism." Tate, Warren, and others posited 
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their literary aesthetic as disinterested and objective, a 
method by which the timeless and universal features of 
great literature could be explicated. Tate identified the 
task of poetry as "the constant rediscovery of the perma-
nent nature of man." On the other hand, "propagandist 
art," for Tate, demonstrated "that side of his nature in 
which he is interested in at the moment; it is a tempo-
rary oversimplification of the human predicament." Lit-
erature that sought to identify and correct contemporary 
social ills Tate viewed as "an escape from reality" (qtd. 
in Foley 4). Similarly, Malcolm Cmlley derided literature 
with "social aims and political programs" because these 
were "likely to be accepted only on the top level of the 
mind" (87)--that part of the mind occupied with such 
ephemeral concerns as poverty and hunger, sexism and seg-
regation. Likewise, for John Crowe Ransom, poetry was 
"always something magnificently chimerical" and would be 
"irresponsible if it would really commit us to an action" 
(qtd. in Reising 169-70). This New Critical worship of an 
apolitical literature, of form for form's sake, of course, 
is itself political. For in denigrating literature that 
sought political action and that offered a radical cri-
tique of the status quo, New Critics enshrined a litera-
ture that endorsed the prevailing ethos of liberal plural-
ism. 
In Creating Faulkner's Reputation, Lawrence Schwartz 
showed that more than inherently political, New Criticism, 
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particularly its championing of Faulkner, was actively 
promoted and funded by the Rockefeller foundation as a 
means of furthering America's cultural reputation and en-
couraging its global influence. For Schwartz "the intel-
ligentsia understood that the defense of culture was part 
of a larger economic and political struggle with the So-
viet Union" (140); in this struggle, 
the aesthetics of formalism and modernism not only 
reflected a political ideology but helped to legiti-
mize it as well. Literary modernism, with "individu-
alism" adopted as its symbol of artistic freedom, 
became an instrument of anti-communism and an ideo-
logical weapon with which to battle the "totalitari-
anism" of the Soviet Union. (Schwartz 201)20 
New Criticism, then, with its repudiation of the vulgarly 
social and its praise for balance and ambiguity, was an 
implicit endorsement of liberal pluralism and an attack on 
fanaticisms generally and communism particularly. To John 
Crowe Ransom, a poem was "like a democratic state, so to 
speak, which realizes the ends of a state without sacri-
ficing the personal character of its citizens" (New Criti-
cism 54). According to Ransom, 
people who are engaged with their pet 'values' become 
habitual killers •••• It is thus that we lose the 
power of imagination, or whatever faculty it is by 
which we are able to contemplate things as they are 
in their rich, contingent materiality. (World's Body 
116) 
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In the same manner, when discussing Dreiser's literary 
flaws, Lionel Trilling spoke of that "dark and bloody 
crossroads where literature and politics meet" (10). Once 
New Criticism was naturalized and became the essential 
method of literary evaluation, this anticommunism, this 
association of politicized criticism with "habitual kill-
ers" \'Tho meet at a "dark and bloody crossroads" was no 
longer necessary. To the extent that New Critical prin-
ciples pe=sist (particularly within gatekeeper intellec-
tual journals and mainstream book reviewers), however, the 
principles of liberal pluralism continuie to be reinforced 
and radical social critique to be minimized. 
An essential element of New Criticism, anticommunism 
has also shaped contemporary literary and cultural theory. 
For many contemporary theorists, Marxism is a totalizing 
discourse based upon an almost metaphysical belief in eco-
nomic determinism. As such, Marxism is viewed as a con-
tinuation of the Enlightenment paradigm, is thought to 
rely upon claims to universal reason and knowable truth, 
and thus is seen to thwart rather than encourage libera-
tion. Ranier Nagele identifies three main components of 
this totalizing discourse that contemporary theorists seek 
to overturn (or at least to problematize): "teleology of 
a universal history, teleology of the autonomous subject, 
and teleology of a universal discourse as the language of 
a universal spirit," involving such procedures as "cen-
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tralization (clear hierarchies of center and margin, of 
inclusion and exclusion, definite boundaries); spiritual-
ization and sublimation; unification of language games." 
For Nagele, "unification out of a need for universal con-
troland domination is the underlying principle" (94-95). 
Likewise, Dick Hebdige rejects master narratives "which 
set out to address a transcendental Subject, to define an 
essential human nature, to prescribe a global human des-
tiny or to proscribe collective human goals" (qtd. in Ar-
nowitz 68). And Jean-Francois Lyotard calls for a "severe 
reexamination • • • on the thought of the Enlightenment, 
on the idea of a unitary end of history and of a subject" 
(73). For Michel Foucault, the Marxist concept of ideol-
ogy is troubling because "it always stands in virtual op-
position to something else which is supposed to count as 
truth" and because it refers necessarily "to something of 
the order of a subject" (P/K 118). Foucault concludes, 
therefore, that 
one should not assume a massive and primal condition 
of domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' 
on one side and 'dominated' on the other, but rather 
a multiform production of relations of domination 
(P/K 142). 
Writers such as Foucault, Lyotard, and Hebdige do not 
resort to red-baiting and in fact incorporate many in-
sights from Marxism. But even without overt anticomrnu-
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nism, contemporary theorists view class, false conscious-
ness, and historical materialism as oppressive conceits; 
instead, they find resistance and liberation within exist-
ing social structures. Hence Foucault suggests we "ap-
proach politics from behind and cut across societies on 
the diagonal" (FR 376). In their celebrations of indeter-
minacy, their ininimizing of class analysis, and their wish 
for heterogeneity, these critics endorse a position that 
resembles liberal pluralism. Change the key slightly and 
Foucault's "multiform production of the relations of domi-
nation" becomes Ransom's "things ••• in their rich, con-
tingent materiality." 
The Vietnam War Canon 
Having passed through these filters, there now exists 
a canon of critically acclaimed novels and memoirs about 
the Vietnam War. These works were composed, published, 
and received during a time of ascendent conservatism, a 
time when, writes Andrew Martin, "neoconservative inter-
pretations of Vietnam worked to transfer responsibility 
for the lost war from those who had planned and executed 
it to those who had opposed it" (xxi). The critically 
praised war literature of this period does not generally 
blame the opponents of the war, and the ideologies con-
veyed in these texts are various, contradictory, and often 
critical of American policy. But the Vietnam War canon 
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does not explode prevailing notions about the fundamental 
morality of U.S. actions, nor does it document the 
widescale killing of Vietnamese. In fact, within these 
texts the Vietnamese are practically invisible. From this 
literature one does not see what Robert McNamara described 
in a memorandum to Lyndon Johnson as a "picture of the 
world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 
1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny 
backward nation into submission" (qtd. in Martin 20). 
With its focus on the suffering of individual American 
soldiers and its refusal to consider the war as an exten-
sion of U.S. global interests, this literature does not 
challenge and in many ways supports the right's ongoing 
historical reconstruction. This support is encouraged 
(and radical critique hindered) by a sanctioning process 
involving literary agents, editors, and marketers; review 
editors and book-reviewers; critics at gate-keeper intel-
lectual journals; academic critics and college teachers. 
Each of these cultural guardians in turn is constrained by 
the biases, filters, and sympathies inherent in mainstream 
corporate, media, and educational institutions. These 
factors combine to promote a literature that does not se-
riously question elite interests and beliefs. Thus, al-
though the Vietnam War produced widespread public dissen-
sion, as well as a critique of corporate capitalism and 
U.S. imperialism, the literature of the Vietnam War that 
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has received consistent cultural sanction makes only a 
limited and modest critique of U.S. militarism in Indo-
china, one consistent with the liberal pluralist values of 
American literary culture. 
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Notes 
1. Tate qtd. in Schwartz 76; Ohmann, English in 
America 303. 
2. As Russell Reising makes clear, there has been a 
long-standing alternative social tradition within American 
literature consisting of 
(1) writers, texts, and even genres that reflect a 
direct, often critical apprehension of the histori-
cal, social, economic, and political contexts of 
American culture; (2) the broader assumption that 
all literature mediates social reality; and (3) 
criticism that grants the importance, if not the cen-
trality, of such social concerns, one that takes 
itself seriously as a form of social knowledge. (34) 
Even with the broadening and decentering of the canon, 
though, this alternative tradition remains marginalized. 
3. Gregor McLennan identifies the following as plu-
ralist conventions: 
(1) a sociology of competing interest groups; (2) a 
conception of the state as a political mechanism re-
sponsive to the balance of societal demands; (3) an 
account of the democratic civic culture which sets a 
realistic minimum measure for the values of political 
participation and trust; (4) an empiricist and mul-
ti-factorial methodology of social science. (qtd. in 
Guillory 4) 
4. That the academic literary establishment does al-
low leftist critique--this dissertation, for instance--is 
due to this very insignificance. If English departments 
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had access to real power in this society, it is unlikely 
that radical discourse would have even the limited accep-
tance it is now accorded. 
5. As Chris Faatz notes (and as commercial publishing 
house's fiction lists reveal), "many large publishing 
houses have been casting an opportunistic eye on the prof-
its made possible by the explosion of work by lesbian and 
gay, African-American and Latino/a authors" (915). 
6. Although they do not concern themselves with con-
temporary literature and thus are not directly useful for 
developing a model of the contemporary literary/academic 
culture, Lawrence Schwartz in Creating Faulkner's Reputa-
tion and John Rodden in The Politics of Literary Reputa-
tion do offer specific case studies that inform my cul-
tural model and reaffirm its general outlines. 
7. For Ohmann, writing in 1978, these included the 
New York Review of Books, the New Republic, the New York-
er, Commentary, Saturday Review, Partisan Review, and 
Harpers. 
8. John Rodden explains: 
even this rudimentary characterization of cultural 
radiation--from author to critic to group to public--
is • • • routinely contradicted. The radiation of 
reputation is not a simple 'trickle-down' process: 
there is constant back-and-forth movement and inter-
level interaction among people and institutions. Nor 
is the 'average reader' a passive consumer of elite 
and mass media opinions. Sometimes critic-reviewers 
will be influenced as much or more by a group or by 
the public as the reverse in a particular case. Thus 
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the radiation of a reputation is not merely patterned 
in ever-widening circles. Images and opinions are 
exchanged from person to person and from small groups 
to large groups, each communication act modifying the 
image in different ways. (418n.) 
9. This inverse relationship between literary reputa-
tion and commercial success, which is wrapped up in our 
notion of literature as the imaginative expression of in-
dividual genius, was shaped by the Romantics and their re-
action to being marginalized by nascent industrialism and 
commercial book-publishing. Writes Terry Eagleton, 
Deprived of any proper place within the social move-
ments which might actually have transformed indus-
trial capitalism into a just society, the writer was 
increasingly driven back into the solitariness of 
his own creative mind •••• Art was extricated from 
the material practices, social relations and ideo-
logical meanings in which it is always caught up, 
and raised to the status of a solitary fetish. (Lit-
era.ry 20-21) 
10. In 1981 Thomas Whiteside gave a brief history of 
the merging and corporatizing of the publishing industry, 
explaining that within the previous twenty years 
the hardcover trade-book houses of Alfred A. Knopf 
and Pantheon Books were taken over by Random House 
and Random House was acquired by RCA. Random House 
then acquired the formerly independent paperback pub-
lishing company Ballantine Books. And then RCA sold 
Random House to Newhouse Publications, which owns the 
Newhouse newspaper chain. In the last four years, 
Dell Publishing, one of the principal mass-market-
paperback houses, was acquired by Doubleday & Com-
pany, the largest trade-book publisher in the coun-
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try, which had previously acquired, among other en-
terprises, the Literary Guild, the nation's sec-
ond-largest book club. Another mass-market-paperback 
publisher, Fawcett Publications, was acquired by CBS, 
which had already acquired yet another mass-market-
paperback house, Popular Library, and the hardcover 
house Holt, Rinehart & Winston. The hardcover house 
Bobbs-Merrill was acquired by the International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corporation. Pocket Books, a lead-
ing publisher, was acquired, as part of the hardcover 
house Simon & Schuster, by the conglomerate Gulf & 
Western, which also owned Paramount Pictures. G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, which had acquired the trade-book 
house of Coward, McCann & Geoghegan and the paperback 
publisher Berkeley Books, was acquired by MCA, which 
had earlier acquired Universal Pictures. The hard-
cover house Viking Press became a part of Penguin 
Books, which, in turn, was owned by a conglomerate 
known as the Pearson-Longman group. Bantam Books, 
another of the leading paperback publishers, wound up 
under the control of Bertelsman Verlag, of Germany, 
probably the largest publishing concern in the world. 
The hardcover house E. P. Dutton was acquired by the 
Dutch publishing complex Elsevier. Another hardcover 
house, Little, Brown & Company, was acquired by Time, 
Inc., which subsequently acquired the largest exist-
ing book club, the Book-of-the-Month Club. And this 
is only a partial listing of corporate mergers in the 
publishing list in the recent past. (2-3) 
11. Paramount Communications (Simon & Schuster, Ginn 
& Company, and others); Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (Aca-
demic Press and others); Time Warner (Little, Brown; 
Scott, Foresman; Time-Life Books; Book-of-the-Month-
Club); Bertelsmann, A.G. (Doubleday, Bantam Books, Dell, 
Literary Guild); Reader's Digest Association (Condensed 
Books and others); Newhouse (Random House and others). 
12. Simon & Schuster also demanded to see a copy of 
Bagdikian 's The Media Monopoly before publication and ar-
gued unsuccessfully for deletions. 
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13. In his essay Jon Wiener also discusses the 
troubled histories of Robert Sam Anson's The Rules of the 
Magic (on the Disney corporation); Christopher Byron's 
Skin Tight: The Bizarre Story of Guess vs. Jordache; 
Thomas Hauser's Missing (originally titled The Execution 
of Charles Horman); Peter Matthiessen's In the Spirit of 
Crazy Horse; and Roy Rowan and Sandy Smith's Connections: 
American Business and the Mob. 
14. The following statistics, taken from Ohmann's 
"The Shaping of a Canon, 1960-1975" (72), originated in a 
study conducted by Harry Smith and printed in The 
Newsletter, 30 July 1969: 
Publishers 
Random House 
Harper 
Little, Brown 
Dutton 
Lippincott 
Harvard 
Pages 
74 
29 
29 
16 
16 
9 
of ads Pages of reviews 
58 
22 
21 
4 
4 
negligible 
15. In 27 years Viking allegedly has published one 
unsolicited manuscript out of 135,000 submissions, Random 
House one out of 60,000 (Rodden 58, 416n.). Even if, as I 
suspect, these figures are exaggerated, they nonetheless 
reveal the important gate-keeping role played by literary 
agents. 
16. The following is meant merely to suggest some of 
the more prominent examples of this criticism. For Afri-
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can-American literature, see Barbara Christian, Black Wom-
en Novelists, Henry Louis Gates (ed.), Black Literature 
and Literary Theory and The Signifying Monkey, Robert 
Stepto, From behind the Veil; for women's literature, 
Nina Baym, Women's Fiction, Judith Fetterly, The Resisting 
Reader, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman 
in the Attic; for proletarian literature, Barbara Foley, 
Radical Representations; for gay literature, Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, Between Men, Thomas E. Yingling, Hart Crane and 
the Homosexual Text; and for non-Western literature, Bill 
Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire 
Writes Back, Wale Soyinka, Myth, Literature and the Afri-
can World. 
17. For a fuller demonstration of the ideological 
function of P.C. see Jim Neilson, "The Great PC Scare: 
Tyrannies of the Left, Rhetoric of the Right" in PC Wars: 
Politics and Theory in the Academy, ed. Jeffrey Williams. 
18. See Ellen w. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCar-
thyism and the Universities and Robert Cohen, When the Old 
Left Was Young: Student Radicals and America's First Mass 
Student Movement, 1929-1941. 
19. To Tom Wolfe the Review was "the chief theoreti-
cal organ of radical chic," and to Walter Goodman it was 
"cocktail party revolutionary"; Esquire asserted that 
"from among [its] authors the next Stalin and his speech-
writers will emerge" (qtd. in Nobile 7, 5, 126). 
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20. Geraldine Murphy makes a similar point when she 
argues that 
the cultural front of this apocalyptic struggle be-
tween East and West pitted a socialist realism con-
trolled by the State for its own propagandistic pur-
poses against a subjective symbolistic, abstract mod-
ernism--the kind of art that readily symbolized the 
independent critical role of the artist in a demo-
cratic society. (738) 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE AMERICANIZING OF GREENE 
The most glaring attack in the book • • . is not directed 
at American "interference" ••• in Vietnam; far from 
partisan theories on the role of particular nations, 
Greene's real assault is aimed at self-deception. 
--Anne T. Salvatore 
I would go to almost any length to put my feeble twig in 
the spokes of American foreign policy. 
--Graham Greenel 
The Reviewers 
When published in the United States in 1956, Graham 
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Greene's The Quiet American created a minor sensation. Of 
particular concern to reviewers was Greene's depiction of 
the quiet American, Alden Pyle, a seemingly innocent and 
well-intentioned diplomat who, in an attempt to promote 
U.S. interests via a "Third Force" between colonialism and 
communism, was responsible for the deaths by explosion of 
fifty innocent people. Viewing Pyle as a representative 
American and his actions as characteristic of American 
foreign policy, many reviewers took Greene to task for his 
malign depiction of U.S. behavior in Indochina. 
Greene's criticism of American policy could not be 
reconciled with a belief in U.S. support for democratic 
social movements. In reality--as demonstrated in the 
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early 1950s by the U.S.-sponsored overthrow of Mohammed 
Mossadegh in Iran and Jacobo Guzman Arbenz in Guatemala 
and by U.S. refusal to allow nationwide elections in Viet-
narn--democracy was never much more than a rhetorical ploy 
in America's war against communism. Ignorant of the ex-
tent of U.S. covert action and U.S.-sponsored terror, op-
erating within an era of vigorous and often rabid anticom-
munism and having already recognized Greene as an impor-
tant contemporary writer (The Power and the Glory espe-
cially having achieved nearly pre-canonical status), Arner-
ican literary culture faced a potentially awkward situa-
tion with the publication of The Quiet American. A re-
spected and culturally sanctioned writer, Greene not only 
disagreed with the conventional understanding of U.S. glo-
bal policy but found this policy murderous and even showed 
sympathy for the Viet Minh. Greene was too prominent a 
writer to ignore, his argument too radical to endorse. 
The result: American literary culture acknowledged his 
skill but repudiated the anti-Americanism and communist-
sympathizing of The Quiet American. 
Robert Gorham Davis's front page review in the New 
York Times Book Review makes clear how troubling The Quiet 
American was to status quo belief in the probity of U.S. 
foreign policy. Davis flatly declares The Quiet American 
a political novel--or parable--about the war in Indo-
china, employing its characters less as individuals 
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than as representatives of their nations or political 
factions. 
In The Quiet American, according to Davis, "the effect of 
circumstances is specifically ideological and political." 
Davis finds unfair the argument between Alden Pyle and the 
novel's narrator, middle-aged English newspaper correspon-
dent Thomas Fowler, objecting to "the easy way Fowler is 
permitted to triumph in his debate with Americans" (1). 
And he argues that "there is no real debate in the book, 
because no experienced and intelligent anti-Communist is 
represented there" (32). It is difficult to imagine Davis 
or any other mainstream critic objecting to an anticom-
munist writer's failure to include the views of an experi-
enced and intelligent communist. Davis's objection, then, 
is really more to the nature of Greene's argument than to 
its lack of fairness; it is not the easy way Fowler is 
permitted to triumph that Davis objects to but that Fowler 
is permitted to triumph at all. Besides, the novel's main 
argument rests not on the dialogue between these two char-
acters but on the murderous actions Greene imputes to Pyle 
and thus to the u.s., actions Greene identifies in the 
novel's foreword as rooted in historical fact. 
Davis also faults Greene for disregarding the lethal 
consequences of conununist rule. He reminds us of "the 
thousands of individuals who make desperate escapes from 
Communist countries every week in order to live as humans" 
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(32); he suggests that "the elimination of liberals and 
social democrats always comes first • • • in the Commu-
nists' program for political seizure of power" (1); and 
he wonders whether in granting primary justice to the com-
munist cause Greene has reconciled himself to the "ter-
rible surrender" that "history or God now demands of the 
church and Western civilization" (32). It is difficult to 
to see in Greene's modest criticism of u.s. foreign policy 
and occasional support for the Viet Minh the fall of the 
West. Davis's rhetoric here has little to do with 
Greene's text and everything to do with cold war anticom-
munism. 
Besides suggesting Greene's ignorance of the terror 
of communist imperialism, Davis criticizes him for imply-
ing "that only the Communist respects or understands the 
peasant" (qtd. in Davis 1). In finding a sympathy between 
communists and Vietnamese peasants, Greene (or so Davis 
alleges) falls prey to a familiar romanticizing of commu-
nist-led anti-colonial struggles. What Davis does not 
recognize is that Greene through Fowler speaks of an in-
digenous Vietnamese communism that in the context of post-
World War II Vietnam was the only large social force that 
respected and understood the peasantry and that offered 
the possibility of overturning the French colonial admin-
istration, of implementing a policy of genuine land re-
form, of addressing the country's persistent poverty. As 
Gabriel Kolka argues, 
The basic pattern in modern Vietnamese history was 
the non-Communists' endemic inability to relate to 
the dynamics of their own times. Only the Communist 
Party could fill such a vacuum. Its triumph was due 
not simply to its own abilities but also to the vir-
tual absence of other serious opposition to French 
colonialism. (13) 
This widespread support for the communists was recognized 
by the CIA, who argued that "If the scheduled national 
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elections are held in July 1956, and if the Viet Minh does 
not prejudice its political prospects, the Viet Minh will 
almost certainly win" (qtd. in Kolko 84).2 In his inabil-
ity to see Vietnamese anti-colonialism and communism as 
other than part of the global red menace, Davis echoes a 
belief common to U.S. policy elites, one that is stated 
forthrightly in a 1954 report by the Special Committee on 
the Threat of Communism and included within The Pentagon 
Papers: "Communist imperialism is a transcending threat 
to each of the Southeast Asian states" (Shehhan, et al. 
37) and "defeat of the Viet Minh in Indo-China is essen-
tial if the spread of Communist influence in Southeast 
Asia is to be halted" (Sheehan, et al. 35).3 Because it 
sought to hinder the spread of communism in Southeast Asia 
and to maintain French support against communism in Eu-
rope, the U.S., from the end of the Japanese occupation of 
Vietnam, supported the French in their attempt to reinsti-
tute colonial rule. According to the Committee of Con-
cerned Asian Scholars, 
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though the French returned to Indochina first in a 
few symbolic French transports, these were followed 
by a long succession of American ships, flying the 
American flag, manned by American crews. The French 
army, disembarking from these ships in American-made 
uniforms, launched their assaults with American lend-
lease weapons, tanks, trucks, and jeeps. (23) 
Between 1950 and 1954 U.S. military aid to the French in-
creased from $150 million to $1 billion, and by 1954 the 
U.S. was underwriting 80 percent of the cost of the war 
(Committee 23). American support for the French and oppo-
sition to Vietnamese anti-colonialism (and much of the 
subsequent history of American militarism in Southeast 
Asia) can be traced to its need to promote the interests 
of capital by stopping the spread of communism, as well as 
to an inability to recognize the local and specific nature 
of Vietnamese communism. It is this American insensibil-
ity to Vietnamese culture and hostility toward communism 
that Green satirizes through Alden Pyle--and that Robert 
Gorham Davis demonstrates in his review of The Quiet Amer-
ican. 
Philip Rahv, writing in Commentary, raises some of 
the same objections as Davis. He too asserts that the ar-
gument between Pyle and Fowler is facile and one-sided, 
contending that Greene states "his case with such glibness 
and plain malice that he invites us to discount him as a 
suspect witness" (489). Just as Davis criticizes Greene's 
suggestion that only the communist respects or understands 
the peasant, so Rahv argues that 
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Greene appears to admire [the Viet Minh's] efficiency 
and its closeness to the peasant masses--but the Com-
munists are always "close to the masses" in the pe-
riod of revolutionary conquest. The issue is what 
will happen later, when their power is consolidated 
and identification with the masses no longer serves 
Communist interests. One doubts that Greene is suf-
ficiently political-minded to do justice to such con-
siderations. (480) 
Although he denounces Greene's "clever attack on the Unit-
ed States, its policies and methods, values and ideals," 
Rahv does not ultimately condemn Greene. Instead, Rahv 
tells his readers not "to become over-exercised about [The 
Quiet American]," since all Greene is doing is turning 
"the Jamesian theme of innocence vs. experience inside 
out" (480). By transforming Greene's criticism of U.S. 
policy in Indochina into a familiar dialogue about na-
tional character, Rahv diminishes the political import of 
The Quiet American, taming its potentially troubling mes-
sage and making it amenable to the readers of Commentary. 
A. J. Leibling, reviewing The Quiet American in the 
New Yorker, is far less tolerant of Greene's depiction of 
Pyle, particularly Pyle's involvement in mass murder. 
Leibling labels libelous the suggestion that the u.s. 
State Department encourages terrorism. "If the State De-
partment had promoted the historical explosion," he 
writes, "we needed a new State Department" (153). Leib-
ling is upset because "anybody who read the book would 
wonder whether the State Department was engaged in the 
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business of murdering French colonels, and in their de-
fault, friendly civilians" (153). Leibling is either ig-
norant or disingenuous, since the history of U.S. foreign 
policy during the Cold War was characterized by neither 
restraint nor excessive concern for the suffering of inno-
cents. Years later, in his introduction to a new edition 
of The Quiet American, Greene spoke to Leibling's criti-
cism, writing that "a Mr. Liebermann [sic], condemned me 
for accusing my 'best friends' (the Americans) of murder" 
( "Introduction" xviii) • Greene went on to identify sev-
eral reasons to believe U.S. officials had been involved 
in terrorist activities and suggested press complicity in 
keeping this information secret.4 Like Davis in the New 
York Times, therefore, Leibling in the New Yorker accepts 
the basic morality of U.S. policy and reacts hostilely to 
Greene's suggestion that this policy is criminal. In re-
acting so fervently and in denying Greene's argument so 
completely, Davis and Leibling reveal both their and Amer-
ican literary culture's sympathy with the status quo be-
lief in the benign and democratic nature of u.s. policy. 
Time's anonymous reviewer demonstrates this complic-
ity even more strikingly, asserting, "the Kremlin alone 
might pretend to believe that American Government offi-
cials abroad are prone to fool around with bombs." Time 
finds Greene guilty of anti-Americanism and suggests that 
he failed to recognize "one of the great facts of the 20th 
century," one that has "baffled, beguiled and infuriated 
many minds"--"the phenomenon of U.S. good will." Time's 
belief in American good will is part of a Cold War Mani-
chaeanism apparent throughout the March 12, 1956 issue in 
which The Quiet American review appears. 
For instance, in an article about the place of the 
Communist Party within Italian politics Time writes of 
"Krushchev's new python policy--embrace, constrict and 
devour" (32). Discussing British military aims, Time as-
serts that Sir Anthony Eden's military advisers had come 
to a gloomy conclusion. They have now revised from 
ten to five years their estimate of the time it will 
take before Russian industrial strength reaches the 
point where the Communists may again be tempted to 
violent global conquest. (32) 
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While Time trumpets the alleged aims of Soviet militarism, 
it reports without comment tangible evidence of the harm 
caused by U.S. militarism. Time tells of Japanese scien-
tists' findings that a nuclear explosion in Nevada had 
"dropped radioactive rain on much of Japan and radioactive 
dust on the northern island of Hokkaido" (73), that radio-
active rain had fallen in Paris, and that "the fission 
products from far avvay Nevada had also fogged photographic 
film as they drifted over Europe" (74). Time reports 
these incidents matter-of-factly, its belief in U.S. good 
will unaffected by U.S. complicity in the spread of radia-
tion across two continents. 
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Time also tells of how Guatemala had been "torn by 
bitter years of a Communist-written land reform that set 
peasant against landholder," a policy that had begun in 
1952 by "Red-led" President Arbenz and that had resulted 
in land seizures "amid scenes of bloodshed and destruc-
tion." Time praises the 1956 reform (written with the 
advice of U.S. farm experts), which "provides for the 
well-compensated expropriation of idle parts of big es-
tates and their division among the landless" (40). Miss-
ing from this account is any suggestion of U.S. economic 
interest in Guatemala. Arbenz's land reform had been ini-
tiated to diminish the power of the United Fruit Company, 
who owned property amounting to more than the combined 
property of half of Guatemala's landholding population, 
who owned Guatemala's telephone and telegraph facilities 
and all but 29 miles of its railroad track, and who in 
1950 reported an annual profit that was, according to Ri-
chard H. Immerman, "more than twice the revenues of the 
entire Guatemalan government" (73). Missing too is recog-
nition of the C.I.A.-led coup that toppled Arbenz. And in 
their praise for President Carlos Castillo Armas's attempt 
to raise "the agricultural health of all Guatemalans," 
Time does not reveal the all too familiar results of the 
phenomenon of U.S. good will--that Castillo Armas returned 
to United Fruit more than 99 percent of its expropriated 
lands (Immerman 198) and instigated a brutal authoritarian 
rule. 
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The Castillo Armas government disenfranchised three 
quarters of Guatemala's electorate; outlawed all politi-
cal parties and labor organizations; began burning 'sub-
versive' books (including Dostoevesky novels and Victor 
Hugo's Les Miserables). After eighteen months of Castillo 
Armas's rule, only one half of one percent of the peasants 
who had won plots under the Arbenz land reform program re-
mained on their new land (Schlesinger and Kinzer 221-233). 
Castillo Armas destroyed the labor movement, outlawing 
more than five hundred unions and requiring that union 
charters be approved by the National Committee for Defense 
against Communism. The Armas government could declare any 
strike illegal and could sentence strikers to three years 
in prison. "By the end of the decade," writes Immerman, 
Guatemala's union membership had fallen to ten thou-
sand, one-tenth of the total during Arbenz's last 
year in office. In all of Latin America, only Haiti 
had fewer organized workers. (200) 
I cite this information to explain the context in 
which The Quiet American was received and to identify 
something of the history that Greene sought to document. 
It has been thought that Pyle was based on Colonel Edward 
Geary Lansdale, a C.I.A. operative involved in a success-
ful counter-insurgency program in the Philippines that re-
sulted in the election of Ramon Magsaysay. After his sue-
cess in the Philippines, Lansdale was sent to Vietnam. 
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Whether or not Pyle was modeled on Lansdale (Greene has 
denied this),S Lansdale's clandestine activities seem rep-
resentative of the anti-democratic acts regularly con-
ducted by the u.s. in Southeast Asia and elsewhere during 
the early 1950s. A report in the Pentagon Papers on Lans-
dale's covert team, the Saigon Military Mission, explains 
that he was "to undertake paramilitary operations against 
the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare" 
(54). This operation included spreading stories about a 
Chinese Communist regiment raping village girls, compiling 
an almanac of famous North Vietnamese astrologers predict-
ing disaster for the communists, contaminating the oil 
supply of the Hanoi bus company, and smuggling eight and 
half tons of supplies to a paramilitary group in the 
North. It is precisely this side of U.S. good will that 
Greene documents in The Quiet American and that reviewers 
in the New York Times, the New Yorker, and Time repudiate 
as false and polemical. 
These reviewers seem unaware of the consistent conse-
quences of U.S. opposition to indigenous anti-colonial 
movements. Just as the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran led 
to the brutal reign of the Shah and the overthrow of Ar-
benz in Guatemala to the dictatorship of Armas, so opposi-
tion to the Viet Minh resulted in the despotism of Ngo 
Dinh Diem. Thwarting the nation-wide elections (which had 
been guaranteed by the Geneva Accords and which would have 
ensured a communist electoral victory), the U.S. helped 
establish the Diem regime in South Vietnam.6 While the 
Viet Minh had begun a policy of radical land reform, Diem 
instituted his own reform which, like the Armas reform in 
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Guatemala, did little to redistribute land ownership. Di-
em's reforms, according to the Committee of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, "reduced rents which the Viet Minh had 
abolished, sold land which the Viet Minh had given away, 
and reestablished estates which the Viet Minh had broken 
up" (29). Diem's land reform, according to Mark Selden, 
did nothing to alter landlord domination as the cen-
tral fact of South Vietnamese rural life. The over-
whelming number of landless farmers and tenants were 
completely bypassed by it •••• In many areas it 
served primarily to provide cover for wresting land 
from the poor and restoring it to former landlords. 
(376) 
According to The Pentagon Papers, by 1960 "45% of the land 
remained concentrated in the hands of 2% of landowners, 
and 15% of the landlords owned 75% of all the land" (qtd. 
in Truong Buu Lam 39). 
In 1956, as The Quiet American was being repudiated 
by significant sections of the American literary estab-
lishment, Diem issued Ordinance 47, which called for the 
detention of people thought dangerous to the state, gave 
legal justification for the creation of political prison 
camps, and suspended habeas corpus (Fitzgerald 119). This 
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policy was administered by military tribunals who allowed 
no appeal and made being a communist or even working with 
one a capital offense (Kolko 89). According to Frances 
Fitzgerald, 
In 1956 official estimates put the prison camp popu-
lation at twenty thousand. • • • The camps • • . con-
tained a wide variety of people, from the leaders of 
sects and the smaller political parties to the unco-
operative members of the press and the trade unions. 
• • • In the period 1955-1959 • • • the Diemist offi-
cials arrested thousands of people whose only politi-
cal sin was to have fought for independence against 
the French before Diem took power. Some of these 
people they killed on arrest, others they beat and 
tortured; still others they held for indefinite pe-
riods under inhuman conditions in order to extort 
money or confiscate their land. (120, 140-41) 
It has been estimated that by the end of 1958 there were 
40,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam and that be-
tween 1955 and 1957 the Diem regime was responsible for 
12,000 deaths (Kolko 89). By March 1962, according to 
figures compiled by the National Liberation Front, 105,000 
former resistance supporters had been killed and 350,000 
(including 6,000 children) were being held in 874 prisons 
and concentration camps (Burchett 71). John McDermott 
summarizes Diem's policies and their consequences: 
by a system of totalitarian controls, by a series of 
military expeditions against its own peasantry, and 
by the forced regroupment of almost the entire rural 
population did the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam attempt to pacify the countryside. In a 
period of eight years the entire social system of the 
countryside was destroyed. (9) 
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Diem's tyranny, besides revealing the fraudulence of u.s. 
good will, demonstrates the often destructive consequences 
of U.S. foreign policy, consequences Greene depicts in The 
Quiet American. 
Not all critics denounced Greene or thought this por-
trayal of American global terror unbelievable. American 
literary culture's reaction to The Quiet American was not 
lock-step anticommunism; instead, there was a measure of 
ideological diversity, as demonstrated by Walter Allen's 
review in the Nation. According to Allen, 
Greene expresses a criticism of America and espe-
cially of American behavior in foreign affairs that 
is widely held, if not openly stated, by a great many 
people outside the United States. (344) 
But instead of looking at Pyle, the emodiment of American 
policy, Allen concentrates on the initially neutral ob-
server, Fowler. Ignoring Greene's publisher's assertion 
that "religion plays little or no part" in The Quiet Amer-
ican, Allen sees in Fowler "the hall mark of the Greene 
man, whether presented as Catholic or atheist: the sense 
of abandonment" (344). Rather than discussing the spe-
cific evil wrought by Pyle to thwart communism, Allen dis-
cusses "the awareness of evil; the awareness of two 
worlds side by side--heaven and hell--yet with how many 
leagues between them" (345). And he cites Greene's saying 
years ago that "Human nature is not black and white but 
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black and grey" (344). A specific political indictment 
becomes for Allen a speculation on the metaphysics (and 
chromatics) of evil. While it is certainly possible to 
read The Quiet American in the context of Greene's concern 
with alienation and spiritual exhaustion, doing so diverts 
attention from the book's historical urgency. Thus in the 
left-most journal within commercial American literary cul-
ture, the political content of Greene's novel is exorcised 
in favor of an analysis of the nature of evil. 
Like Allen, John Lehmann in the New Republic dis-
misses Greene's publisher's assertion that religion plays 
little or no part in The Quiet American, suggesting in-
stead that "the religious theme is there all the same, as 
anyone can see" (26). Lehmann praises Greene's masterly 
story construction and declares The Quiet American "a 
highly skilled work of fiction by one of our major liter-
ary craftsmen" (27). For Lehmann the stature of The Quiet 
American depends not on the book's religious thematizing 
or Greene's technical expertise but on his depiction of 
contemporary warfare, on "the theme of the wastefulness 
and the cruelty of war" (26) and "the ultimate ethics of 
all wars of liberation" (27). Thus, although sympathetic 
to his politics and his interpretation of events in Indo-
china, neither Allen nor Lehmann focuses on Greene's cri-
tique of the murderous consequences of U.S. foreign poli-
cy. In the initial critical reception of The Quiet Ameri-
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can, therefore, we find mainstream American literary cul-
ture attacking Greene's politics, while the marginalized, 
left-liberal side of this culture distances itself from 
Greene's specific critique to speak broadly about his 
"awareness of evil" (Allen 345) and his "tragic vision of 
modern life" (Lehmann 27). This collapsing of Greene's 
politics into a general concern for evil and tragedy--ex-
emplified by Allen's view that Greene "is always willing 
to have a go at authority, whether the State Department or 
the Catholic Church" (345)--has helped curtail examination 
of the history informing Greene's narrative and has helped 
depoliticize subsequent academic criticism on The Quiet 
American. 
This absence of a lefitst critique was due to the 
dominance of a formalist understanding of literary worth, 
to a willful ignorance about the nature of American global 
policy, and to a widely endorsed anticommunism. Because 
it was viewed through a narrow critical lens that obscured 
Greene's politics and his attack on the conduct of Ameri-
can policy, The Quiet American could be seen (as Allen and 
Lehmann's reviews demonstrate) as a work of serious liter-
ary merit and could also become a best-seller. Yet even 
this apolitical recognition of The Quiet American gener-
ated flak that was meant to constrain discourse and con-
trol dissent by "regularly assailing, threatening, and 
'correcting' ••. [thus] trying to contain any deviations 
from the established line" (Herman and Chomsky 28).7 An 
editorial in the Saturday Evening Post (headlined "To Get 
Rave Reviews, Write an Anti-U.S.A. Novell") declared The 
Quiet American "an obvious piece of Hate-America propa-
ganda," a "bitter tirade ••• presented as a novel," and 
a "propaganda tract." Greene was attacked as a communist 
and an opium smoker, causing the Post to "wonder whether 
the preposterous statements in his book came to him in a 
pipe dream." And the Post attacked newspaper reviewers 
for spending "so much time reading fiction that they do 
not know some elementary facts about their own country."8 
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The Saturday Evening Post was not the only mainstream 
periodical to go beyond the confines of book reviews to 
attack The Quiet American. Responding to Soviet acclaim 
for Greene's novel, Newsweek declared Soviet critics had 
found a key to the secrets of the novel. All the 
leading characters turn out to be cut·-and-dried po-
litical symbols, rather than the complex fragments of 
humanity which Greene intended (but hardly achieved). 
(96) 
In its repudiation of this vulgar Marxist reading, News-
week endorsed an ostensibly apolitical reading of The 
Quiet American that echoed the assessment made in left-
liberal journals like the Nation and the New Republic. 
After all, there is no great difference between Newsweek's 
"complex fragments of humanity," Allen's "human nature •• 
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. not black and white but black and grey," and Lehmann's 
"tragic vision of modern life." All three readings re-
place u.s. action in Vietnam with general concerns for the 
human condition and thus diminish Greene's political cri-
tique. Unlike the Saturday Evening Post, however, which 
chastised the literary establishment, Newsweek praised 
American literary critics for objecting to "the one-sided-
ness of [Greene's] viewpoint and the dreary stereotyping 
of his American characters." Newsweek hoped that Greene 
would take this criticism more seriously "now that the 
Communists have proved the woodenness of his characters by 
making them over so effortlessly into Marxist stereotypes" 
( 96) • 
Likewise, in Commentary Diana Trilling red-baited 
Greene, declaring that it would be difficult to find a 
clearer example than The Quiet American "of what neutral-
ism means, or clearer evidence of its essential non-neu-
trality and of the pro-Communism which it so regularly 
masks" (66). However, Trilling's main target is not 
Greene's novel but Rahv's review. Trilling wonders why 
Rahv wants to mitigate Greene's offense, wants to suggest 
that Americans should not be indignant at "Mr. Greene's 
unjust attack." To Trilling, Rahv's review demonstrates 
American liberalism's "endemic guiltiness," "fear of na-
tionalistic pride," and "fear of conformity" (67). Ulti-
mately, according to Trilling, Rahv's mild critique of The 
Quiet American reveals that American liberals have "no 
preference for the Soviet Union as against the United 
States, and no philosophical preference for Communism as 
against democracy" (68). 
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There was, then, a general sympathy between the domi-
nant ideology in the United States and the critical evalu-
ations of The Quiet American that appeared in the mass me-
dia.9 The immediate reception of The Quiet American, 
therefore, reveals the parameters of accepted discourse 
within commercial American literary culture: Greene's 
discussion of U.S. policy in Vietnam was (1) consistently 
criticized for its anti-Americanism and pro-communism or 
(2) ignored in favor of the novel's more transcendent 
human concerns. In no mainstream periodical did a re-
viewer focus on the accuracy of Greene's analysis of u.s. 
policy, let alone critique him for having too benign a 
view of U.S. imperialism. 
The Critics 
Admittedly, it would be misleading to judge academic 
literary culture based on reviews of The Quiet American 
that appeared in mass circulation magazines and gatekeeper 
intellectual journals in 1956. These periodicals comprise 
only a small part of--and the overt anticommunism of this 
period is unrepresentative of--American literary culture. 
Since this initial reception, academic critics have been 
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strangely quiet about The Quiet An1erican. Although it in-
spired an initial examination (articles in 1957, 1959, and 
1963), no scholarly article devoted exclusively to The 
Quiet American appears again in the M.L.A. Bibliography 
until 1979. This period coincides with the war and its 
immediate aftermath, beginning a year before the Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution and concluding a year before the elec-
tion of Ronald Reagan. I suspect this timing is not mere 
coincidence but stems from critics' discomfort writing 
about and scholarly journals' discomfort publishing ar-
ticles about a novel that dealt so seemingly contentiously 
with such a divisive issue. As of this writing, the 
M.L.A. lists a total of five articles on The Quiet Ameri-
can in refereed scholarly journals.10 By way of contrast, 
the M.L.A. lists 20 articles on The Power and the Glory, 
17 on The Heart of the Matter, and 14 on Brighton Rock. 
Clearly, for lllnerican literary culture, The Quiet American 
is a paler shade of Greene. 
Its place in the Greene canon notwithstanding, one 
might have expected the historic importance of and the 
controversy surrounding The Quiet American to have gener-
ated further critical attention. The inability of earlier 
critics to examine Greene's critique of U.S. policy, his 
depiction of war in Indochina, and his representations of 
the Vietnamese is understandable, considering these crit-
ics were constrained by a formalist paradigm and were 
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faced with an unexpected shift in Greene's thematic focus 
(from religious to political).ll For later critics, how-
ever, who could more easily utilize a political methodol-
ogy and who had long recognized Greene's turn to the po-
litical,12 this reluctance to examine the socio-political 
dynamic of The Quiet American is surprising. For whatever 
reason (postmodernists' disinterest in realist fiction, 
conservative critics' interest in Greene's Catholicism, 
Vietnam War critics' concentration on American writers) 
the transformation and politicization of literary studies 
has not significantly affected criticism on The Quiet 
American. In the nearly 40 years since it was published, 
critics have maintained a remarkably consistent dialogue 
about The Quiet American, (A) identifying and dismissing 
accusations that Greene \'las anti-American; (B) focusing 
on existential and religious themes and on Greene's liter-
ary technique; (C) replacing the novel's specific his-
torical context and political critique with a broad con-
cern for the human condition; and (D) praising its com-
plex, ambiguous, and equivocal moral and political argu-
ment. 
(A) Anti-Americanism. Repeatedly during the 1950s 
and 1960s literary critics defended Greene from charges of 
anti-Americanism, Robert 0. Evans arguing that "One should 
not imply ••• that Mr. Greene himself is anti-American" 
(247) and R.E. Hughes explaining that "too many readers 
were quick to discover, or invent, evidence that here was 
a bit of anti-American propaganda" (41). "Criticized by 
American reviewers for its supposed anti-Americanism," 
writes A.A. DeVitis, "The Quiet American has been misun-
derstood" (117). Likewise, Philip Stratford dismisses 
"the indignation that The Quiet American aroused in the 
United States" (311). 
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In the 1980s critics would seem to have little need 
to defend Greene from accusations several decades old and 
made during the height of McCarthyism, especially with the 
alleged radicalizing of literary studies. Yet in their 
examinations of The Quiet American contemporary literary 
critics have continued to temper Greene's anti-American-
ism. George M.A. Gaston, for instance, argues that the 
anti-American element has "more to do with the fate of 
Fowler than with that of the world at large" and is "less 
symptomatic of [Fowler's) politics than of his intellec-
tual and emotional condition" (93), and Roger Sharrock 
sees it as "more a vehicle for expressing the nature of 
the conflict between Pyle and Fowler than intrinsically 
significant" (216). 
This desire to disable Greene's critique, to see its 
origins in something other than American policy, has re-
sulted in an assortment of justifications. In 1956 book 
reviewers suggested Greene's anti-Americanism might be due 
to his having been denied an entry visa because of youth-
ful membership in the Communist Party, as well as to his 
having lost a libel suit (for suggesting Shirley Temple's 
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precocious sexuality).13 Critics have attributed Greene's 
hostility toward America to "loss of childhood and the 
pains of growth" (Sharrock 216), "cultural snobbery" (Kel-
ly 16), and a "dislike for the suburban Protestant materi-
alism of England" (Spurling 54). Whatever the arguments 
put forth to explain Greene's enmity toward the U.S., 
critics have refused to see his criticism as rooted in 
American conduct in Indochina, thus seeming to share a 
belief in (or at least an uncritical examination of) the 
benign motivation of u.s. foreign policy. "Anti-American-
ism" is uniformly understood as a pejorative term, not as 
a reasonable response to u.s.-sponsored terror. No critic 
argues that Greene is justifiably anti-American or that he 
is not anti-American enough.l4 
(B) Themes and Technique. In lieu of a discussion of 
Greene's critique of American policy in Indochina, crit-
ics, in seeking to defend him, have focused on the more 
familiarly literary aspects of The Quiet American. Greene 
depicts in gruesome detail the appalling consequences of 
the anti-colonial war in Vietnam, as in this description 
of a massacre in Phat Diem: 
The canal was full of bodies; I am reminded now of 
an Irish stew containing too much meat. The bodies 
overlapped; one head, seal-grey, and anonymous as a 
convict with a shaven scalp, stuck up out of the wa-
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ter like a buoy •••• [A soldier] had found a punt 
hidden in some bushes down the canal .••• Six of us 
got in, and he began to pole it towards the other 
bank, but we ran on a shoal of bodies and stuck. He 
pushed away with his pole, sinking it into this human 
clay, and one body was released and floated up all 
its length beside the boat, like a bather lying in 
the sun. ( 4 4 ) 
Although acknowledging that Greene "seems to understand 
the situation in Indo-China" and sees "beyond the news re-
ports" (246), Evans ignores the factual basis of such pas-
sages and what they reveal about American policy, focusing 
instead upon a French existentialist political philosophy 
that "goes a long way towards explaining the anti-Ameri-
canism of the novel" (247). Criticism of the The Quiet 
American has consistently ignored its political/historical 
context for the sake of discussions of Greene's existen-
tialism and other peripheral concerns. There is something 
almost unseemly about a literary culture that privileged 
such readings, that in examining The Quiet American found 
Western philosophy more significant than Western imperial-
ism, French existentialism more significant than French 
colonialism. Even when faced with passages such as the 
description of the Phat Diem massacre, critics could 
write, as Evans did, "The geographical setting of The 
Quiet American is Indo-China, but the intellectual milieu 
is French" (243). This aestheticism and ahistoricism was 
common to literary formalism, and it set the tone for sub-
sequent critical investigations of The Quiet American. 
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The transformation of literary studies that has oc-
curred within the last 20 years, not to mention the 
decade-long American war in Vietnam, would seem to promise 
a more politicized understanding of The Quiet American. 
Yet in his 1983 examination of Greene's fiction, Gangesh-
war Rai does little more than expand Evans's argument. 
Instead of discussing Greene's representation of Vietnam's 
struggle to free itself from Western rule, Rai suggests 
that Greene "presents the problem of existence and essence 
and shows the significance of free existence deciding es-
sence" (74). According to Rai, Greene is "attracted to-
wards individual's [sic] freedom of choice or his engage-
ment which lies at the heart of Sartrean existentialism" 
(75).15 This focus on Greene's existentialism transforms 
a novel about an ongoing struggle for independence and 
social justice into a metaphysical treatise and is one way 
in which literary culture has elided the real-world con-
cerns addressed by Greene in The Quiet American. 
In addition to reading it existentially, literary 
critics, while recognizing that The Quiet American did not 
maintain the overt Catholic ·thematizing of Greene's ear-
lier novels, nonetheless have concentrated on his use of 
religious themes. Acknowledging that The Quiet American 
"does not deal explicitly with Catholic themes," Kunkel 
declares he will "examine it in connection with the Catho-
lic novels, because it has a religious theme" (148). 
82 
Likewise, Francis Wyndham sees The Quiet American as a 
moral and religious tale. Although "it was suggested that 
[Greene] had temporarily abandoned religious themes," 
writes Wyndham, "the same complex moral problems, the pity 
and the anger" (23) can be found here. And Philip Strat-
ford suggests that in The Quiet American Greene simply 
translates the problem of "commitment to religious belief" 
to "the sphere of politics" (308). 
Ignoring the widespread suffering and brutality 
brought about by an anti-colonial war, critics have fo-
cused on individual Christian suffering and guilt. Yet 
Greene repeatedly documents the horrors of the war; the 
novel turns on Fowler's vivid recounting of the bloody 
consequences of a State Department-sponsored terrorist 
bombing: 
bits of cars were scattered over the square; and a 
man without his legs lay twitching at the edge of the 
ornamental gardens ••••• The doctors were too busy 
to attend to the dead, and so the dead were left to 
their owners, for one can own the dead as one owns a 
chair. A woman sat on the ground with what was left 
of her baby in her lap; with a kind of modesty she 
had covered it with her straw peasant hat •••• The 
legless torso at the edge of the garden still 
twitched, like a chicken which has lost its head. 
(155-56) 
Discussing Pyle's involvement in this massacre (a massacre 
Greene identifies as based on historical fact and which he 
ascribes to U.S. counter-terrorism), Miriam Allott does 
not 
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consider what Greene reveals about u.s. policy but de-
clares, "it is at this point that one becomes aware 
of the thematic continuity linking this book with Greene's 
'Catholic' novels" (198). Greene documents many other 
wartime brutalities, including the dropping of u.s.-sup-
plied napalm by the French, as well as a French pilot's 
attack on helpless Vietnamese: 
The cannon gave a single burst of tracer, and the 
sampan blew apart in a shower of sparks. We didn't 
even wait to see our victims struggling to survive, 
but climbed and made for home. (144) 
Instead of discussing the Vietnamese burned by napalm or 
killed by U.S.-supplied weapons, however, Kunkel writes, 
"God and the ultimates burn in the background • • • in the 
foreground blaze adultery and guilt" (149). Similarly, 
instead of a war between the Vietnamese and the French, a 
war between Vietnamese nationalism and Western imperial-
ism, Stratford sees the novel's "dramatic antagonism" as 
between 
youth and age, innocence and experience, romanticism 
and realism, between Pyle's naive faith and Fowler's 
tired skepticism, between the energetic meddling of 
the one, and the impotent non-intervention of the 
other. ( 309) 
By 1964 when Stratford's book was published, Vietnam was 
f ron·t page news • In 19 6 3 Diem was murdered in a U.S.-
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sanctioned coup, the number of American military advisers 
reached 15,000, and Buddhist monks' self-immolation gained 
world-wide attention; in 1964 Congress passed the Gulf of 
Tonkin resolution, the U.S. flew 5,000 air combat mis-
sions, and American troop strength reached 23,000 (Clod-
felter 1229). Yet Stratford seems oblivious to what The 
Quiet American might reveal about any of this, arguing in-
stead that its central attitude is Christian. In their 
discussions of Greene's Christianity, Stratford, Kunkel, 
and others demonstrate how the established practice of 
literary analysis, particularly its concentration on tra-
ditional themes, can aestheticize and thus obscure a 
work's political and historical content. 
Focusing on the literary and religious heritage 
Greene draws upon, Stratford and Kunkel make no atte~pt t0 
place Greene's religious concerns within a Vietnamese 
social and political context. No critic seems at all 
self-conscious about discussing Greene's Christian themes 
as they play out in a country with a minority Catholic 
population, a religious minority that has long collabo-
rated with the French and has consistently supported 
French colonial rule. According to Fitzgerald, 
the non-Catholic Vietnamese believed with some justi-
fication that the Catholics had acted as a fifth 
column for the French in the period preceding the 
conquest. Certainly the French had always shown 
great favoritism towards the Catholics, turning them 
into a self-conscious elitist minority. (108) 
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In attempting to impose its political and economic agenda 
upon Vietnam through the Diem government, the U.S. also 
relied upon the Catholic minority. Diem was Catholic, led 
an overwhelmingly Catholic administration, and granted 
special privileges to Catholic villages. One reason the 
U.S. encouraged the migration of Catholic refuges from the 
North was because they were Diem's only popular constitu-
ency. In assessing the religious dimensions of The Quiet 
American, critics have largely ignored this important his-
tory. While recent critics have not emphasized the reli-
gious dimensions of Greene's novel, they have nonetheless 
continued to discuss these. Gaston, for example, argues 
that "although war and politics are prominent issues in 
the book, they serve to poise the ultimate concern of per-
sonal salvation" (93). Ga.ston sees Pyler the murderous 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy, as a "paradoxical 
savior" and thinks Fowler "headed for a spiritual recov-
ery" (94). To Gwenn R. Boardman, The Quiet American "ex-
tends the religious perspective" and "shows one way in 
which modern man may begin to approach God" (108). 
By translating the political into the philosophical 
and the religous, critics have revealed their allegiance 
to a formalist literary aesthetic, their reliance upon 
conventional literary themes, and their discomfort with 
Greene's politics. The consistency with which literary 
critics, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, minimized 
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the novel's anti-American politics and displaced this with 
a focus on broad moral and religious issues illustrates 
how effectively literary convention may be used to mask a 
history that brings into question the very premises of 
American liberal pluralist ideology. 
Besides offering existential and Christian readings 
to justify their focus on The Quiet American, critics have 
written about the novel's formal and technical elements. 
Acknowledging the initial controversy surrounding The Qui-
et American, that it was viewed as "a bit of anti-American 
propaganda" and that "the air grew • • • thick with jingo-
ism," Hughes does not seek to counter this criticism with 
reference to Greene's ideology or even to his thematic 
concerns but with discussion of Greene's narrative method. 
'I'he problem with the attack on The Quiet American, for 
Hughes, is "that the novel qua novel was considerably ob-
scured" and "the point most obscured • was the com-
plexity of Greene's narrative technique" (41). Similarly, 
for Stratford, "In view of the indignation that The Quiet 
American aroused in the United States • • • it is neces-
sary to doubly underline a few facts about the novel as 
novel" (311). And Wyndham argues that The Quiet American 
deserves "an important place among Greene's serious fic-
tion" because of "the neat complexity of the story, and 
the fine descriptive passages" (24). For Wyndham, whose 
book was published in the year of the Tet offensive, the 
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novel's importance does not rest upon what Greene reveals 
about U.S. involvement but merely upon its narrative com-
plexity and its brilliant description. Even at the height 
of the war, then, literary critics severed The Quiet Amer-
ican from its historical roots and judged it on aesthetic 
grounds. 
Later critics have continued to discuss Greene's nar-
rative technique in lieu of his politics. Brian Thomas 
argues that "while The Quiet American is about colonial-
ism, it is also, more simply, a love story and an adven-
ture story" (26-27). Thomas goes on to discuss The Quiet 
American ~s a romance, reading the deadly anticommunist 
Pyle as "a highly conventional type of romance hero" (27) 
and the canal in Phat Diem as "a river in a mythically 
'lower' world" (33). Thomas removes the novel's historic 
setting and political content; the war-torn landscape 
becomes a "figuratively annihilated landscape." The peas-
ants who saw their culture shattered, their countryside 
torn apart, and their fellow citizens slaughtered by u.s.-
supplied, French-delivered weapons would have been re-
lieved to learn that, according to Thomas, they are expe-
riencing "the central metaphorical form of the nether re-
gion of [Fowler's] own romance" (36). Similarly, when 
Boardman discusses Greene's critique of the U.S., he as-
serts it "is largely aesthetic" (102). By continuing the 
discussion of existential and religious themes and 
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Greene's narrative technique, recent criticism on The Qui-
et American does not reveal a radically new and politi-
cized literary culture but a culture that in its preoccu-
pations and its literary analyses seems a continuation of 
the older, formalist literary establishment, a culture too 
that seems so dominated by a Western perspective that it 
cannot consider the actual human suffering of the Vietnam-
ese that Greene so carefully documents. 
(C) The Human Condition. In keeping with this con-
centration on aesthetics and on broadly philosophical and 
moral themes, analyses of The Quiet American often have 
replaced its specific historical context with a discussion 
of humanity in general. Kunkel argues that The Quiet 
American can best be understood if we "enlarge our per-
spective by abandoning Greene's views on American foreign 
policy and turning our attention to literary issues" 
(150). This enlarged perspective, however, does not in-
clude the Vietnamese struggle for independence and the 
murderous consequences of American opposition to the Viet 
Minh. According to Kunkel, by concentrating on issues 
such as these we are "misrouting attention from profound 
moral and religious issues [and] obscur(ing) the 
fact that this novel • • • reflects la condition humaine" 
(153). 
Allott also reads The Quiet American in broadly human 
terms, examining "its feelings for the anomalies which 
89 
surround most human attempts to achieve [effective moral 
action], and its assertion nevertheless of certain endur-
ing human values" (188). The extent of Allott's consider-
ation of the political and historical situation in The 
Quiet American appears in her suggestion that 
we need Pyle's courage and none of his ignorance, 
Fowler's moral intelligence and none of his indeci-
siveness, if we are to find a way out of the alarming 
difficulties which as nations and individuals we are 
most of us nowadays required to face. (206) 
Allott identifies Fowler as both moral and intelligent and 
implicates us in his struggle yet ignores what Fowler's 
morality and intelligence have instructed him to do--
thwart u.s. terror and support the Viet Minh. Having in-
ternalized the formal preoccupations of American literary 
culture, Allott can make no more specific political state-
ment than to warn us of "alarming difficulties." Moving 
beyond textual analysis to address her readers directly 
and connect us to the important political concerns "we are 
most of us nowadays required to face," Allott, ultimately, 
can do very little. 
DeVitis also concerns himself with the human condi-
tion, arguing that The Ouiet American is "primarily about 
human beings involved in an ethical dilemn1a" (116). Both 
Allott in focusing on "effective moral action" and DeVitis 
in focusing on the novel's "ethical dilemma" universalize 
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the specific question Greene poses--what should a neutral 
individual do when confronted with the lethal excesses of 
imperialism? As Greene's assertion that he would go to 
almost any length to thwart u.s. imperialism suggests, 
Fowler's dilemma need not be read as a general human pre-
dicament. Yet DeVitis sees Greene not as critiquing the 
immorality of U.S. foreign policy through Alden Pyle but 
as showing "that idealism, when uninformed by experience, 
is a dangerous weapon in a world coerced by the cult of 
power" (118). To DeVitis, rather than an individual loca-
tion with a history of colonial oppression and with an on-
going struggle for liberation, Vietnam (specifically Sai-
gon) "becomes a microcosm that reflects much of twenti-
eth-century political thinking" (117). This formulation 
allows DeVitis to dismiss U.S. policy and to ignore the 
perspective of colonial subjects. DeVitis also argues 
that Fowler's decision to help the Viet Minh assassinate 
Pyle is not so much a political act based on opposition to 
U.S. policy but an act of human compassion. Fowler has 
not aligned himself with the Viet Minh and against the 
U.S., according to DeVitis, but has "taken sides to remain 
human, and the realization of his compassionate spirit 
overwhelms him" ( 120). 
In the 1970s and 1980s critics have continued to sup-
plant the novel's historical/political background with a 
focus on the human condition. Although asserting that 
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"Fowler discovers the realities of a river filled with 
bloated bodies, civilians dead in the path of \'Tar ( 113) , " 
Boardman argues that "The Quiet American is a 'morality' 
designed to show Everyman how to become conscious of 
today's distressing and Absurd condition" (116), and 
Fowler is "The twentieth-century Everyman recogniz[ing] 
his sin" (110). Similarly, Sharrock argues that "These 
scraps of history are by an act of metonymy made to indi-
cate the whole weight of instant history upon modern man" 
(202). A dead child in a ditch, "with its legs drawn up 
embryo-like," to Sharrock is suggestive of "the weakness 
of modern man without supernatural aid" (206). And Gaston 
finds the presence of violence important not because of 
what it reveals about u.s. intervention in Vietnam but 
"because it ia the one pure emotion that joins the primi-
tive with the modern world" (57). The brutal conditions 
in Vietnam for Gaston are not meant to demonstrate the 
harm caused by Western imperialism but to show that "the 
experience of modern man is filled with rot and squalor" 
(94). Likewise, Rai writes, "the setting insists on the 
meaninglessness of human condition [sic]" (75). 
Reading the war-ravaged Vietnamese landscape as sym-
bolic of the modern condition and the novel as speaking to 
enduring human qualities, literary critics have consis-
tently diminished Greene's political concerns and dis-
counted the U.S. role in promoting this war. By univer-
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salizing this text, removing its link to a particular his-
tory and culture, and converting its political commentary 
into a metaphorical statement about the modern condition, 
critics have undermined the potential of The Quiet Ameri-
can to warn about American policy in Vietnam before it es-
calated, to explain something about how this war began 
while the war was ongoing, and to counter the nationalist 
rewriting of this history that has taken place within the 
last two decades. 
(D) Moral Complexity. Critics have further dehistor-
icized and depoliticized The Quiet American by stressing 
the ambiguity and complexity of Greene's moral argument. 
The ambiguity endorsed by literary critics mystifies the 
systemic effects of existing social relations. Similarly, 
the complexity that critics find in Greene's fiction 
denies him the ability to make moral distinctions. In-
stead, critics argue that Greene is critical of both the 
Viet Minh and the Americans; that is, he is critical of 
ideological thinking in general. For instance, Spurling 
(writing in 1964) asserts that Fowler takes the side of 
"the murdered Vietnamese • • • against Pyle and his Ameri-
can bosses" as well as "Pyle's side against his (Fowler's) 
own • cowardly betrayal to the communists" (57) • 
Writing in 1983, Rai argues that Fowler's "attitude toward 
the Communists as well as the Americans seems to reflect 
Greene's own hatred for Communism ••• and his antipathy 
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towards America" (76). Similarly, Salvatore (writing in 
1988) extols Greene's writings because "a sufficient 
amount of ambiguity results in [his) fiction, which forces 
readers to decide whether an attack or a defense has been 
mounted" (51). This praise for Greene's alleged neutral-
ity, his ability to hold opposing positions, is consistent 
with a formalist privileging of paradox and ambiguity, as 
Stratford makes clear with his assertion that Greene has a 
"paradoxically ambivalent attitude. One cannot expect 
from him either extreme of commitment or non-commitment" 
(313). In praising Greene's ambivalence, Stratford re-
peats New Critical dogma, while for later critics like 
Spurling, Rai, and Salvatore, this favorable assessment of 
the equivocal politics of The Quiet American is evidence 
of the lingering formalism and centrism that exists within 
contemporary scholarship. 
This preference for ambivalence over commitment is a 
hallmark of liberalisme It is the kind of ostensibly hon-
est and self-critical politics advocated by Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr. in The Vital Center. For Schlesinger, 
Against totalitarian certitude, free society can only 
offer modern man devoured by alienation and fallibil-
ity. The great issue of this century is who is 
right. Is man a creature of doubt and ambiguity? •• 
• Or has he mastered the secrets of history and 
nature sufficiently to become ruthless, monolithic, 
infallible, to know whom to spare and whom to kill? 
(57) 
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Critical praise for Greene's lack of commitment and his 
repudiation of "abstract ideological conviction" (Rai 80) 
echoes a long-standing conceit of cold war liberalism--an 
anticommunism that positions itself as rational, centrist, 
and non-dogmatic. Whereas for Schlesinger "the totalitar-
ian left and the totalitarian right meet at last on the 
murky grounds of tyranny and terror" (ix-x),16 liberalism 
"is the spirit of the center--the spirit of human decency, 
opposing the extremes of tyranny" (256). 
In the context of a novel about American policy in 
Vietnam, this centrist valorization of ambivalence is far 
from neutral. First, it distorts Greene's position; he 
is sympathetic to Vietnamese anti-colonialism and opposed 
to U.S. policy. At times Greene has forthrightly denied 
his neutrality, arguing that "the temptation to double al-
legiance tends to disappear before American capitalism and 
imperialism" (qtd. in Allain 90). Second, since this al-
leged liberal ambivalence and ambiguity was nowhere in 
evidence in U.S. policy, which consistently opposed the 
Vietnamese communists, and since the U.S. was vastly more 
powerful economically and militarily than the Viet Minh, 
this ambivalence, this refusal to take sides effectively 
supported U.S. policy. 
During the decade that followed the publication of 
The Quiet American the U.S. pursued a brutal war against 
the Vietnamese communists. Embracing a range of lethal 
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technologies and strategies, the u.s. fought a war in 
three countries, generating massive economic and environ-
mental damage, dispossessing countless Vietnamese, Cambo-
dians, and Laotians, and causing upwards of 2 million 
deaths, horrors already in evidence in the 1950s and docu-
mented by Greene in The Quiet American. Against this mur-
derous background, American literary culture has viewed 
The Quiet American almost exclusively in terms of its re-
ligious and moral themes and its aesthetic features. The 
dominance of New Criticism, with its implicitly ahistori-
cal and ostensibly apolitical methodology, caused a novel 
about the roots of U.S. involvement in Vietnam to be seen 
as an examination of the human condition. Even with the 
onset of a newer, more politicized methodology, literary 
critics have persisted in refuting Greene's anti-American-
ism, in emphasizing conventional themes, in universalizing 
a specific political critique, and in praising a "real 
world which is not black and white, but grey" (Sharrock 
207). Whether read as Red, black-and-white, or grey, 
Greene has consistently been rebuked and revised to accord 
with a liberal pluralist ideology. 
Notes 
1. Salvatore 59; Greene qtd. in Allain 90. 
2. There was general agreement about the Viet Minh's 
popular support. In 1953, Senator John F. Kennedy argued 
that "Despite any wishful thinking to the contrary, it 
should be apparent that the popularity and prevalence of 
Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout Indochina would 
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cause either partition or a coalition government to result 
in eventual domination by the communists." Likewise, 
President Eisenhower wrote that he had "never talked or 
corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese 
affairs who did not agree that had an election been held 
at the time of the fighting (1954), possibly 80 percent of 
the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi 
Minh as their leader" (qtd. in Joseph 87). And in 1954 
Joseph Alsop declared, "The Vietminh could not possibly 
have carried on with the resistance for one year, let 
alone nine years, without the people's strong, united sup-
port" (qtd. in Committee 17). 
3. This "domino theory" was a consistent justifica-
tion for u.s. political and military involvement in Indo-
china. President Eisenhower, for instance, argued that 
Asia 
has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to 
the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't af-
ford greater losses. . the loss of Indochina, of 
Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia, 
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now you • • . are talking about millions and millions 
and millions of people •••• the possible conse-
quences of the loss are just incalculable to the free 
world. ( 34) 
4. In his 1973 introduction Greene explains some of 
the historical background that shaped The Quiet American. 
According to Greene, 
The Life photographer at the moment of the explosion 
was so well placed that he was able to take an aston-
ishing and horrifying photograph which showed the 
body of a puss-puss driver still upright after his 
legs had been blown off. This photograph was repro-
duced in an American propaganda magazine published in 
Manila over a title 'the work of Ho Chi Minh, ' al-
though General The had promptly and proudly claimed 
the bomb as his own. • • . There was certainly evi-
dence of contacts between the American services and 
'General' The. A jeep with the bodies of two Ameri-
can women was found by a French rubber planter •.• 
presumably the had been killed by the Viet Minh, but 
what were they doing on the plantation? The bodies 
were promptly collected by the American embassy, and 
nothing mre was heard of the incident. Not a word 
appeared in the Press. An American Consul was ar-
rested late at night on the bridge to Dakow • • • 
carrying plastic bombs in his car. Again the inci-
dent was hushed up for diplomatic reasons. ("Intro-
duction" xviii-xix) 
5. "I grow tired of denying," Greene wrote to the 
London Sunday Telegraph, "that there is any connection be-
tween my character Pyle in The Quiet American and General 
Lansdale, the American counter-insurgency expert whom I 
have never had the misfortune to meet" (Yours 127). 
6. In an election limited to the South and with a 
choice between two candidates, Diem and Bao Dai, Diem won 
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98.2 percent of the vote, including 605,025 votes from the 
450,000 registered voters in Saigon (Young 53). Having 
been outlawed, the Viet Minh and the Communist Party could 
not present candidates in the 1956 elections. 
7. Herman and Chomsky see flak as generated outside 
of and targeted at the media (i.e., institutional adver-
tising, right-wing monitoring and think-tank operations 
designed to attack the media). I am arguing here that the 
media, too, generates flak in order to discredit opinion 
that does not accord with its own centrist ideology. 
8. Among these facts was that the u.s. "was rushing 
food and other supplies into Vietnam for the refugees." 
Also, the Post claimed that The Quiet American "implies 
that the communists love the Asian peasants and that Amer-
ica shouldn't help anti-communists like President Diem of 
South Vietnam, even if the Reds conquer all Asia." Be-
sides the familiar inability to distinguish Vietnamese 
anti-colonialism from global communism, the Post here ig-
nores much about U.S. policy in Vietnam. 
In identifying the food and other supplies the u.s. 
was sending the refugees, the Post distorts the true na-
ture of U.S. aid. According to The Pentagon Papers, be-
tween 1954-1961 more than 75% of U.S. economic aid went to 
the South Vietnamese military, while the "aid for agricul-
ture and transportation principally funded projects with 
strategic purposes and with an explicit military ratio-
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nale." For instance, one 20-mile stretch of highway from 
Saigon to Bien Hoa that had been requested by General 
Samuel T. Williams for specifically military purposes "re-
ceived more U.S. economic aid than all funds provided for 
labor, community development, social welfare, health, and 
education in the years 1954-1961" (qtd. in Truang Buu Lam 
39). 
Also, the refugees alluded to by the Post fled the 
North upon the end of the French-Indochinese War and the 
establishment of the Ho Chi Minh-led government in Hanoi. 
Although the Post proudly points to the aid given these 
refugees by the U.S., it does not reveal the part the U.S. 
played in facilitating this migration of a million Catho-
lics. As Marilyn Young makes clear, this exodus was en-
couraged by the Catholic hierarchy and organized by Lans-
dale and his team. Entire parishes," she writes, "were 
carried south in American ships, following priests who 
told them Christ had moved south, as well as making prom-
ises of land and livelihood." According to Young, Lans-
dale developed a rumor campaign "that the United States 
would back a new war, one in which atomic weapons would 
certainly be used" (45). 
Also missing from the Post's criticism of The Quiet 
American is recognition that the Diem regime and the very 
establishment of a South Vietnamese nation violated the 
Geneva Accords, since the division of Vietnam was a provi-
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sional arrangement that was to last no longer than three 
hundred days. That the Post should ignore these points is 
no surprise; it had, after all, run articles declaring 
South Vietnam "the Bright Spot in Asia" and claiming that 
"Two years ago at Geneva, South Vietnam was virtually sold 
down the river to the Conununists." "This spunky little 
Asian country," the Post wrote, "is back on its own feet, 
thanks to a 'mandarin in a sharkskin suit who's upsetting 
the Red timetable"' ( qtd. in Fitzgerald 114) • 
9. Although I am suggesting an institutional sympa-
thy, not a conspiracy to shape belief, it is worth noting 
that according to Michael Parenti, 
In the early 1950s some 400 to 600 journalists were 
in the pay of the CIA. • • • At least twenty-five 
news organizations have served the CIA, including the 
Washington Post, the New York Times, CBS, ABC, NBC, 
Time, Newsweek, the Associated Press, United Press 
International, the Hearst newspapers, the Scripps-
Howard newspapers, u.s. News and World Report, and 
the Wall Street Journal •.•• In the early 1950s a 
news story claiming that China was sending troops to 
Vietnam to help insurgents fight against the French 
proved to be a CIA fabrication. The agency induced 
the New York Times to remove a reporter, Sidney Gru-
son, from a story about the CIA-inspired overthrow of 
a democratic government in Guatemala because he was 
getting too close to uncovering the u.s. plot. 
(232-33) 
The academic community, too, had substantial ties with the 
C.I.A. and the State Department. In 1966 C.I.A. director 
Admiral William F. Raborn declared, 
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in actual numbers [the C.I.A.] could easily staff the 
faculty of a university with our experts. In a way, 
we do. Many of those who leave us join the faculties 
of universities and colleges. Some of our own per-
sonnel take leave of absence to teach and renew their 
contacts in the academic world. 
In the same year State Department Under-Secretary for Ad-
ministration William J. Crocket claimed, 
The colleges and universities provide [the State De-
partment] with a rich body of information about many 
subjects, countries, and people prepared for many 
clients and purposes. For example, the United States 
Government is spending $30 million this year on for-
eign affairs studies in American universities •••• 
[the State Department has] a file on more than 5,000 
foreign affairs studies now underway in American uni-
versities. Our foreign affairs documentation center 
lends out to State Department officers and officers 
of other agencies 400 unpublished academic papers 
each month. The Department receives each month over 
200 new academic papers. (qtd. in Windmiller 121) 
10. Robert 0. Evans, "Existentialism in Greene's The 
Quiet American," Modern Fiction Studies 3 (1957): 241-48; 
R. E. Hughes, "The Quiet American: The Case Reopened," Re-
nascence 12.1 (1959): 41+; Georg M.A. Gaston, "The Struc-
ture of Salvation in The Quiet American," Renascence 31 
(1979): 93-106; Lisa Vargo, "The Quiet American and 'A Mr. 
Lieberman,'" English Language Notes 21.4 (1984): 63-70; 
Zakia Pathak, Saswati Senupta and Sharmila Purkayastha, "The 
Prison House of Orientalism," Textual Practice 5.2 (1991): 
195-218. 
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11. The only exceptions to this apolitical, New Criti-
cal reading of The Quiet American during the period 1957-
1970 appeared, not surprisingly, in Soviet and East German 
literary journals: Anna Elistratova, "Graham Greene and His 
New Novel," Soviet Literature VIII (1956): 149-55; N. Eish-
iskina, "Graham Greene's Novels," Voprosy Literatury VI 
(1961): 149-69; and Valentina Ivasheva, "Legende und War-
heit uber Graham Greene," Zeitschrift fur Anglistik und 
Amerikanstik X (1962): 229-58. 
12. Henry J. Donaghy writes, "With The Quiet American, 
Greene left his explicitly religious novels behind and re-
turned to the political novel" (Graham Greene 67); Graheme 
Smith speaks of "the internationalist phase we can see be-
ginning with The Quiet American (131); John Spurling dis-
cusses "the series of post-war 'political' novels from The 
Quiet American to The Human Factor" (33); and Samuel Hynes 
declares that 
Greene himself describes his work as being first po-
litical, then Catholic, and then political again, dis-
tinguishing early novels such as It's a Battlefield and 
later novels such as The Quiet American from the major 
religious works of his middle period, Brighton Rock, 
The Power and the Glory, and The Heart of the Matter. 
( 3) 
13. In its review of The Quiet American, Newsweek de-
clared that 
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In 1952 [Greene) was temporarily denied a visa to the 
United States. In accordance with the McCarran Act, 
the United States consul in Saigon refused the visa be-
cause in his youth Greene had been a Communist for four 
weeks •••• More poignantly, he may remember the libel 
suit which Shirley Temple, then age 9, brought against 
him for a review of "Wee Willie Winkie." ••• Delicacy 
forbids repeating the exact words of Greene's review, 
which suggested what a precociously appetizing tidbit 
the young star was. ("This Man's" 59) 
Delicacy does not forbid me from repeating Greene's words; 
he wrote that Shirley Temple "had a certain adroit coquetry 
which appealed to middle-aged men" (qtd. in Kelly 11). 
14. Not all critics have sought to defend Greene from 
these charges. John Atkins refers to "This anti-American 
element [that caused] a great splash of emotion and upset a 
lot of people" (232) without attempting to repudiate 
Greene's anti-Americanism. Instead, he argues that no 
"prejudice, even the rankest prejudice, necessarily spoils a 
novel. There is no reason," he writes, "why the author 
should not have a viewpoint, and even a crazy viewpoint does 
not damn a novel" (232). Similarly, Francis Kunkel suggests 
that even if we grant the premise (of critics like Robert 
Gorham Davis) "that this book is riddled with political her-
esy," such "unhealthy political notions ••• do not doom a 
novel." For Kunkel, "only apolitical shortcomings are 
enough to bury a failing novel" (150). So that their opin-
ions will conform to the dominant beliefs within and receive 
the approbation of literary culture, Atkins and Kunkel grant 
the validity of the flak directed at Greene and argue that 
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such political concerns are irrelevant to their consider-
ations of the literary merit of The Quiet American. 
15. It is revealing to juxtapose Rai's discussion of 
Sartrean existentialism with Sartre's discussion of the 
Vietnam War. To Sartre, the war was 
a new stage in the development of imperialism, a stage 
usually called neo-colonialism because it is character-
ized by aggression against a former colony which has 
already gained its independence, with the aim of subju-
gating it anew to colonial rule. With the beginning of 
independence, the neo-colonialists take care to finance 
a putsch or coup d'etat so that the new heads of state 
do not represent the interests of the masses but those 
of a narrow privileged strata, and, consequently, of 
foreign capital. (538) 
As for the U.S., Sartre argues, "the American government is 
guilty of having preferred • • . a policy of war and aggres-
sian aimed at total genocide to a policy of peace" (548), 
16. Presumably, these grounds are just around the 
corner from Lionel Tilling's "dark and bloody crossroads 
where literature and politics meet." 
CHAPTER 3 
THE GREENEING OF INDOCHINA 
Who cared about the individuality of the man in the paddy 
field--and who does now? The only man to treat him as a 
man is the political commissar. He'll sit in his hut and 
ask his name and listen to his complaints; he'll give up 
an hour a day to teaching him--it doesn't matter what, 
he's being treated like a man, like someone of value. 
--Graham Greene 
The French are dying every day •••• They aren't leading 
these people on with half-lies like your politicians--and 
ours. I've been in India, Pyle, and I know the harm lib-
erals do •••• I'd rather be an exploiter who fights for 
what he exploits and dies with it. 
--Graham Greene1 
The repeated attacks on The Quiet American were not 
evidence of Greene's radicalism so much as of the reac-
tionary political climate of America in the 1950s. Cold 
war liberalism was critical of views like Greene's that 
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were not wholly supportive of U.S. global policy and whol-
ly condemning of communism. To see through the cloud of 
red-baiting stirred up by The Quiet American is to find a 
novel that, far from assaulting American verities, adheres 
to a belief in the benign motivation behind U.S. foreign 
policy. Instead of seeing the war as part of a larger 
struggle to further the interests of global capital, 
Greene blames American idealism and laments the passing of 
French and British colonialism. Despite the red-baiting 
he was subjected to and despite his occasional sympathy 
for the Viet Minh, then, Greene in The Quiet American 
makes what amounts to a modest critique of U.S. policy, 
perpetuates a paternalistic attitude toward colonial sub-
jects, and reinforces stereotypes common to colonial dis-
course. 
The Americans 
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While the main tendency of journalists and critics 
has been to dehistoricize and depoliticize The Quiet Amer-
ican, there has been since the war a counter (if marginal) 
tendency to see Greene's novel as an accurate, even pre-
scient depiction of the lethal ignorance and naivete of 
U.S. policy.2 Writing in London Magazine, Michael Menshaw 
declared The Quiet American "still the best novel about 
the war, and • appallingly prophetic" (105). In Roll-
ing Stone Gloria Emerson claimed Greene "always understood 
what was going to happen there, and in that small and 
quiet novel, told us everything" (123). Richard Kelly as-
serted, The Quiet American "has acquired a new relevance 
since it first appeared in 1955. Alden Pyle ••• antici-
pates the painful folly of the American intervention in 
Vietnam some years later" (67). Gordon Taylor argued that 
The Quiet American "is as likely to be cited as 'evidence' 
by historians and reporters as to be lauded as exemplary 
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by literary critics" (294), while "Greene's delineation of 
the 1946 to 1954 French-Viet Minh conflict," to Thomas 
Myers, "is an eerie experience in regard to the replicat-
ing and enlarging of its key elements during the American 
involvement" (39). Beginning in the mid-1970s and con-
tinuing to the present, literary critics have considered 
the political and historical dimensions of The Quiet Amer-
ican1 most often finding Greene's novel an insightful an-
alysis of the motivation behind and the exercise of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Despite the frequency of these claims, though, little 
has been written that identifies exactly how Greene's de-
piction of U.S. behavior in Vietnam between 1952 and 1954 
anticipates subsequent U.S. militarism in Vietnam. Prob-
ably the most complete discussion along these lines is 
Eric Larsen's 1976 essay in the New Republic. "Remarkable 
in its prescience," The Quiet American, for Larsen, "reads 
like an explicit prophecy of exactly what was to occur in 
the disastrous years following 1964" and "is still the 
best novel to have come out of the Vietnam War" (40-41, 
emphasis added). Larsen goes on to say that "Greene's 
analysis of the American motivation in that war is 
rather unpleasantly accurate" (41). And he traces U.S. 
prosecution of a decade-long war against the Vietnamese 
communists to 
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our failure to perceive life generously for the un-
tidy thing it really is. • •• Here we can see the 
specific failure of perception or emotion that Greene 
speaks of as "innocence": our characteristic failure 
to see or experience life as quite real •••. What 
the satire is all about finally is our inability to 
think, politically or morally, or perhaps even to 
feel without recourse to abstraction. (41) 
This American innocence, this inability to see life in its 
full complexity, is embodied by Alden Pyle and his belief 
in "democracy." According to Larsen, Greene describes 
through Pyle "that part of us that chooses not to think 
but to substitute a few abstract and therefore rigid as-
sumptions for the process of real thought" (42).3 
In assessing The Quiet American, Larsen is correct; 
this ffinerican innocence, this tendency to think abstractly 
about "democracy" and to ignore the complicated and con-
tradictory real world is a central part of Greene's cri-
tique. Pyle is a representative innocent American who is, 
Greene writes, "absorbed in the dilenunas of democracy and 
the responsibilities of the West" (11). He is an idealist 
whose face often registers a "look of pain and disappoint-
ment ••• when reality didn't match the romantic ideas he 
cherished, or when someone he loved or admired dropped be-
low the impossible standard he had set" (66-67). At times 
Pyle is a Jimmy Stewart-like rube who admits he "never had 
a girl ••• not properly. Not what you'd call a real 
experience" (94), and who gazes "at a milk bar across the 
street and sa[ys] dreamily, 'That looks like a good soda-
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fountain'" (16). He is respectful, well-mannered, and 
"very meticulous about small courtesies" (3), and he ob-
jects to profane comments about Vietnamese prostitutes, 
"complaining that anything good--and prettiness and grace 
are surely forms of goodness--should be marred or ill-
treated" (31). His very appearance shows him to be inno-
cent: his "unmistakably young and unused face," Fowler 
says, "f:!.ung at us like a dart. With his gangly legs and 
his crew cut and his wide campus gaze he seemed incapable 
of harm" (10). With his New England background--"only ten 
days ago he had been walking back across the Common in 
Boston"--(10) and the allusion to John Alden (who had in-
nocently wooed Priscilla from Miles Standish, much as Pyle 
woos Phuong from Fowler), Alden Pyle is clearly meant as a 
representative innocent and idealistic American. 
In Pyle Greene continues the theme of American inno-
cence (and European experience) that was an especial con-
cern for Henry James. Greene long maintained his admira-
tion for and indebtedness to James's fiction, claiming The 
Wings of a Dove was among his favorite novels (Jove 23) 
and declaring that "the pure novel ••• reach[ed] its 
magnificent tortuous climax in England in the works of 
Henry James" (qtd. in Shuttleworth 34). Although wrong 
for ignoring the historical context and political content 
of The Quiet American, critics like Roger Sharrock were to 
some degree correct in noting that 
underneath the documentary and the political comment 
the conflict between innocence and experience is the 
true theme, played out • • • in a real historical 
situation in a real world. (216) 
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Greene updates this theme, showing that on the world stage 
such innocence can be lethal. As Frances Kunkel explains, 
"Where James sees this innocence as a redemptive quality 
that will save the Old World, Greene sees it as positively 
ruinous in the world of today" (151). When thinking back 
on Pyle, Fowler exhorts God to "save us always . • • from 
the innocent and the good" ( 12). 
Greene is unsparing in his depiction of Pyle's devo-
tion to cant and obliviousness to the real-world conse-
quences of his actions. After walking through the remains 
of an explosion he has arranged, Pyle sees blood on his 
shoes and declares he "must get a shine," to which Fowler 
comments, "I don't think he knew what he was saying. He 
was seeing a real war for the first time." Fowler forces 
Pyle to see the grim results of his actions, "push[ing] 
him into a patch of blood where a stretcher had lain" 
( 15 7) • 
But Fowler's efforts are to no avail, as he soon rec-
ognizes, asking, "What's the good? he'll always be inno-
cent, you can't blame the innocent, they are always guilt-
less. All you can do is control them or eliminate them. 
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Innocence is a kind of insanity" (157). Pyle, Fowler 
tells us, "was impregnably armoured by his good intentions 
and his ignorance" (158); he knows little of the politi-
cal situation in Indochina, depending entirely upon the 
conceits of academic foreign policy expert York Harding. 
(Hardi.ng, who had been in Vietnam "once for a week on hi.R 
way from Bangkok to Tokyo" [162], is the author of The Ad-
vance of Red China, The Challenge to Democracy, and The 
Role of the West.) In commentary meant to identify Pyle 
as an embodiment of American policy, Fowler says, 
I know your motives are good; they always are •••• 
I wish sometimes you had a few bad motives; you 
might understand a little more about human beings. 
And that applies to your country, too. (126) 
For Greene, Pyle's flaws--a lack of worldly experience, a 
failure to recognize his own destructiveness, an excessive 
idealism, and a reliance upon abstractions--are America's 
flaws. 
It is precisely this use of Pyle that distorts 
Greene's analysis. For while the American innocent may 
have a long-standing place within literary tradition, it 
is another thing entirely to turn to a nineteenth century 
literary conceit and national myth to explain mid-twenti-
eth century u.s. foreign policy. After all, the core in-
nocence Greene attributes to Pyle is little apparent in 
U.S. foreign policy during the cold war--and even less ap-
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parent in U.S. actions in Vietnam. As a figure meant to 
embody the aims and beliefs of u.s. policy--Pyle is decid-
edly unrepresentative. 
To demonstrate how Greene's use of Pyle misrepresents 
the grounds upon which American foreign policy is formu-
lated and implemented, we must answer this question: to 
what extent has this policy been motivated by, in Time's 
words, "the phenomenon of u.s. good will"? Or to put it 
another way, is u.s. policy significantly inspired by con-
cerns other than economic self-interest and national ad-
vantage? In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy William Ap-
pleman Williams identifies three conceptions that guide 
American policy: 
One is the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to 
help other people solve their problems. A second is 
the principle of self-determination applied at the 
international level, which asserts the right of every 
society to establish its own goals or objectives, and 
to realize them internally through the means it de-
cides are appropriate. • • • But the third idea • . 
• is one which insists that other people cannot 
really solve their problems and improve their lives 
unless they go about it in the same way as the United 
States. (9) 
Williams argues that this third idea overwhelms whatever 
warm impulses and concerns for self-determination are held 
by U.S. policy elites. "This insistence that other people 
ought to copy America," he writes, "contradicts the hu-
manitarian urge to help them and the idea that they have 
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the right to make such key decisions for themselves" (10). 
I would argue that the first two of Williams's points 
function rhetorically, not practically; warm impulses and 
the principle of self-determination do not determine poli-
cy. I take issue with Williams's third point as well, 
since it suggests that, however ultimately frustrated, the 
u.s. is motivated by compassion and benevolence. 
I do not deny that policy-makers may frequently be-
lieve their own mythology--such deception, after all, is a 
central purpose of ideology. Nonetheless, in attempting 
to understand the nature of U.S. foreign policy it is more 
important (and ultimately more explanatory) to view the 
results of this policy than to construct motivations for 
the people who shape it. As Richard Miller observes, 
We resolve the question of interests and principles 
with (major political figures) as with anyone else, 
by looking at what they actually do, and at the in-
formation and background of their choices. (164) 
It is difficult to find a shaping humanitarian impulse be-
hind the results of u.s. foreign policy. On the other 
hand, if one can get past the fog of ideology, it is easy 
to recognize how ruling class interests shape this policy. 
Williams's notion that American diplomacy is a tragedy, 
that American policy-makers are well-intentioned but self-
deceived Lears, foolishly making decisions that contradict 
their best impulses, puts far too noble a gloss on a poli-
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cy that has consistently thwarted anti-capitalist social 
movements and supported authoritarian pro-capitalist re-
gimes. American foreign policy has been guided by eco-
nomic self-interest, and its long, bitter campaign against 
communism has been waged to maintain and expand global 
capital. The American crusade against communism was moti-
vated by the need to thwart, in the words of Noam Chomsky, 
the effort of indigenous movements to extricate their 
societies from the integrated world system dominated 
largely by American capital, and to use their re-
sources for their own social and economic develop-
ment. (At War 5) 
Of course; some find a vital link between capitalism 
and social justice and thus maintain that there is no dis-
crepancy between humanitarian impulses and global capital. 
Harry Magdoff summarizes this argument: 
Political freedom is equated with Western-style de-
mocracy. The economic basis of this democracy is 
free enterprise. Hence the political aim of defense 
of the free world must also involve the defense of 
free trade and free enterprise. (Age of Imperialism 
175) 
Or as President Clinton's National Security Adviser An-
thony Lake explained, having "Throughout the cold war • • 
• contained a global threat to market democracies," the 
U.S. can now seek "enlargement--enlargement of the world's 
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free community of market democracies" (qtd. in Chomsky, 
"Clinton Vision" 28). The consequences of this defense 
and enlargement of capitalism, however, have been far from 
humanitarian. There has instead been a widening gap be-
tween rich and poor, as well as an increase in unemploy-
ment, ecological ruin, malnutrition, and disease.4 
Greene's reliance upon the innocent American mythos, 
then, perpetuates a useful falsehood about the motivation 
of U.S. policy elites. In The Quiet American Greene sees 
U.S. foreign policy as driven by an ignorance born out of 
innocence. Although he shows the brutal results of Ameri-
can policy, demonstrating that U.S. actions are no differ-
ent from any other nation's, Greene does not challenge and 
in fact reinforces the notion that American policy-makers 
see their actions as benign and believe in their own good 
will. In his response to Diana Trilling in Commentary, 
Philip Rahv identifies the ideological usefulness of 
Greene's view of American innocence: 
Mrs. Trilling appraises this anti-Americanism as Com-
munist in essence. But is it? Its principal con-
tent, apart from some pointed witticisms, is the 
charge of "innocence," which it is said mankind can-
not afford to indulge Americans in at this hour of 
universal peril. Now obviously this is a charge that 
Communism does not consider in the least useful; it 
has never formed a part of its indictment of America. 
What the Communists do accuse Americans of is "war-
mongering" and conspiring to dominate the world for 
imperialist gain. Imperialists and "Wall Street 
profiteers" are scarcely noted for their "innocence," 
a quality implying good will and good intentions. 
( 69) 
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U.S. policy toward the Vietnamese communists, Greene sug-
gests (and U.S. action during the Vietnam War, Larsen and 
others suggest), is due to the American national charac-
ter, to its excessive innocence and idealism, to the naive 
determination of people like Pyle "to do good, not to any 
individual person, but to a country, a continent, a world" 
(~ 11). No matter how fundamentally ignorant and mis-
guided were U.S. actions, the motivation behind such ac-
tions, on this account, was benign. 
Repeatedly, the pundits, politicians, bureaucrats, 
journalists, and scholars who comprise the American for-
eign-policy establishment, even while admitting the awful 
consequences of its policy, have reinforced notions of 
American exceptionalism. For Hans Morgenthau, "Only the 
enemies of the United States will question the generosity 
of [American efforts to build a nation in South Vietnam] 
which have no parallel in history" (qtd. in Chomsky, Amer-
ican Power 32). Acknowledging that the U.S. "did indeed 
rip South Vietnam's social fabric to shreds" and agreeing 
that Vietnamese communists' criticism of American imperi-
alism "was not entirely wrong," Stanley Karnow argued that 
the U.S. was "motivated by the loftiest of intentions" 
(439). For Arthur Schlesinger, U.S. policies in Vietnam 
circa 1954 were "part of our general program of interna-
tional goodwill" (qtd. in American Power 329), and for 
George Kennan, throughout its diplomatic history but par-
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ticularly in Asia, the U.S. has attempted "to achieve our 
foreign policy objectives by inducing other governments to 
sign up to professions of high moral and legal principle" 
(46). We have, Kennan argues, made "ourselves slaves of 
the concepts of international law and morality" (54). 
Writing only a few years before the U.S. would overthrow 
democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala 
and would subvert the Geneva Accords in Vietnam, Kennan 
identified America's "legalistic-moralistic approach to 
international problems" (95) as the most serious flaw in 
u.s. policy formulation, a flaw he argued had severely 
handicapped U.S. global aims. Likewise, Herman Kahn 
lamented that "people in this country are not used to 
doing dirty tricks and playing rough. It doesn't come 
naturally to most of us" (qtd. in Windmiller 118).5 This 
belief in American beneficence is not a cold war relic. 
Anthony Lake, writing two years after the Persian Gulf 
War, asserted that, unlike other nations, the U.S. does 
"not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by 
force" (qtd. in Chomsky, "Clinton Vision" 28), while in 
1994 in the New York Times Magazine and Vanity Fair re-
spectively, David Fromkin argued that "American motives 
are now largely humanitarian" and former Vietnam War cor-
respondent David Halberstam wrote of "the American in-
stinct for goodness and morality in foreign policy" 
(250) .6 
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The Quiet American is meant to demonstrate the absur-
dity and venality of such views. But in so doing Greene 
does not question the basic premise underlying this posi-
tion; he shows Pyle to be a cynical exploiter, not a 
naive believer in the myth of American exceptionalism. 
For Greene, "Pyle was an innocent and an idealist" (Yours 
127). The problem here is that to see American policy as 
idealist is to assert its humanitarian inspiration; to 
see it as innocent is to suggest that policy-makers are 
unaware of the consequences of their actions, consequences 
Greene shows are the consistent results of U.S. policy. 
Thus whereas many earlier critics thought Pyle's exagger-
ated character stemmed from Greene's anti-Americanism, I 
find the opposite to be true--Pyle's unbelievability stems 
from Greene's acceptance of American exceptionalism. 
Greene's view of American foreign policy--out of which 
Pyle has been constructed and which he is meant to repre-
sent--is itself unbelievable. Those of Pyle's character-
istics (virginity, chivalry, courage, enthusiasm, naivete) 
that are the most unbelievable and that most obviously 
violate the otherwise realistic, almost journalistic tenor 
of this novel are those qualities meant to signify Ameri-
can innocence and idealism. 
Although critical of its policy in Vietnam, Greene in 
The Quiet American does not question, and in fact rein-
forces a belief in American exceptionalism, a belief that 
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underlies the dominant view of U.S. foreign policy. That 
Greene was repeatedly attacked for being anti-American is 
evidence of the especially constrained discourse of cold 
war liberalism. That literary critics, even while defend-
ing Greene's analysis and critique of U.S. policy, have 
not questioned the novel's affirmation of U.S. humanitari-
anism suggests a broad sympathy between the world-views of 
American literary culture and the political establish-
ment.7 
Missing from The Quiet American and from its critical 
evaluations has been a recognition that u.s. policy is 
part of a systematic effort to thwart egalitarian social 
movements that threaten American commercial interests and 
frustrate American geopolitical aims, an effort "to secure 
the international position of the U.S. and the interests 
of the capitalist class" (Joseph 16). Although Greene is 
well aware that in Vietnam the U.S. was motivated by geo-
political and economic concerns, his reliance upon the in-
nocent American lessens U.S. blame and diminishes the view 
that, in Chomsky's words, 
the Vietnam war is simply a catastrophic episode, a 
grim and costly failure in [the] long-term effort to 
reduce Eastern Asia and much of the rest of the world 
to part of the American-dominated economic system (At 
War 9). 
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The Europeans 
His understanding of the motivation behind u.s. poli-
cy notwithstanding, Greene's depiction of the French-In-
dochinese War generally accords with the historical re-
cord. A careful reader may even discover, in the composi-
tion of troops fighting to keep Indochina under French 
control, something of the dislocations caused by and the 
global exploitation inherent in capitalist imperialism. 
Among the "French" soldiers encountered by Fowler are a 
Senagelese sentry (38), Moroccan and Senegalese platoons 
(75), and a corporal "making a joke in German" (30). 
Also, the troops who accompany Fowler at the canal massa-
cre are German: Fowler "heard somebody ••• say with 
great seriousness, 'Gott sei dank.' Except for the lieu-
tenant they were most of them Germans" (45). These are 
Foreign Legionnaires who Greene describes elsewhere in The 
Quiet American as standing "guard in their white kepis and 
their scarlet epaulettes" (18). These details, however, 
are neither emphasized nor explained. Greene uses this 
information neither to criticize the French nor to iden-
tify the complex mix of geopolitics and capitalist expan-
sion against which this war takes place. Instead, these 
details make up the historical background out of which he 
writes. H. Bruce Franklin spells out some of the history 
Greene omits: 
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the great majority of those fighting under French 
command were not French but Vietnamese conscripts, 
Foreign Legionnaires (many of whom were Germans, in-
cluding tens of thousands of Nazi soldiers captured 
at the end of World War II), and troops from the 
French colonies in Africa, especially Algeria, Mo-
rocco, and Senegal, forced to fight against an anti-
colonialist insurgency with which many were beginning 
to identify •••• General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
April 1945 explicitly stripped all captured German 
soldiers of their rights as prisoners of war by con-
signing them to a new classification he called "Dis-
armed Enemy Forces" (DEF). Of the DEF under u.s. ju-
risdiction, 140,000 were transferred to the Soviet 
Union, which repatriated the last survivors in 1956; 
400,000 were shipped to Great Britain, which used 
them as slave laborers until July 1948; and 740,000 
were given to France, where many of them starved to 
death. It has been argued that this starvation was a 
deliberate policy designed to force the prisoners to 
choose the only available escape: enlistment in the 
French Foreign Legion, whose ranks were being swelled 
so that France could reoccupy its colonies in Indo-
china. So tens of thousands of German POWs, actually 
U.S. prisoners illegally handed over to France, ended 
up as one of the main forces fighting from 1946 to 
1954 to destroy the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and reduce Vietnam once again to colonial status. 
(25-27)8 
The recruitment of troops from their colonies was not a 
new policy for the French, who had employed colonial 
troops during the first world war. Ho Chi Minh asserted 
that from its far-flung empire, "700,000 natives came to 
France, and of this number 80,000 [would] never see the 
sun of their country" (73). According to Thomas Hodgkin, 
50,000 Vietnamese troops and 50,000 workers were sent to 
Europe during World War I (211). The global reach of 
French colonialism sometimes resulted in a surprising 
(though hardly liberatory) boundary-transgressing multi-
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culturalism, as in Nguyen Dac Bang's remembrance of being 
guarded by "a platoon of red-capped Senagelese soldiers" 
while a political prisoner in French Guinea (qtd. in Luong 
119). 
It is worth noting that, despite their national pur-
suits for economic advantage in East Asia, France and 
Britain were united in their opposition to communism. In 
June 1931, for instance, during a French campaign against 
the Indochinese Communist Party, Ho Chi Minh escaped to 
Hong Kong, where he was, in Marilyn Young's words, "coop-
eratively arrested" by the British (5). In September 
1945, after Ho Chi Minh had declared Vietnamese indepen-
dence, the British (who were in charge of the Japanese 
surrender south of the 16th parallel) with Indian Ghurka 
troops fought the Viet Minh in Saigon. As Young explains, 
"Not only did one colonial power come to the aid of an-
other in need, but it drew on the resources of its colo-
nies to do so" (12). Also, Britain, like France, employed 
former axis troops, rearming both Vichy French and J"apa-
nese soldiers to help expel the Viet Minh from Saigon. 
Whether or not this use of Japanese troops to reinstall 
French colonial rule was the explicit aim of the British 
(Stanley Karnow suggests this policy resulted from deci-
sions made by British General Douglas Gracey in Saigon and 
not by officials in the British government), the result--
expulsion of communists and maintenance of colonial rule--
was in keeping with the capitalist powers' primary goals.9 
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At times in The Quiet American Greene suggests simi-
larities between the French war and British and American 
imperialism. A battle between French and Vietnamese 
troops is described as "fixed like a panorama of the Boer 
War in an old Illustrated London News" (38). Greene tells 
us that among Pyle's books is "a history of the war in the 
Philippines" (21). And in response to the suggestion that 
America came into Vietnam "with clean h.:mds," Fowler re-
sponds, "Hawaii, Puerto Rico • • • New Mexico" ( 117). But 
Greene's intent here is not to demonstrate the continuity 
of capitalist exploitation of the third world. Instead, 
he seeks to defend French colonialism by delegitimating 
American exceptionalism, an exceptionalism that has tradi-
tionally been thought of, in Amy Kaplan's words, as "in-
herently anti-imperialist, in opposition to the empire-
building of either the Old World or of communism and fas-
cism, which collapse together into totalitarianism" (12). 
Greene attempts to show that the U.S. is not anti-imperi-
alist, as the exceptionalist myth asserts, but that, like 
France, its policy is determined by economic and geopo-
litical interests. Ironically, as I discussed above, even 
as he attempts to deny American exceptionalism in prac-
tice, Greene reinforces the notion that, however wrong-
headed, it serves as a guiding principle for u.s. policy 
elites. 
Greene consistently sympathizes with the French, par-
ticularly when compared with Americans. Fowler derides 
his "American colleagues of the press, big, noisy, boyish 
and middle-aged, full of sour cracks against the French, 
who were, when all was said, fighting this war" (15). 
Similarly, Fowler declares, "it was their war, not ours. 
We had no God-given right to information. We didn't have 
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to fight left-wing deputies in Paris as well as the troops 
of Ho-Chi-Minh ••• We were not dying" (57). But perhaps 
the clearest example of Greene's sympathy for the French 
is voiced by the heroic Captain Trouin, a pilot Fowler ac-
companies on a bombing mission. Trouin declares he de-
tests "napalm bombing. From three thousand feet, in 
safety." And 
he said with anger against a whole world that didn't 
understand, "I'm not fighting a colonial war. Do you 
think I'd do these things for the planters of Terre 
Rouge? I'd rather be court-martialled. We are 
fighting all of your wars, but you leave us the 
guilt." (145) 
Trouin is partly correct: the French were fighting for 
the interests of capitalist nations, as is evident in the 
amount of economic and material support provided them by 
the u.s., and as was graphically demonstrated by the sub-
sequent American war against the Vietnamese. Trouin goes 
on to say, 
I think that I am defending Europe. And you know, 
those others--they do some monstrous things also. 
When they were driven out of Hanoi in 1946 they left 
terrible relics among their own people--people they 
thought had helped us. (146) 
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Trouin's notion that he is defending Europe accords with 
the view that Vietnamese communism is a local manifesta-
tion of global communism. His justifying the French war 
because the Vietnamese committed atrocities, a justifica-
tion Greene seems to affirm, ignores obvious differences 
between the French and Vietnamese struggles--the French 
fought to continue their exploitation of Indochina, the 
Vietnamese to achieve self-determination and to escape the 
onerous conditions resulting from colonial exploitation. 
Trouin also fails to consider the racist aspects of French 
colonialism. This racism was identified years earlier by 
Phan Chu Trinh in a letter to French Governor-General Paul 
Beau: 
Note how everywhere, in your newspapers, in your 
books, in your intimate conversations, is expressed 
in all its intensity the deep contempt which you feel 
towards us. In your eyes we are simply "savages," 
"pigs," "creatures incapable of distinguishing be-
b..reen good and evil, " whom you don't merely refuse to 
treat as equals, but whose physical presence you fear 
as a kind of contamination. (qtd. in Hodgkin 186) 
Such racism, of course, was not an essential component of 
French or Western thought, as Nhat-Linh makes clear in his 
account of a journey from Vietnam to France: 
The farther the ship got from Vietnam and the closer 
it got to France, to the same degree the more de-
cently the people aboard the ship treated me. In the 
China Sea they did not care to look at me. By the 
Gulf of Siam they were looking at me with scornful 
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apprehension, the way they would look at a mosquito 
carrying malaria germs to Europe. When we entered 
the Indian Ocean, their eyes began to become infected 
with expressions of gentleness and compassion • • • 
and when we crossed the Mediterranean, suddenly they 
viewed me as being civilized like themselves, and 
began to entertain ideas of respecting me. At that 
time I was very elated. But I still worried about 
the time when I was going to return home! (qtd. in 
Luong 225) 
French racism toward the Vietnamese was more common in 
Vietnam than in France because in Vietnam it served a spe-
cific function--to justify and excuse the systematic ex-
ploitation of colonial rule. Thinking of the Vietnamese 
as less than human, the French could more easily maintain 
an exploitative colonial system and could reconcile belief 
in the nobility of their culture and its civilizing mis-
sion with their often inhumane treatment of the Vietnam-
ese. 
Trouin overlooks the historic abuses of this system, 
saying nothing about the long history of French colonial 
rule and its repression of Vietnamese communists. Recit-
ing one instance of this repression, Huynh Kim Khanh tells 
of how in 1940 the French arrested more than 5,000 people 
and packed them "into dry-docked ships floating in the 
Saigon River. For want of chains and handcuffs, wires 
piercing the hands and heels of prisoners were used to 
hold them in place" (qtd in Young 5). Trouin also ignores 
the more immediate historical context that led to the Viet 
Minh's being driven out of Hanoi in December 1946. One 
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month earlier the French, in violation of a cease-fire 
agreement, had demanded the evacuation of Viet Minh troops 
from Haiphong and had given them two hours to do so. 
Karnow recounts the actions taken by the French: 
French infantry and armored units went through the 
city, fighting house to house against Vietminh 
squads. French aircraft zoomed in to bomb and strafe 
while the cruiser Suffren, in the harbor, lobbed 
shells into the city, demolishing whole neighborhoods 
of flimsy structures. Refugees streamed into nearby 
provinces with their belongings in baskets and on bi-
cycles, and the naval guns shelled them as well. 
(156) 
Vietnamese deaths from this action have been estimated at 
between 500 and 20,000. In recounting Trouin's story of 
Viet Minh atrocities, Greene provides no critical comment, 
nor does he refer to this or other relevant background in-
formation or to the systemic abuses that occurred during 
France's 70 year occupation of Vietnam; he gives a plat-
form for the heroic and eloquent Trouin, but gives no 
similar space for the Vietnamese communist position. 
At times there is an almost elegiac quality to 
Greene's depiction of the French-Indochinese war, as in 
Fowler's recounting of what occurs after the strafing of a 
sampan: 
I put on 
speak to me. 
the sunset is 
not miss it," 
my earphones for Captain Trouin to 
He said, "We will make a little detour. 
wonderful on the calcaire. You must 
he added kindly, like a host who is 
showing the beauty of his estate, and for a hundred 
miles we trailed the sunset over the Baie d'Along. 
The helmeted Martian face looked wistfully out, down 
the golden groves, among the great humps and arches 
of porous stone, and the wound of murder ceased to 
bleed. (144-45) 
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While maintaining a certain irony here in his description 
of Trouin's Martian face scanning the beautiful Vietnamese 
landscape, Greene does not mock Trouin. Rather, he seems 
sympathetic to Trouin's pain and nostalgia, to this 
Frenchman's wistful appreciation of his nation's declining 
colonial estate, to this imperial sunset. 
The most prominent representative of the colonial 
powers in The Quiet American, though, is the narrator, En-
glishman Thomas Fowler. Much of the initial attack di-
rected at this novel centered around Fowler's criticism of 
America. Greene defended himself from charges of anti-
Americanism by asserting that reviewers like Robert Gorham 
Davis mistakenly read Fowler's opinion as his own; on the 
contrary, Greene argued, Fowler too was a satirical tar-
get. There are reasons, however, to believe that Pyle and 
Fowler are not comparable targets and that to some extent 
Fowler serves as a spokesman for Greene. For one thing, 
Pyle is a caricature, whereas Fowler is a fully rounded 
character, is capable of introspection, of self-doubt and 
self-criticism. Unlike the rigid ideologue Pyle, Fowler 
can learn and change. In a novel with no other normative 
character, and in Fowler faced with a character whose 
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politics and moral crisis are consonant with the heroes in 
many of Greene's other novels, a character who like Greene 
is an English journalist writing about Indochina, a char-
acter who is genuinely affected by the suffering wrought 
by Pyle and who agonizes over what if any action he should 
take to thwart further suffering, the reader inevitably 
will find sympathy between Fowler's beliefs and Greene's. 
The central dilemma in The Quiet American is Fowler's 
choice between disengagement and action. This dilemma is 
presented most overtly in a discussion between Pyle and 
Fowler when, accompanied by two Vietnamese guards, they 
seek shelter from the Viet Minh. Fowler voices his com-
passion for suffering humanity and his dismissal of po-
litical philosophies: 
"Isms and ocracies. Give me facts. A rubber 
planter beats his labourer--all right, I'm against 
him. He hasn't been instructed to do it by the Min-
ister of the Colonies. In France I expect he'd beat 
his wife. I've seen a priest so poor he hasn't a 
change of trousers, working fifteen hours a day from 
hut to hut in a cholera epidemic, eating nothing but 
rice and salt fish, saying his Mass with an old cup--
a wooden platter. I don't believe in God and yet I'm 
for that priest. Why don't you call that colonial-
ism?" (87-88) 
By demanding facts (such as the beating of a laborer by a 
rubber planter), Fowler seems to want to cut through ideo-
logical mystifications to discover the genuine suffering 
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of real individuals. In effect, however, Fowler is decon-
textualizing such suffering, severing it from the system 
that produced it. Fowler's argument against colonialism's 
systemic mistreatment of workers is to say that the rubber 
planter was not commanded to beat his workers by the Min-
ister of Colonies. This collapsing of system into con-
spiracy is a familiar response to ideological critique. 
Based on Fowler's repudiation of this critique (what he 
derides as "isms and ocracies") and his praise for the 
French priest, one could conclude that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with colonialism--a colonial power, ac-
cording to Fowler's understanding, does not systemically 
exploit and terrorize its subjects. Instead, the good and 
the bad of colonialism are produced by the vagaries of in-
dividual wills. 
Needless to say, the suffering produced by French co-
lonial rule in Indochina was widespread and systemically 
reproduced. Hy V. Luong identifies the systemic economic 
exploitation intitiated by the French: 
Parallel to the consolidation of political control 
was the development of a colonial economic policy 
that created conditions favorable to the capitalist 
exploitation of land, labor, and other natural re-
sources, and that compounded the problems faced by 
peasants in maintaining their livelihoods. Specific 
colonial measures in Indochina included the introduc-
tion of direct and indirect taxation and the conver-
sion of tax payments from kind to cash in order to 
facilitate capitalist growth, the concession of in-
digenous land to colonial settlers for the develop-
ment of major cash crops, the appropriation of labor 
through a corvee system, and the introduction of re-
pressive labor laws to hold down labor costs for 
capitalist agromineral ventures. (43) 
In sum, according to Gabriel Kolko, "French investment 
procedures and practices in Vietnam were unquestionably 
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among the most violent and exploitative known to the twen-
tieth century" (16). Among many specific instances of 
this violence and exploitation, Kolko refers to the con-
struction of a railway link between Hanoi and the Chinese 
border which saw 30 percent of its 80,000 laborers die on 
the job (16). According to company records, between 1917-
1944 there were 12,000 deaths out of 45,000 workers at one 
Michelin company rubber plantation, 10,000 out of 37,000 
at two plantations belonging to the Cexo Company, and 
22,000 out of 198,000 at plantations owned by the Terre 
Rouge Company--the company Trouin denies defending (Hodg-
kin 182). Karnow claims that in Vietnam rubber "was pro-
duced by virtually indentured workers • • • blighted by 
malaria, dysentery, and malnutrition" (118). "For the 
Vietnamese," asserts the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, "increasing misery was the lot of all but the 
few who collaborated with the French. The real standard 
of living fell" (7).10 As Governor-General of Indochina 
(and later President of France) Paul Doumer stated, "When 
France arrived in Indochina, the Annamites were ripe for 
servitude" (qtd. in Karnow 116).11 
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Fowler is not oblivious to the suffering of the Viet-
namese. He recognizes and is sympathetic to the appeal of 
the Viet Minh, asserting that "the only man to treat [the 
peasant] as a man is the political commissar. He'll sit 
in his hut and ask his name and listen to his complaints; 
he'll give up an hour a day to teaching him" (89). In ar-
guing against Pyle's democratic cant, Fowler states his 
own views about the needs and beliefs of the Vietnamese: 
"They don't believe in anything either. You and your 
like are trying to make a war with the help of people 
who just aren't interested." 
"They don't want communism." 
"They want enough rice," [Fowler] said. "They 
don't want to be shot at. They want one day to be 
much the same as another. They don't \IT ant our white 
skins around telling them what they want. " ( 8 6) 
While Fowler may understand the desperate conditions of 
the peasantry and may be correct about their basic needs, 
his sympathy with French colonialism and his political 
disengagement make it impossible for him to offer any way 
to alter this situation in order to help the Vietnamese. 
As Terry Eagleton argues, 
Fowler's political position is ••• deeply confused. 
The question of how peace and enough rice are to be 
attained~-the fact that it is, inescapably, a politi-
cal question, and that it slides over certain addi-
tional issues, such as whether the peasants are to 
govern themselves or be governed by imperialist re-
gimes--is seriously blurred. (126) 
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In The Quiet American, rather than making an umbiguous 
critique of French colonialism and American imperialism, 
and rather than identifying some basis by which the ex-
ploitation of the Vietnamese may be lessened, Greene es-
tablishes a dynamic between Pyle's simplistic (and murder-
ous) ideology and Fowler's disengagement in order to test 
the question of political commitment and individual re-
sponsibility. 
The central actor in this scenario is Fowler. At 
first he is cynical and disengaged, telling us that once 
he "was interested in what for want of a better term they 
call news. But grenades had staled on me; they were 
something listed on the back page of the local paper" 
(10), and claiming, "I would not be involved ••.• I took 
no action--even an opinion is a kind of action" (20). 
Greene does not endorse Fowler's despair, cynicism, and 
inaction, and so contrives a situation (Pyle's involvement 
in mass murder) in which Fowler must act. Confused and 
indecisive, Fowler addresses his concerns to a Viet Minh 
operative, Mr. Heng: "What'll he do next, Heng? How many 
bombs and dead children can you get out of a drum of 
Diolacton?" (167). In a sentence that speaks to America's 
actions (and is the kind of statement critics see as fore-
casting America's history in Vietnam) Fowler declares, "He 
comes blundering in, and people have to die for his mis-
takes" (168). To Fowler's confusion Heng responds with 
what perhaps is the key to the novel: "one has to take 
sides--if one is to remain human" (168). The vital ques-
tion in The Quiet American is whether Heng is correct, 
134 
whether in a world of suffering our humanity is determined 
by our commitment, by our choosing sides and taking ac-
tion. 
Greene gives no certain answer to this dilemma. He 
recognizes the inadequacy of Fowler's disengagement but 
suggests that his action--to stop further killing by 
having Pyle killed--is no solution either. For one thing, 
Fowler regrets his action and den:onstrates sympathy for 
Pyle, wishing "there existed someone to whom [he] could 
say that [he] was sorry" (183). For another, Fowler's mo-
tivation is ambiguous; there is reason to believe he 
kills Pyle to reclaim Phuong. Eagleton summarizes 
Greene's final position: 
Detachment is desirable, but only to the degree that 
it does not sterilise the humane feelings by which 
criticism of others' more committed (and so more de-
structive) involvements can be made. The uncommitted 
man must be shown as both inhumanly cynical and hu-
manly sensitive; either perspective can be selected 
to attack the revolutionary, but both are necessary 
if the attack is to rest on a version of man both in-
ferior and superior to the revolutionary's own. (128) 
Greene establishes a binary (disengagement/activism) in 
order to problematize both positions, suggesting an alter-
nate, moderate path, a concerned and critical humanitari-
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anism that is neither detached from the world nor commit-
ted to an ideology. In Fowler Greene constructs an expe-
rienced and complex European, a regretful colonialist who 
contrasts favorably with the childish and lethally inno-
cent ideologue, Pyle. Greene ultimately supports an indi-
vidualist politics based on integrity and complexity of 
character, a politics that to the Vietnamese can offer 
only concern and regret and recognition of the inadequacy 
of ideological solutions. Although writing generally 
about colonial discourse, Abdul R. JanMohammed summarizes 
the logic at work in The Quiet American: 
since the colonialist wants to maintain his privi-
leges by preserving the status quo, his representa-
tion of the world contains neither a sense of his-
torical becoming, nor a concrete vision of a future 
different from the present, nor a teleology other 
than the infinitely postponed process of "civiliz-
ing." (88) 
The Orientals 
In colonial discourse the colonized world has often 
been depicted as female. In the Rhetoric of Empire, David 
Spurr cites a turn-of-the-century French writer for whom 
Laos is "swooning like a lascivious lover, between the 
arms of her river and her stream, drunk with pleasure • . 
• at the flanks of her burning mountains." Spurr also 
cites a reporter for the Chicago Tribune who in 1983 de-
picted Saigon as "an aging dowager mistress, pining for 
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her lost youth, yet still ca9able of firing the imagina-
tion with gestures that hint at the elegant temptress she 
once was" (171-73). A similar gendering (and eroticizing) 
of the colonial world appears in The Quiet American, where 
the contested mistress Phuong suggests Vietnam torn be-
tween lovers, the colonial powers (Fowler) and the postwar 
neocolonial U.S. (Pyle).l2 
This analogizing of the femal~ and the third world 
was due to a perceived similarity between the binaries 
men/women and colonizer/colonized: just as women were in-
ferior to men, so the colonies were inferior to the colo-
nial powers. This inferiority was both physical (women/ 
colonial subjects were weaker) and intellectual (women/ 
colonial subjects were irrational). Additionally, just as 
women were unknown and mysterious, so the colonized world 
was alien and exotic. Both women and colonial subjects 
were thought natural, in close communion with the earth. 
In combination, these features--submissiveness, irratio-
nality, exoticism, and naturalness--suggest the unique 
sensuality of native women. The East in particular has 
been associated with sex. As Edward Said observes, "the 
Orient seems still to suggest not only fecundity but 
sexual promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlim-
ited desire, deep generative energies" (188). 
A similar rhetoric is apparent in The Quiet American, 
where Vietnamese women have little identity outside of 
their physical appearance and sexual performance. Greene 
describes the "lovely flat figures [in] white silk trou-
sers, the long tight jackets in pink and mauve patterns, 
slit up the thigh" (10). And Fowler declares the_· "To 
take an Annamite to bed with you is like taking a bird: 
they twitter and sing on your pillow" (5). One might 
expect that in their feminist/postcolonialist reading of 
The Quiet American Zakia Pathak, Saswati Sengupta and 
Sharmila Purkayastha would criticize Greene for this 
sexist and racist portrayal. After all, they properly 
rebuke the literary establishment's response for its 
liberal humanist programme of purifying the story 
from historical dross, reducing Vietnam to a micro-
cosm of the modern world and collapsing the politics 
into categories of Christian discourse. (202) 
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Likewise, they assert they will "read the collusion of two 
discourses, imperialist and patriarchal, as constituting 
[Phuong] and structuring the text" (202). It comes as a 
surprise then that Pahtak, et al. do not link Fowler's 
views with Greene's. Instead they repeat the notion, com-
mon to the critical reception of The Quiet American, that 
Fowler is to be read ironically. As "the target of ••• 
authorial irony" Fowler becomes a 
masculinist who for all his sympathy with Phuong, his 
desire to protect her from the crudities inflicted on 
her by white men, his frustration at her silence, ul-
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timately settles for her body on which he inscribes 
the sign of his possession. On the political plain, 
[Fowler becomes] the twentieth-century Orientalist; 
sympathetic but outsider; confronting the East as 
object to be understood in an essentially hermeneuti-
cal relation. (204) 
Rather than repeating familiar colonial tropes about Ori-
ental women, Greene is seen as critiquing Orientalist as-
sumptions through his ironic depiction of Fowler. As I 
have already discussed, though, this ironic reading is not 
quite so clear-cut. For while criticizing Fowler, Greene 
also sympathizes with him. It becomes difficult, there-
fore, to know the extent to which Greene repudiates or en-
dorses Fowler's beliefs. Unless he is to be read entirely 
ironically (his concern for proper moral action and his 
complexly drawn character would seem to preclude such a 
reading), we cannot with any certainty separate Fowler's 
beliefs from Greene's.13 
Nowhere are Fowler's/Greene's attitudes toward Viet-
namese women clearer than in the depiction of Phuong. She 
first appears in the novel not as an individual but as an 
anonymous Vietnamese beauty. Fowler says, "I couldn't see 
her face, only the white silk trousers and the long flow-
ered robe, but I knew her for all that" (3).14 This is a 
fitting introduction, since Phuong remains faceless (and 
voiceless) throughout the novel. If Pyle is quiet, Phuong 
is virtually mute. At times even her physical presence 
seems insubstantial. Fowler says, "One always spoke of 
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her • • . in the third person, as though she were not 
there. Sometimes she seemed invisible" (37). Phuong's 
insubstantiality, in particular her silence, is character-
istic of colonial (and patriarchal) discourse about indig-
enous peoples (and women). 
When not silenced or erased, Phuong is depicted as a 
natural object. Sleeping with her is like "taking a 
bird"; her name means Phoenix. (This bird imagery is 
consistent with Fowler's name: he will grant her some 
freedom but will not let her fly away--and when she breaks 
free to go with Pyle, he will ensure she returns). She 
lay upon Fowler's bed "like a dog on a crusader's tomb" 
). She is "indigenous like an herb" (7), is "like a flow-
er" (94), is "so young a plant" (108). "Her colour," 
Greene writes, "was that of the small flame" (7). Bird, 
Phoenix, dog, herb, flower, plant, flame--Phuong is many 
things but never a fully rounded human being. 
What individuality Phuong does achieve is as Fowler's 
servant and mistress. Except for when she leaves him for 
Pyle, Phuong regularly takes Fowler's commands and does 
his bidding. Fowler declares, "she always told me what I 
wanted to hear, like a coolie answering questions" (108), 
and "She did at once what I asked. • • • Just so she would 
have made love if I had asked her to, straight away, peel-
ing off her trousers without question" (109). Fowler de-
scribes Phuong's function: "she cooked for me, she made 
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my pipes, she gently and S'llleetly laid out her body for my 
pleasure" (134). Even when his description turns figura-
tive, Fowler identifies Phuong by the services she per-
forms( erasing her humanity and transforming her into use-
ful object: "she was • • • the hiss of steam, the clink 
of a cup; she was a certain hour of the night and the 
promise of rest" ( 4) • 
Other than to be his sexual partner, Phuong's main 
function is to prepare Fowler's opium pipes. She is, in 
fact, consistently associated with and at times likened to 
opium. Fowler says, 
When I opened my eyes she had lit the lamp and the 
tray was already prepared. The lamplight made her 
skin the colour of dark amber as she bent over the 
flame with a frown of concentration, heating the 
small paste of opium. • • • I thought that if I 
smelled her skin it would have the faintest fragrance 
of opium, and her colour was that of the small flame. 
(5-7) 
For Fowler, Phuong is like opium--she seduces him with an 
easy comfort and removes him from his daily cares. Fowler 
is almost addicted to her. His only comfort when she 
leaves him is to turn to that which she resembles--opium. 
This dependence upon Phuong/apium suggests Fowler has 
fallen prey to Eastern lassitude and decadence, becoming 
even more cynical and disengaged.l5 
The notion that opium addiction is emblematic of the 
Orient and the Eastern way of life has been common in 
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Western representations of Asia. In truth, however, opium 
was a vital component of Western commerce and colonial 
rule. Alfred w. McCoy outlines this history: 
In the 1500s European merchants int.roduced opium 
smoking; in the 1700s the British East India Company 
became Asia's first large-scale opium smuggler, forc-
ibly supplying an unwilling China; and in the 1800s 
every European colony had its official opium dens. 
At every stage of its development, Asia's narcotics 
traffic has been shaped and formed by the rise and 
fall of Western empires •••• By the late nineteenth 
century the government opium den was as common as the 
pith helmet, and every nation and colony in Southeast 
Asia--from North Borneo to Burma--had a state-regu-
lated opium monopoly ••.• While the health and vi-
tality of the local population literally went up in 
smoke, the colonial governments thrived: opium sales 
provided as much as 40 percent of colonial revenues 
and financed the building of many Gothic edifices, 
railways, and canals that remain as the hallmark of 
the colonial era. (59-63) 
In Vietnam, the French established an opium franchise six 
months after annexing Saigon in 1862. By 1918 in Indochi-
na there were 1,512 opium dens and 3,098 retail shops 
vending opium. At this time, according to McCoy, opium 
made up more than one-third of all colonial revenues in 
French Indochina (McCoy 73-74). In an essay on "the Poi-
soning of the Natives," Ho Chi Minh notes that "There ex-
isted [in Annam) 1500 alcohol and opium shops for a thou-
sand villages; while there were only ten schools serving 
the same area" (qtd. in Hodgkin 180). Although its pos-
session was illegal in France, in Indochina the French 
purchased and processed opium, and they sold it through a 
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state-run monopoly at a profit of between 400 and 500 per-
cent (Jamieson 62). McCoy describes the human conse-
quences of the French opium trade in Vietnam: 
Large numbers of plantation workers, miners, and 
urban laborers spent their entire salaries in the 
opium dens. The strenuous work, combined with the 
debilitating effect of the drug and lack of food, 
produced some extremely emaciated laborers, who could 
only be described as walking skeletons. Workers 
often died of starvation, or more likely their fami-
lies did. While only 2 percent of the population 
were addicts, the toll among the Vietnamese elite was 
considerably greater. With an addiction rate of 
almost 20 percent, the native elite, most of whom 
were responsible for local administration and tax 
collection, were made much less competent and much 
more liable to corruption by their expensive opium 
habits. ( 75-76) 
The essential link between Asians and opium that is sug-
gested by Greene functions ideologically to obscure the 
Western powers' promotion, distribution, and sale of opium 
in the Far East. Greene treats a profitable institution 
established and perpetuated by the colonial powers as an 
innate trait of colonial subjects--as seen in Phuong's re-
peated association with opium. 
In addition to being portrayed as a form of addiction 
and a natural or useful object, Phuong is described as ir-
rational. She is "wonderfully ignorant" (4) and should 
not be subjected to a "passion for truth" because this is 
"an Occidental passion" (73-74). It does not occur to 
Fowler that this ostensible ignorance might be the product 
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of linguistic and cultural difference, that it might be an 
attempt to maintain a private sphere separate from the 
ubiquitous and prying colonialist, or that it might be the 
result of a colonial system that denied education to the 
vast majority of Vietnamese, especially to women. Accord-
ing to Virginia Thompson, prior to the establishment of 
the French colonial system, "at least 80 percent of the 
people were literate to some degreE:!" (qtd. in Hodgkin 
185), while under French colonialism, according to the 
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, "The rate of lit-
eracy ••• decreased considerably. Higher education 
ceased altogether" (7). 
The French transformed education in Vietnam, insti-
tuting a system whose main goal was to train a small per-
centage of the populus to become subordinate officials 
serving the colonial administration. (Ironically, from 
this elite group came many of the founding members of the 
Vietnamese revolution.) By 1907, Francois Rodier, ex-
Lieutenant-Governor of Cochin-China, could declare that 
"Annamites continue to speak their own language, but they 
no longer know how to read it or write it. That is why I 
have said we turn them into illiterates" (qtd. in Hodgkin 
185). By the 1920s, of two million school age children, 
only 200,000 received any schooling at all. Thompson 
notes, "this meant literacy for only one boy out of twelve 
or for one girl in a hundred" (qtd. in Hodgkin 186).16 If 
Phuong is ignorant, it is likely due to a system that 
denied her education because of her nationality and 
gender. 
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Besides ignorance and unfamiliarity with truth, an 
essential element of Asian consciousness, according to 
Fowler, is the inability to experience the full range of 
human emotions. Prefiguring comments like those made by 
General Maxwell Taylor, who noted that Americans "place 
higher value on human life than [Vietnamese] do," and Gen-
eral William Westmoreland, who asserted that "life is 
cheap in the Orient" (qtd. in Baritz 5), Fowler declares 
that "Love's a Western word. • • • we use it for sentimen-
tal reasons or to cover up an obsession with one woman. 
These people don't suffer from obsessions" (126). 
In arguing that Asians are incapable of love, Fowler 
rationalizes Phuong's refusal to love him and justifies 
his continued sexual exploitation of her. There are many 
reasons Phuong does not love Fowler, perhaps the foremost 
being the gross economic disparity between them. Phuong's 
goals are understandably mercenary: aided by her protec-
tive older sister, she is "determined on a good European 
marriage" (32). Although little of her background is 
known--Pathak, et al. observing that "Phuong is without a 
history; there is a noticeable absence of cultural mark-
ers of class, religion, education" (205)--it is safe to 
assume that Phuong is economically disadvantaged. Her de-
sire for a European marriage--and the fact that although 
"the most beautiful girl in Saigon" (35) she remains with 
Fowler, "a man of middle age, with eyes a little blood-
shot, beginning to put on weight, ungraceful in love" 
(32)--are best explained as resulting from her economic 
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insecurity. Fowler uses his economic and social superior-
ity to gain Phuong's sexual favors; Phuong serves (and 
services) Fowler because she longs for a secure and com-
fortable life. This exploitation of economic advantage 
for sexual gain is common to First World nationals in the 
Third World, as Fowler readily admits: "Every correspon-
dent, it was assumed, had his local girl" (64). 
Women in the Third World are often doubly oppressed, 
victims of capitalist underdevelopment and patriarchal re-
pression. Based on statistics compiled by the United Na-
tions and the International Labour Organization, Jeanne 
Bisilliat and Michele Fieloux estimate that women account 
for half the world's population and two-thirds of the 
world's total working hours but (as of 1983) only one-
hundredth of the world's wealth and property (Schipper 9). 
Alan Durning explains the hardships women undergo in the 
global economy: 
Women's burdens multiply endlessly. They are paid 
less than men but they work more. They are less well 
educated, but bear greater responsibility for the 
health of children. They are expected to give birth 
to, raise, and feed numerous--preferably male--off-
spring and consequently grow weak and ailing as their 
bodies are exhausted by the cycle of repeated preg-
nancy and childbirth. They are commonly abused and 
beaten at home, but have few legal rights and fewer 
property rights. For poor women, as one Brazilian 
woman says, "the only holiday ••• is when you are 
asleep." (139-40) 
Faced with limited opportunities and constrained by a pa-
triarchal culture,17 it is entirely understandable that 
146 
Phuong should serve as Fowler's maid and mistress with the 
hope that she might one day marry him and move to England. 
Although her silences and her willingness to leave 
him for Pyle reveal how little genuine feeling Phuong has 
for Fowler, Greene draws a clear distinction between her 
behavior and prostitution. The first time Fowler saw Phu-
ong she was "dancing past [his] table at the Grand Monde 
in a white ball dress, eighteen years old, watched by an 
elder sister" (32). Greene makes certain to tell us that 
"It had been a long and frustrating courtship •• three 
months passed before [Fowler] saw her so much as momen-
tarily alone" (33). Greene also draws a clear distinction 
between Fowler and colonial debauchees like the anonymous 
rubber planter in whose apartment 
was an extraordinary tall ashtray • • • made like a 
naked woman with a bowl in her hair, and there were 
china ornaments of naked girls embracing tigers, and 
one very odd one of a girl stripped to the waist 
riding a bicycle. In the bedroom, facing his enor-
mous bed, was a great glazed oil painting of two 
girls sleeping together. (152) 
·.,. ,. 
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Fowler, well aware of how pitiful and absurd is this 
scene, can in no way be compared to this comic relic of 
colonialism. In fact, Fowler "was tempted to ask him 
whether he would sell himself with his collection: he 
went with them; he was period too" (153). Greene also 
distinguishes Fowler from whore-mongering journalists like 
Bill Granger, who warns Pyle, "You got to be careful in 
[Saigon] ••• Thank God for penicillin" (27). 
Greene shows the prevalence of prostitution in Viet-
nam, at one point describing a bordello--the House of the 
Five Hundred Girls. In its courtyard "Hundreds of girls 
lay • . • talking to their companions. " And he shows the 
desperation of these "fighting, scrabbling, shouting 
girls" as they pursue potential customers: 
I had learned a technique--to divide and conquer. I 
chose one in the crowd that gathered round me and 
edged her slowly towards the spot where Pyle and 
Granger struggled •••• I caught sight of Granger 
flushed and triumphant; it was as though he took 
this demonstration as a tribute to his manhood. One 
girl had her arm through Pyle's and was trying to tug 
him gently out of the ring. I pushed my girl in 
among them •••• I got hold of Pyle's sleeve and 
dragged him out, with the girl hanging onto his other 
arm like a hooked fish. Two or three girls tried to 
intercept us before we got to the gateway. (30-31) 
While acknowledging that prostitution in late colonial 
Vietnam is widespread, that Westerners there regularly 
sexually exploit native women, and that these women are 
often desperate to gain the favor of relatively well-off 
Westerners, Greene is careful to separate Fowler and 
Phuong from this background, to show that Fowler is no 
crass exploiter, Phuong no prostitute. Despite the simi-
larity between their relationship and the colonial 
master/mistress relationship, Fowler and Phoung remain 
apart from this system of male colonialist exploitation. 
It can even be argued (her domestic and sexual subservi-
ence notwithstanding) that Phuong maintains a measure of 
control in their relationship.18 Yet, in spite of the 
care with which Greene distances them from the pattern of 
Western male exploitation of Third World females, their 
relationship fits this pattern exactly. 
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No matter how Greene extenuates Fowler's relationship 
with Phuong, it remains exploitative--and it comes out of 
a long history of and foreshadows an even worse exploita-
tion. First World males' desires for exotic, subservient 
Third World girls, especially within a global capitalist 
system that maintains a gender and race-based division of 
labor, have had devastating consequences for poor women. 
Nowhere is this more true than in Southeast Asia. The 
harsh conditions brought about by a crumbling empire and a 
revolutionary war made prostitution a necessary occupation 
for many Vietnamese women during the early 1950s. The 
French gave official sanction to prostitution through the 
"Bordel Mobile de Campagne," which Karnow describes as "an 
authorized bordello that travelled with the troops" (440). 
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According to Susan Brownmiller, these mobile field broth-
els were made up of women imported from Algeria (Against 
93). 
By the time of full-scale American intervention in 
the mid-1960s, prostitution was rampant in South Vietnam; 
there were even brothels on some U.S. military installa-
tions. Brownmiller describes one such base: 
[In the] "recreation area" belonging to the base camp 
• • • was a one-acre compound surrounded by barbed 
wire with American MP's standing guard at the gate. 
It was opened only during daylight hours for security 
reasons. Inside the compound there were shops that 
sold hot dogs, hamburgers and souvenirs, but the main 
attraction was two concrete barracks, each about one 
hundred feet long--the military whorehouses that ser-
viced the four-thousand-man brigade. Each building 
was outfitted with two bars, a bandstand, and sixty 
curtained cubicles in which the Vietnamese women 
lived and worked. (Against 94-95) 
Most prostitution in Vietnam, though, was not organized 
and sanctioned. Rather, it developed in cities and out-
side of military bases as a means of survival for young 
women in this war-ravaged nation. Frances Fitzgerald 
notes the destructive social consequences of the American 
military presence: 
there had grown up entire towns made of packing cases 
and waste tin ••• entire towns advertising Schlitz, 
Coca-Cola, or Pepsi Cola a thousand times over. • •• 
a series of packing-case towns with exactly three 
kinds of industry--the taking in of American laundry, 
the selling of American cold drinks to American sol-
diers, and prostitution for the benefit of the Ameri-
cans. (470-71) 
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Karnow draws a similarly grim picture of the consequences 
of U.S. policy in Vietnam: 
An estimated four million men, women, and children--
roughly a quarter of South Vietnam's population--fled 
to the fringes of cities and towns in an attempt to 
survive. They were shunted into makeshift camps of 
squalid shanties where primitive sewers bred dysen-
tery, malaria, and other diseases. Thousands, des-
perate to eke out a living, drifted into Saigon, Da-
nang, Bienhoa, and Vung Tau, cities that now acquired 
an almost medieval cast as beggars and hawkers roamed 
the streets, whining and tugging at Americans for 
money. (439) 
The increase in prostitution that occurred during the war 
was part of the larger destruction of traditional Vietnam-
ese society, a destruction initiated by rapid (and often 
forced) urbanization, by the break-up of families through 
the lure of American affluence, by an expanding narcotics 
trade, by widespread graft and corruption. Fitzgerald 
notes that the importation of American goods led to run-
away inflation (between 1965 and 1967 the cost of living 
in Vietnamese cities rose 170 percent) and the destruction 
of both the local agricultural and industrial sectors. In 
the new Americanized economy, there were some who prof-
ited: "the hotel owners .•• the licensed importers, the 
brothel keepers, real estate dealers, diamond merchants, 
and distributors of American luxury goods" (Fitzgerald 
466-67). To Fitzgerald, the transformation of the Viet-
namese economy, with its attendant human suffering, was 
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not an unforeseen consequence of the war but was part of a 
conscious strategy. "The United States," Fitzgerald 
writes, "would win the war by making all Vietnamese eco-
nomically dependent upon it" (470). Besides American 
bombs, it was American wealth that shattered Vietnamese 
society and caused poor women to eke out livings as bar 
girls and prostitutes. 
The increase in prostitution accompanying American 
intervention was not limited to Vietnam--it took place 
throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines 
and Thailand: "Manila was competing internationally with 
Bangkok," Sterling Seagrove claims, "as the top destina-
tion for sex tours" (318). The sex tourism industry grew 
out of the widespread prostitution that accompanied the 
American military presence in both countries. Seagrove 
discusses the 
large child brothels around the U.S. military bases 
at Subic Bay and Clark [Air Force Base] •••• By 
both bases, children as young as fourteen months were 
bought, sold, and traded for the gratification of GI 
pedophiles. (321) 
In Thailand prostitution was encouraged by a 1967 agree-
ment with the U.S. that designated Thailand an official 
destination for American troops on R & R (rest and recre-
ation). This agreement, asserts Aaron Sachs, gave 
the sex tourism industry what amounted to official 
sanction •••• Less than a decade later, Thailand 
could claim 20,000 brothels and other sex-industry 
establishments; and the hyped mythology of the 
young, submissive, sexy girls waiting for wealthy 
tourists in sultry Southeast Asia was making its way 
around the world. (28) 
The American presence in Thailand (eight major bases and 
46,000 servicemen) transformed Thai culture, bringing, in 
the words of Benedict Anderson, 
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"Americanization" to rural Siam in a very inunediate 
way. The construction of these installations poured 
money into the countryside, but also meant the pen-
etration of the sleaziest aspects of American civili-
zation. The results were a vast increase in prosti-
tution, births of "red-haired" (fatherless Amerasian) 
children, narcotics addiction, and the like. (24) 
Anderson cites Wiraprawat Wongphuaphan's account of the 
township of 'l'akhli, which became the site of an American 
airbase in 1961 (for missions over Laos and the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail). By 1972 there were more bars and nightclubs 
in Takhli than Buddhist temples (and as of 1982 there were 
twice as many prostitutes as Buddhist monks in Thailand 
[Muecke 892]). The increase in American airmen that ac-
companied Nixon's 1972 bombing campaign against North 
Vietnam was accompanied by an increase in venereal dis-
ease--91 prostitutes checked in for VD inspections in 
January 1972, 2,954 in June (Anderson 23-24).19 
Most prostitutes in Thailand are recruited from poor, 
rural villages, since, according to the International La-
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bor Organization, Thai women can make about 25 times more 
in the sex industry than in any other available occupation 
(Sachs 26). In 1979, Noi, a twenty year-old Thai woman, 
made about $1.50 a day working in a battery factory, which 
was, she claimed, "not enough to cover my expenses. How 
could this be enough to pay for my food, my bus ticket and 
other expenses? • • • I have to find work at night so that 
I can send money to my parents" (qtd. in Fuentes and Ehr-
enreich 26). 
Perhaps, considering the exploitative nature of the 
work demanded of women in factories in much of the Third 
World, there is no great distinction between this work and 
prostitution. In both professions women are underpaid, 
are chosen for their youth, health, and docility, and are 
forced to work under difficult and potentially harmful 
conditions.20 The similarity between prostitution and 
labor exploitation can be seen in the following announce-
ments, the first from a Swiss tour operator's description 
of Thai women, the second from a Malaysian government 
investment brochure: 
[Thai women] are slim, sun-burnt and sweet ••• mas-
ters of the art of making love by nature. (qtd. in 
Robinson 416) 
The manual dexterity of the Oriental female is famous 
the world over. Her hands are small, and she works 
fast with extreme care •••• Who, therefore, could 
be better qualified by nature and inheritance, to 
contribute to the efficiency of a bench-assembly pro-
duction line than the Oriental 9irl? (qtd. in Fuentes 
and Ehrenreich 16) 
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Considering the exploitative nature of factory work in the 
Third World, it is no wonder that many poor women "choose" 
more lucrative employment as prostitutes. The legacy of 
the Vietnam War, an indigenous patriarchal culture (with a 
gender division of labor), and its position within the 
global economy have combined to produce in Thailand a sex 
tourism industry worth $5 billion annually and comprising 
2 million women, 800,000 of whom are under 16 years old.21 
Vietnam's isolation from the capitalist world economy 
has hampered the development of a sex tourism industry. 
But with the dismantling of its revolutionary government, 
there has begun a resurgence in prostitution. While most 
of the clientele are Vietnamese, foreign sex tours have 
become increasingly pcpular in Ho Chi Minh City and the 
beach resort of Vung Tau. Ginger Ladd, Susan Brownmiller, 
and the Economist all attribute these developments to 
Vietnam's embrace of capitalism. To Ladd, "sexual promis-
cuity, long repressed by the country's communist govern-
ment, has exploded since it began loosening social and 
economic controls in 1986"; to Brownmiller, "prostitution 
is one of the growth industries in the new Vietnam" ("Af-
ter" 82); to the Economist, "economic progress has been 
accompanied by what the government calls 'negative phenom-
ena': robbery, prostitution and various forms of corrup-
tion" (38). Brownmiller argues that the commodification 
of women has accompanied the economic transformation of 
many formerly communist nations: 
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efforts to overhaul unworkable economic systems and 
attract foreign investment go hand in hand with an 
unsubtle retooling of the role and image of women. A 
traveler goes to Beijing or Hanoi or Moscow or Prague 
and notes that the women are dressing more color-
fully, a pleasing sign (who could object?) that the 
country is loosening its authoritarian restraints. 
Next, calenders and tourist brochures featuring buxom 
young women with come-hither smiles and pre-revolu-
tionary attire put in an appearance, followed by 
beauty contests and imported pornography. Finally 
and inescapably, battalions of young recruits, so new 
at the trade that their shame is more evident than 
their seductive skills, are dragooned into selling 
their bodies for quick gain. ("After" 83) 
Thus far in Vietnam HIV infection has been limited mostly 
to intravenous drug users (whose drug of choice is an 
adulterated form of opium.) The Vietnam News reports that 
in each district of Ho Chi Minh City there are now between 
5 and 15 opium dens, each receiving between 150 and 200 
customers per day. Phan Nguyen Binh, director of Ho Chi 
Minh City's Drug Abuse and Prevention Center, attributes 
the soaring number of drug abusers in recent years to "the 
increasing availability of opium since Vietnam opened its 
doors to foreign trade" (Ladd). There has also been an 
increase in child prostitution, Vietnamese researchers re-
porting girls as young as 12 being sold into prostitution 
by their parents. Seeing abused child prostitutes as vic-
tims of the new Vietnam, Dr. Duong Quyn Hoa, former Health 
Minister for the National Liberation Front/Provisional 
Revolutionary Government laments, "We fought for freedom, 
independence, and social justice. . Now it's all mon-
156 
ey. You can count on your fingers the revolu·tionaries who 
still believe in ideals" (qtd. in Brownmiller, Against 
84). With an increase in prostitution and opium addiction 
and a desperate need for foreign capital, Vietnam seems to 
be returning to what it had been forty years earlier--when 
Greene penned The Quiet American. 
In The Quiet American Greene presents an attitude 
toward Asian female sexuality that has contributed to 
widespread suffering throughout southeast Asia. A sex 
tour operator's notion that Thai women "are slim, sun-
burnt and sweet. • masters of the art of making love by 
nature" is not much different from Fowler's rhapsody over 
women with "skin the colour of amber" (14) who "twitter 
and sing on your pillow" ( 5) . As the first novel to gain 
critical attention for i·cs examination of the role of the 
u.s. in Vietnam, The Quiet American established a pattern 
that subsequent American novels about the war have re-
peated, regardless of their sometimes drastically differ-
ent aesthetics. In these novels, the Vietnamese remain 
invisible. Written from an American perspective, these 
novels see Vietnamese much as did American servicemen--as 
a shadowy and elusive enemy almost inseparable from the 
Vietnamese landscape, as the carnage and refuse of battle, 
as sexual objects. What Pathak, et al. note about The 
Quiet American is true for the vast majority of Vietnam 
War novels: "The Vietnamese people exist as a dismembe:r-ed 
race, as bodies flung in the pond at Phatdiem, as a woman 
with a mutilated baby in her lap. This is modern Orien-
talism" (204). 
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Greene's perception of the motives behind U.S. policy 
has also been consistently echoed in later novels and mem-
oirs. While critical of the nature of u.s. policy, Viet-
nam War authors have either endorsed the view that this 
policy ste~med from noble if tragically flawed aims or 
have ignored this question, concentrating instead upon the 
day-to-day experiences of American soldiers. Unlike those 
critics who see The Quiet American as forecasting U.S. 
military and diplomatic policy in Vietnam, I see it as 
prefiguring an ethnocentric view of the war that ignores 
the Vietnamese, does not seriously challenge American ex-
ceptionalism, and does not recognize the suffering and 
inequity reproduced by global capital. 
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Notes 
1. The Quiet American, 87, 88. 
2. It is not surprising that literary culture should 
begin (albeit moderately and largely within the liberal 
view of the war) to historicize The Quiet American. A 
complete separation of art and politics, scholarship and 
experience, could not be maintained (that this separation 
lasted as long as it did is a testament to the power of 
the non-ideological ideology of New Criticism/liberal plu-
ralism). With the war raging on, with its grim reality 
broadcast nightly, with domestic protest mounting, Ameri-
can literary culture could not blithely persist in its 
preoccupation with formal and mannered readings of liter-
ary texts. As scholars continued to write about "la con-
dition humaine," anti-war protests exploded across college 
campuses. During the first six months of 1969 alone (and 
counting only 232 of the country's two thousand colleges 
and universities), 215,000 students took part in campus 
protests, 3,652 were arrested, 956 were suspended or ex-
pelled. According to the F.B.I., in the 1969-1970 school 
year there were 1,785 student demonstrations (Zinn 481). 
I do not mean to imply that literary culture was sud-
denly radicalized by the war. Its inherent conservatism 
remained largely intact, and its scholarship continued to 
focus on textual matters far removed from the political 
concerns of the day. Nonetheless, inspired by opposition 
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to the war, by the civil rights movement, and the rise of 
feminism, literary culture slowly began to incorporate 
social issues into its practice. Also contributing to the 
incipient politicizing of literary studies was recognition 
of the university's role in perpetuating the war. As 
Theodore Roszak declared in 1968, 
the war is very largely a product of the academic com-
munity's own cultural default •••• The advisers who 
have moved both the Kennedy and the Johnson administra-
tions toward the war are, for the most part, prestigous 
and conventionally liberal academics from our best 
schools •••. Further, the very fact that the war has 
been able to creep steadily and without specific debate 
from a marginal commitment to a major preoccupation of 
our society has much to do with the silence and caution 
that characterized our universities prior to 1965. (vi) 
If the scholarship written about The Quiet American is any 
indication, the academic literary establishment likewise 
helped maintain this silence and caution. Members of bour-
geois institutions that contributed directly to the war and 
that relied upon the affluence generated by u.s. global pol-
icy, professors of English (like professors in other disci-
plines) provided tacit support for U.S. actions in Vietnam. 
Some in the literary culture recognized their own complic-
ity. Louis Kampf, for instance, declared, "The health of 
the profession, the superabundance of respectable jobs, and 
the academy's general affluence all depend on the Cold War 
and its occasional hot outbursts" (49). To Kampf, quite 
simply, "As our overseas markets expand, so do our English 
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departments; the more Vietnams, the more endowed chairs" 
(50). 
3. Although concerned with the accuracy of Greene's ex-
amination of U.S. motive, Larsen echoes the arguments made 
by formalist literary critics. His assertion that Greene 
denounces the tendency to embrace abstraction over real 
thought is not much different from Roger Sharrock's asser-
tion that Greene distrusts initiatives supported by theo-
retical premisses or Gangeshwar Rai's notion that Greene re-
pudiates involvement in politics inspired by abstract ideo-
logical conviction. What separates Larsen from these crit-
ics is his identification of this sympathy for abstraction 
over real thought as a particularly American trait. 
4. In their examination of 36 studies on underdevelop-
ment in the Third World, Volker Bornschier and Christopher 
Chase-Dunn conclude that "a high degree of penetration and 
control by transnational corporations • • • has a long-run 
retardant effect on economic growth and is associated with 
greater income inequality" (xi). Specifically, Bornschier 
and Chase-Dunn explain that 
The poorest 40 percent of the world's population had 
4.9 percent of world income in 1950, and 4.2 percent in 
1977, and the gap between the poorest and riches halves 
of the world's population is increasing •••• The 
overall inequality of world income has not increased 
much, however, because the upper middle income groups 
have gained, mostly at the expense of the poor. (62) 
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Alan Durning finds the gap between rich and poor increasing 
during the 1980s. According to Durning, 
Since 1950, the gap between rich and poor nations has 
grown mostly because the rich got richer. But since 
1980, in many developing countries the poor have been 
getting poorer too. Forty-three developing nations 
probably finished the decade poorer, in per capita 
terms, than they started it. The 14 most devastated--
including Zambia, Bolivia, and Nigeria--have seen per 
capita income plunge as dramaticaly since their trou-
bles began as the United States did during the Great 
Depression. Indeed, the term developing nation has be-
come a cruel parody: many countries are not so much 
developing as they are disintegrating. 
For an example of the connection between "development" and 
disease, I turn to the recent outbreak of pneumonic plague 
in Surat, India. According to Praful Bidwai, although Surat 
"is the most important industrial town" (480) in a section 
of India known as the Golden Corridor for its decade-long 
growth rate, its sewer system services only an eight percent 
of the city, a phenomenon "replicated on a national scale" 
in India. Tying this plague outbreak, and health problems 
in general, to Western-promoted capitalist development, Bid-
wai writes, 
India, with its rash of growth enclaves, its newly 
opened markets and its consumption boom in the elite 
sector, has one of the lowest public health budgets in 
the world ••.• Finance Minister Manmohan Singh's new 
structural adjustment policy, implemented since mid-
1991 under the tutelage of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, has aggravated the health 
crisis. Under pressure to reduce the deficit, Singh 
savagely cut spending on health: education and social 
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services ••.. Today in terms of G.D.P., India spends 
10 to 20 percent less on the social sector than it did 
in the late 1980s. The result is a further drop in the 
already appalling quality of life and more destitution 
for the poor. (481) 
5. Sometimes this generosity and innocence were not 
seen as exclusive to America but found to be characteristic 
of Western capitalism in general. According to Adam Ulam, 
Problems of an international society undergoing an eco-
nomic and ideological revolution seem to defy • . • the 
generosity--granted its qualifications and errors--that 
has characterized the policy of the leading democratic 
powers of the West. (qtd. in Chomsky, "Clinton Vision" 
32) 
6. Attempts to reconcile the historical record with 
American exceptionalism can sometimes lead to a rather tor-
tured reasoning, as in this New York Times op-ed piece by 
Richard Spielman, a professor of international affairs: 
It took the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait to reveal what 
should have been obvious all along to the foreign pol-
icy experts: the bipolar, cold war world has given way 
not to "multipolarity" but to "unipolarity," with the 
u.s. the only pole left •••. But unipolarity is not 
the same as American hegemony •.•• A unipolar world 
is not the same as a hierarchical system dominated by a 
single power that creates the rules as well as enforces 
them. (qtd. in Kaplan 13) 
7. For an example of the kind of argument I am making 
about the broad sympathy between American literary culture 
and the political establishment see Richard Ohmann, "A Case 
Study in Canon Formation: Reviewers, Critics, and The 
Catcher in the Rye" in Politics and Letters. For Ohmann, 
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common sense and a belief in real connections between 
people's ideas and their material lives are enough •. 
• to make it seem natural for a critical establishment 
•.• located in U.S. capitalism to interpret and judge 
literary works in a way harmonious with the continuance 
of capitalism. (66) 
8. According to Marilyn Young, the "French" army "con-
sisted of approximately 80,000 French soldiers; 20,000 For-
eign Legionnaires, 10,000 of whom had served in Nazi armies; 
48,000 gathered from France's other colonies; and some 
300,000 Vietnamese" (29). 
9. Similarly, after the Japanese surrender to the U.S. 
in Korea, General John Reed Hodge (Commanding General, 
United States Armed Forces in Korea) declared that what had 
been the Japanese occupation government would continue to 
function, without change in personnel. According to the New 
York Times, "the State Department ••• disclaimed any part 
in military orders leaving the Japanese in office tempo-
rarily •••• It was evidently a decision by the local the-
ater commander" (qtd. in Cumings 139). Bruce Cumings gives 
a different explanation for U.S. policy: 
a People's Republic had been proclaimed two days before 
the American entry and might assume power if the Japa-
nese were run out. It is probably this revolutionary 
situation that caused Hodge to murmur about chaos and 
work closely with the Japanese. (139) 
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Cumings goes on to show how the u.s.-constructed and u.s.-
trained Korean armed forces were made up of, according to 
Se-jin Kim, "officers with a Japanese [military] background" 
(qtd. in Cumings 175). Cumings writes, 
In Japan, the American Occupation tried and executed a 
number of high Japanese and Korean militarists as war 
criminals and made "automatic purgees" of "all former 
commissioned officers of the regular army, navy, and 
volunter reserves." Yet in Korea such commissioned of-
ficers were rewarded with control of the [Armed 
Forces]. (176) 
American willingness to allow (and even to encourage) Korean 
officers who had sympathized with the Japanese to control 
the Korean Armed Forces was due in large part to a desire to 
thwart an incipient nationalist and anti-capitalist movement 
in the newly liberated Korea. 
10. For a detailed analysis of the political economy of 
French Indochina see Martin J. Murray, "The Development of 
Capitalism and the Making of the Working Class in Colonial 
Indochina, 1870-1940," in Proletarianisation in the Third 
World, ed. B. Munslow and H. Finch. 
11. "Annam" was the name given the center of Vietnam by 
the French in order "to portray Vietnam as disunified" (Kar-
now 57), a divide-and-conquer strategy later employed by the 
u.s. with its construction of a North and South Vietnam. 
12. Hollywood has also used women as symbols of Vietnam 
in such films as Full Metal Jacket and Casualties of War. 
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13. Chinua Achebe makes a similar argument about an-
other English novelist who travelled in and wrote about the 
third world, Joseph Conrad. Achebe argues that 
It might be contended • • • that the attitude to the 
African in Heart of Darkness is not Conrad's but that 
of his fictional narrator, Marlow, and that far from 
endorsing it Conrad might indeed be holding it up to 
irony and criticism. Certainly, Conrad appears to go 
to considerable pains to set up layers of insulation 
between himself and the moral universe of his story •• 
• • But if Conrad's intention is to draw a cordon sani-
taire between himself and the moral and psychological 
malaise of his narrator, his care seems to be totally 
wasted because he neglects to hint, clearly and ad-
equately, at an alternative frame of reference by which 
we may judge the actions and opinion of his characters. 
It would not have been beyond Conrad's power to make 
that provision if he had thought it necessary. Conrad 
seems to ••• approve of Marlow, with only minor res-
ervations--a fact reinforced by the similarities be-
tween their two careers. (9-10) 
14. Fowler's repeated reference to this native dress 
(the ao dai), to "the girls in the white silk trousers" 
(25), is meant to evoke the exoticism and sensuality of 
Vietnamese women. But Greene's use of the ao dai is mis-
leading. For the large percentage of women who were peas-
ants or were from the urban working class, the ao dai was 
reserved for feast days. Their usual dress was much less 
exotic and sensual--black cotton trousers and a black or 
white cotton blouse (Sully 72). 
15. The full consequences of this dissolute life are 
seen in the appearance of a Chinaman, Mr. Chou, about whom 
Fowler declares, 
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He looked at me with the indifferent gaze of a smoker: 
the sunken cheeks, the baby wrists, the arms of a small 
girl--many years and many pipes had been needed to 
whittle him down to these dimensions. (119) 
16. In constrast, as shown in Luong's sociocultural 
study of the village of Son-Duong, education was revitalized 
under communist rule: 
The village school had begun offering junior high 
school classes as early as 1958-1959, being the third 
in the district to do so. By 1987, with 42 teachers, 
it offered up to grade twelve and had enrolled 1001 
male and female students. The three nursery schools in 
the village also enrolled 120 pupils. The equal access 
to education for boys and girls stood in sharp contrast 
to the almost all-male enrollment of 35 students in the 
three-grade village school on the eve of the August 
1945 uprising. (173) 
17. Some of the features of traditional Vietnamese pa-
triarchy are discussed by Luong, who writes of a 
gender-based division of labor and an "exclusive reserve of 
public power and societal leadership roles for men" (70). 
In the village he studied, 
The main room of the house was a male domain where im-
portant guests were received and where the ancestral 
altar was located. Not only were junior female members 
of the household • • • unable to enter this main room 
in the presence of guests, but they reportedly had to 
cover their faces with conical hats when passing in 
front of it in the presence of male guests. (73) 
18. Indeed, Pathak, et al. assert that "Phuong's twit-
ter is silence as much as her silence is speech--both are 
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willed acts in the furtherance of her objective." Likewise, 
"Fowler's self-deception is a measure of her success in the 
deployment of speech and silence" (204). 
19. Although prostitution in Thailand was promoted by 
the U.S. military presence there, it would be wrong to blame 
the U.S. exclusively. James Petras and Tienchai 
Wongchaisuwan point to "a historical legacy [in Thailand] of 
absolute monarchical rule based on controlling and exploit-
ing slaves, serfs, women, and children." And they argue 
that the sex industry has been vital to capitalist develop-
ment in Thailand: "The secret of Thai growth is based on 
economic activity which is very profitable and has a spe-
cialized niche in the global marketplace: prostitution, the 
child sex trade, and child labor" (35). Thus in 1980 Deputy 
Prime Minister Booncha Rojanasathian recommended that pro-
vincial governors encourage 
certain entertainment activities which some . • • may 
find disgusting and embarassing because they are re-
lated to sexual pleasures •••• We must do this be-
cause we have to consider the jobs that will be created 
for people. (qtd. in Muecke 896) 
Several commentators (Petras and Wongchaisuwan, Robinson, 
Sachs) have even asserted that, in encouraging Thailand to 
promote its tourism industry, the World Bank gave tacit ap-
proval to the Thai sex tourism industry. According to 
Sachs, 
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In 1971, Robert McNamara, the president of the World 
Bank. . • without specifically mentioning the sex in-
dustry, urged Thailand to supplement its export activi-
ties with an all-out effort to attract rich foreigners 
to the country's various tourist facilities. After 
all, spending by U.S. military personnel on R & R in 
Thailand had quadrupled between 1967 and 1970, from 
about $5 billion to about $20 billion. McNamara was 
probably well aware of that trend, because he just hap-
pened to have been Secretary of Defense under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson at the time of the infamous R & R 
treaty. And he would have had to be unimaginably naive 
not to know that R & R usually meant sex. 
By 1975, Thailand, with the help of World Bank 
economists, had instituted a National Plan of Tourist 
Development, which specifically underwrote the sex in-
dustry. The new plan basically just buttressed the 
1966 Entertainment Places Act, the national law that 
had made possible the international R & R treaty. 
Without directly subsidizing prostitution, the Enter-
tainment Places Act, referring repeatedly to the "per-
sonal services" sector, gave encouragement to pimps and 
brothel owners by suggesting creative ways in which to 
develop their industry •••• The Act also made it 
clear that the proprieters of entertainment establish-
ments could feel free to hire whomever they wanted: 
the maximum fine for employing a "hostess" or "mas-
seuse" under the age of 18 was 2000 baht--or about 
$100. ( 28-29) 
20. Women are singled out by multinational corpora-
tions: globally, they comprise 80 percent of the work force 
in the assembly industry, 85 percent in electronics (Matte-
lart 111). Besides for their dexterity, women are chosen by 
multinational corporations because they are perceived to be 
more compliant. As Fuentes and Ehrenreich argue, "Multina-
tionals want a workforce that is docile, easily manipulated 
and willing to do boring, repetitive assembly work. Women, 
they claim, are the perfect employees" (12). 
21. Sachs describes Asia as the center of the child sex 
industry, with 60,000 child prostitutes in the Philippines, 
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400,000 in India, 20,000 (most of them boys) in Sri Lanka. 
Sachs and Petras/Wongchaisuwan note that recruitment of 
child prostitutes has spread into Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, 
Laos, and China. 
In addition to the social destruction wrought in South-
east Asia by the sex industry, there has developed a growing 
AIDS epidemic. Ironically, as the incidence of AIDS rises, 
the age of recr·uitment of child prostitutes declines to meet 
the demand for uncontaminated girls (in Thailand it has been 
estimated that 6.2 to 8.7 percent of females between the 
ages of 15 and 35 have been employed in the sex industry 
[Robinson 494]; child prostitution is the major occupation 
for children 10 to 16 [Petras and Wongchaisuwan 36]). It 
has further been estimated that 40 percent of child prosti-
tutes in Tha~land are HIV positive (Petras and Wongchaisuwan 
38). In 1993, 600,000 Thais were infected with AIDs, and 
there were approximately 1200 new cases per day (Petras and 
Wongchaisuwan 38); in India, over one million people are 
HIV-positive (Barnathan, et al. 357). By the year 2000, as 
many as one-third of all deaths in Thailand may be caused by 
AIDS, and in Asia more than a million people annually will 
become infected with HIV (Robinson 497, Barnathan, et al. 
357). 
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CHAPTER 4 
WAGING WAR AGAINST TOTALITY 
It is repugnant for honest people to think that the gov-
ernment of a country with the standing of the United 
States had, for many years, premeditated, prepared, and 
planned, down to the most minute details, systematic ag-
gression; a criminal war of genocide and biocide against 
a small people, a small country situated 10,000 kilometers 
and more from America's frontiers; to think that this 
government for many years on end has deliberately and 
knowingly lied to cover up the crime, to hide its plans 
and deceive American public opinion. 
--North Vietnamese pamphlet, 1971 
"Daddy, tell the truth," Kathleen can say, "did you ever 
kill anybody?" And I can say honestly, "Of course not." 
Or I can say, honestly, "Yes." 
--Tim 0'Brien1 
To some critics The Quiet American significantly in-
fluenced subsequent literary representations of the Viet-
nam War. Thomas Myers writes, "The shadow cast over the 
entire American corpus of Vietnam works by Greene's work • 
• • is indeed a large one" (38). Generally, though, the 
influence of Greene's novel has been minor. American nov-
elists of the war have moved away, in Gordon Taylor's 
words, "from a center Greene seems at once still to occupy 
and no longer usefully to provide," and have instead 
sought to exploit "the resources of several genres rather 
than settle into established prose patterns," reflecting 
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"internally on problems of literary procedure presented by 
new social and psychic 'information' generated by the war" 
(qtd. in Melling 93). In other words, contemporary au-
thors have employed a postmodern aesthetic because its 
dialogical content and its recognition of the uncertain 
and mediated nature of reality is perceived as a more ac-
curate rendering of the Vietnam War and of contemporary 
experience. To many academics, the defamiliarizing strat-
egies and heterogeneity of postmodernism are also con-
nected to a radical political vision. In this chapter, 
after briefly defining postmodernism and explaining why it 
often is tied to the Vietnam War, I will examine Tim 
O'Brien's The Things They Carried as a representative 
postmodern text, focusing 1) on O'Brien's use of a post-
modern aesthetic, 2) on how this aesthetic reinforces an 
ethnocentric and individualist perspective, and 3) on how 
postmodern anti-totalization thwarts an understanding of 
the systemic causes and consequences of historical events 
like the Vietnam War. 
Discussions of postmodernism co~nonly begin with as-
sertions about its uncertain definition and multiple mean-
ings. John Carlos Rowe writes of "the ambiguity of the 
postmodern" and of "the different ways the term has been 
used to characterize a wide range of social, aesthetic, 
economic, and political phenomena" (179). Fredric Jameson 
notes that the problem with postmodernism lies in "how its 
fundamental characteristics are to be described, whether 
it even exists in the first place, whether the very con-
cept is of any use, or is, on the contrary, a mystifica-
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tion" (55). "Of all the terms bandied about in both cur-
rent cultural theory and contemporary writing," asserts 
Linda Hutcheon, "postmodernism must be the most over- and 
under-defined" (3). Definitions of postmodernism, then, 
are notoriously difficult and often do not convey the full 
range of contradictory meanings with which this term has 
been associated. 
Nonetheless, I hope the following attempt at a defi-
nition will communicate much of what is associated with 
postmodernism. By "postmodernism" I mean what Lyotard 
identifies as "that severe reexamination • . • on the 
thought of the Enlightenment, on the idea of a unitary end 
of history and of a subject" (Condition 73). Or as Stan-
ley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux explain, postmodernism con-
sists of a 
refusal of grand narratives, [a] rejection of univer-
sal reason as a foundation for human affairs, [a] de-
centering of the humanist subject, [and a) radical 
problematization of representation (61). 
Postmodernism is the label given the tendency in contempo-
rary thought to question the individual's ability to order 
and understand reality. Mediated by language, knowledge 
is seen as contingent, local, fragmentary--the site of on-
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going discursive struggle. Objective reality, subjectiv-
ity, representation, and any totalizing schema--what Lyo-
tard defines as "any science that legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse" (xxiii)--are brought into 
question by postmodernism. If there were a credo for 
postmodernists, it would be Lyotard's call to "wage a war 
on totality; [and to] be witnesses to the unpresentable" 
(Condition 82).2 
That in attempting to document his experience in 
Vietnam O'Brien uses a postmodern aesthetic is understand-
able, since it is a widely accepted notion that, in order 
to render something of the sense-fracturing nature of con-
temporary life, literary texts must challenge such conven-
tions of realist fiction as characterization, historical 
narration, description, causal sequence, and, adds Jerome 
Klinkowitz, "the belief that the world is predictable, not 
mysterious, and answerable to the writer's control" (140). 
If O'Brien is to tell the truth about Vietnam, therefore, 
he must endorse an aesthetic that questions the very pos-
sibility of truth. 
Many critics have also seen a necessary link between 
postmodernism and the Vietnam War. For Jameson it was 
"the first terrible postmodernist war" (44), for Myers "a 
war that was at its core postmodern both in form and in 
historical message" (143). As Donald Ringnalda explains, 
"the war does not fit within the tidy perimeters of the 
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ethnocentric, traditional war narrative" (68) and thus re-
quires a postmodern literary aesthetic. Or as Klinkowitz 
asserts, 
the appropriate fictive responses to America's in-
volvement in Vietnam will only be successful when 
they account for postmodern • • • techniques for 
dealing with a fundamentally unstructurable reality. 
(155) 
Fragmented and unreal, the Vietnam War is thought to over-
whelm conventional categories of understanding, leading 
critics like Klinkowitz to speak of "the void itself that 
Vietnam had become for us" (135) and to view the war as an 
experience that "could be described as one of uncertainty 
in the face of disrupted forms" (137). Similarly, Jameson 
suggests that the Vietnam War leads to "the breakdown of 
all previous narrative paradigms along with the 
breakdown of any shared language through which a veteran 
may be said to convey such experience" (44).3 
Consequently, reviewers praised O'Brien for conveying 
a sense of this almost unrepresentable war. To Robert R. 
Harris in the New York Times Book Review The Things They 
Carried "crystalizes the Vietnam experience for us." 
Likewise, to Julian Loose in the Times Literary Supplement 
O'Brien's is not "a merely fashionable reflectivity." 
Instead, by "creating a work which so adroitly resists 
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finality, O'Brien has been faithful both to Vietnam and to 
the stories told about it." And to PeterS. Prescott in 
Newsweek, "Straightforward wars are built like novels . 
. Messy wars, like the one we fought in Vietnam, lend 
themselves more readily to fragmented narratives." 
The war, according to these critics, was defined by 
uncertainty--in motivation, history, strategy, official 
rhetoric, media representations, identification of friend 
and foe. For Klinkowitz, it was "a nonlinear war, with no 
objective to seize, no identifiable goal to achieve, and 
no overall end-date in sight" (148). Likewise, Myers 
speaks of the war's "chimerical, processive nature" (25), 
a perception stemming from an "unfamiliar geography, con-
stantly shifting official pronouncements, absence of dis-
cernible objects, and decaying support at home" (35-36). 
Conventional notions of truth and reference were disrupted 
by the war. As Timothy Lomperis puts it, 
with the facts of Vietnam in such a flux, perhaps 
some small measure of comfort can be taken in the 
certainty that eventually everyone will be wrong. 
The facts, in Vietnam, make liars of us all (59). 
This indeterminacy, however, is at odds with a standard 
feature of war narratives--the need to bear witness. 
There remains a tension throughout The Things They Carried 
between O'Brien's belief in reality as an imaginative con-
struct and his desire to tell the truth. This tension 
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begins with the title page, where The Things They Carried 
is identified as "a work of fiction by Tim O'Brien," and 
the opening epigraph, taken from John Ransom's Anderson-
ville Diary, which asserts textual authenticity: 
Those who have had any such experience as the author 
will see its truthfulness at once, and to all other 
readers it is commended as a statement of actual 
things by one who experienced them to the fullest. 
Central among O'Brien's concerns is the attempt to recon-
cile fact and fiction, the real and the imagined. His aim 
is paradoxical and characteristically postmodern--to iden-
tify the fundamental nature of the Vietnam War while re-
vealing the impossibility of such epistemological cer-
tainty, to reconcile historical accuracy with the inef-
fable unreality of his experience in Vietnam. Ultimately, 
this reconciliation is sought through self-referentiality, 
through viewing the war not as past experience but as on-
going interpretation, as the very process of literary ere-
ation. 
Postmodernism 
The Things They Carried is a hybrid text, a collec-
tion of stories that functions as a novel. Characters and 
incidents are repeated from story to story and are re-
fracted through several literary modes and through the 
O'Brien narrator/persona's shifting self-interest and 
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self-delusion. Thus The Things They Carried is an embodi-
ment of the processive and indeterminate nature of con-
sciousness; it seeks to replicate a veteran's struggle to 
make sense of war-time experience and memory. To show 
specifically how O'Brien's aesthetic works in The Things 
They Carried, I will concentrate on one incident--the 
death of his comrade Kiowa. 
In the story "Speaking of Courage" O'Brien tells us 
his platoon bivouacked beside the Song Tra Bong River in 
what they discovered too late was "a shit field. The vil-
lage toilet" (164). Rain transformed this field into 
"deep, oozy soup •••• Like sewage" (164). During the 
night the platoon was bombarded by mortar fire that made 
the ground explode and boil. Kiowa began to drown in this 
shit field. Another soldier, Norman Bowker, 
grabbed Kiowa by the boot and tried to pull him out . 
• • • then suddenly he felt himself going too. He 
could taste it. The shit was in his nose and eyes •• 
• • and he could no longer tolerate it •••. He re-
leased Kiowa's boot and watched it slide away. (168) 
O'Brien repeatedly forces this image before us to convey 
the horror of war. Beyond its power to shock, this image 
serves as a metaphor for combat. To American soldiers in 
Vietnam "the shit" referred to "the day-to-day combat op-
erations endured by Gis in the field" (Clark 463). O'Bri-
en revivifies this conventional metaphor by making it 
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horribly tangible. That men's lives were wasted in Viet-
nam is likewise made literal by the shit field. Kiowa's 
death also evokes the notion that for the U.S. Vietnam was 
a quagmire; his drowning functions almost emblematically 
to suggest America's deepening entanglement in southeast 
Asia. "This field," O'Brien writes, "had embodied all the 
\vaste that was Vietnam" ( 210). 
But it is not this particular metaphor that makes The 
Things They Carried memorable. From e.e. cummings's Olaf 
glad and big to Thomas Pynchon's Brigadier Pudding, writ-
ers have used coprophagia to suggest war's dehumanization. 
What is striking about O'Brien's novel is its elaborate 
and elusive self-consciousness. O'Brien gives us several 
versions of this incident and foregrounds his role in 
shaping these stories. In "Speaking of Courage," he tells 
us that Norman Bowker failed to save Kiowa. In "Notes," 
he reveals that Kiowa's death had been omitted from an 
earlier version of this story and that Bowker, haunted by 
that night, committed suicide. In still another story, 
"In the Field," 0 'Brien blames not Bowker but an unnamed 
soldier who instigated the mortar attack by carelessly 
turning on his flashlight. And in "Field Trip" O'Brien 
tells us about his return to the site of Kiowa's death 
years after the War. "That little field," he writes, 
had swallowed so much. My best friend. My pride. 
My belief in myself as a man of some small dignity 
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and courage. Still, it was hard to find any real 
emotion ••.• After that long night in the rain, I'd 
seemed to grow cold inside, all the illusions gone, 
all the old ambitions and hopes for myself sucked 
away into the mud. (210) 
Nowhere in The Things They Carried does O'Brien explain 
more clearly the psychic devastation wrought by wartime 
trauma. In order to overcome this trauma and to regain 
what he lost in Kiowa's death, O'Brien must confront his 
past, so he wades into the filthy river. Previously, he 
had "felt a certain smugness about how easily [he] had 
made the shift from war to peace" (179). Now he writes, 
in a way •.• I'd gone under with Kiowa, and ••. 
after two decades I'd finally worked my way out ••. 
• I felt something go shut in my heart while some-
thing else swung open. (212) 
Despite the conviction with which O'Brien recounts this 
incident and his repeated attempts to come to terms with 
his battlefield experiences, however, there is little 
reason to believe that what he tells us is true. For 
throughout The Things They Carried he suggests that the 
truth about the war, or for that matter any truth, is best 
seen as process, as an act of remembering and telling. 
O'Brien sees truth and reality as indeterminate, as 
inseparable from their imaginative reconstruction. Ac-
cordingly, "What sticks to memory," he writes, "are those 
odd little fragments that have no beginning and no end" 
(39), fragments such as 
A red clay trail outside the village of My Khe •• 
A hand grenade. 
A slim, dead, dainty man of about twenty. 
Kiowa saying, "No choice, Tim. What else could 
you do?" 
Kiowa saying, "Right?" 
Kiowa saying, "Talk to me." (40) 
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O'Brien tells us how such fragments are reimagined in the 
process of writing. "I'm forty-three y·ears old, and a 
writer now," he declares, 
and the war has been over for a long while. Much of 
it is hard to remember. I sit at this typewriter and 
stare through my words and watch Kiowa sinking into 
the deep muck of a shit field • • • and as I write 
about these things, the remembering is turned into a 
kind of rehappening. (36) 
Explaining how such fragments of memory are given signifi-
cance and meaning by the imagination, O'Brien told Eric 
Schroeder: "we use our imaginations to deal with situa-
tions around us, not just to cope with them psychologi-
cally but, more importantly, to deal with them philosophi-
cally and morally" (139). In this sense, all of us are 
"spin" doctors, treating and reconstructing experience, 
giving it coherence and meaning and making it true through 
our imaginations. 
This preoccupation with truth-telling is most vividly 
seen in "How to Tell a True War Story." Here O'Brien 
identifies his fiction as inherently accurate: "This is 
true" (75), he writes, "It's all exactly true" (77), "It 
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all happened" (83), "here's what actually happened" (85). 
But such insistence upon the truthfulness of his fiction, 
rather than reinforcing its essential accuracy, fore-
grounds the uncertain relationship between reality and 
textual representation. Because of its complex and con-
tradictory character, the war for O'Brien can never be 
faithfully rendered: "the only certainty," he writes, "is 
overwhelming ambiguity" (88). He goes on to say that "in 
a true war story nothing is ever absolutely true" (88). 
Yet it is through stories that experience is given the 
heft of truth: "As I write about these things," O'Brien 
tells us, "the remembering is turned into a kind of rehap-
pening" (36). And this "story-truth is truer sometimes 
than happening-truth" (203). 
O'Brien attempts to resolve this paradox--the need to 
tell the truth about an experience that is inherently un-
real and which thereby defies conventional categories of 
true and false--by emphasizing the process of story-mak-
ing. It is in this process that truth and falsehood, re-
ality and representation, subject and object, fact and 
fiction cohere. Hence a true war story cannot be sepa-
rated from its telling. By emphasizing artifice, by dem-
onstrating the extent to which experience is an imagina-
tive construct, O'Brien attempts to identify the important 
truths buried within his memories of Vietnam. To O'Brien 
self-referentiality is a necessary feature of truthful 
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writing, for only by emphasizing artifice can he write the 
truth, or as he suggests, "you tell lies to get at the 
truth" (Schroeder 141). 
This obsession with conveying the truth, while un-
characteristic of postmodernism, is familiar to war narra-
tives and, according to Kali Tal, is a defining feature of 
the literature of trauma. Reading the accounts of Holo-
caust and A-bomb survivors, rape and incest victims, and 
war veterans, Tal finds an "urge to bear witness, to carry 
the tale of horror back to the halls of normalcy and tes-
tify to the truth of the experience" (emphasis added, 
229). O'Brien emphasizes the traumatic, obsessive nature 
of his experience by repeatedly circling back to specific 
incidents, such as Kiowa's death. Sometimes these inci-
dents are merely alluded to. At other times, they are 
discussed at length but are approached from different 
angles and through different narratives, as if O'Brien 
must face these hard truths obliquely, defensively. 
O'Brien's final story, "The Lives of the Dead," is 
unlike anything else in The Things They Carried. Its fo-
cus is broader, concentrating not on Vietnam but on those 
times throughout O'Brien's life when he was made aware of 
human mortality, from the death of childhood schoolmate 
Linda to numerous American and Vietnamese battle casual-
ties. These confrontations with mortality scar O'Brien 
and shape his belief that the most important thing fiction 
183 
can do is reimagine the dead. "Stories," he suggests, 
"van save us. in a story . the dead sometimes 
smile and sit up and return to the world" (255). Stor.ies 
are a means of overcoming trauma, "a way of bringing body 
and soul back together" (267).4 Ultimately, The Things 
They Carried functions as O'Brien's attempt to sort 
through the pieces of his life to begin connecting his 
fractured self into a sensible whole. "I'm forty-three 
years old," he writes in the novel's concluding passage, 
and ••• still dreaming Linda alive •••• in the 
spell of memory and imagination, I can still see her 
as if through ice •••• I can see Kiowa ••• and 
sometimes I can even see Timmy skating with Linda •• 
• • I'm young and happy. I'll never die. I'm skim-
ming across the surface of my own history • • • and 
when I take a high leap into the dark and come down 
thirty years later, I realize it is as Tim trying to 
save Timmy's life with a story. (273) 
In this conclusion O'Brien attempts to achieve psychic 
wholeness by reconnecting the boy he was before Vietnam 
with the man he has become. Also, he transforms the waste 
of Vietnam into the purity of ice, and the unstable ground 
which swallowed Kiowa into a solid surface meant to sup-
port his fractured psyche. Nonetheless, in its emptiness 
and coldness this final image suggests O'Brien has not 
fully regained his capacity to feel. And in skimming 
across the frozen surface of his own history, O'Brien 
avoids plumbing the depths of his troubled psyche, thus 
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replicating a veteran's ongoing struggle to make sense of 
war-time experience and memory. 
Ethnocentrism 
Of course, a modernist or realist aesthetic is just 
as capable of rendering an individual soldier's tortured 
psyche. The difference alleged of a postmodern aesthetic 
is that it can capture something essential about the na-
ture of contemporary life. Andreas Huyssen identifies 
a slowly emerging cultural transformation in Western 
societies, a change in sensibility for which the term 
"post-modern" is actually, at least for now, wholly 
adequate •••• in an important sector of our culture 
there is a noticeable shift in sensibility, practices 
and discourse formations which distinguishes a post-
modern set of assumptions, experiences and proposi-
tions from that of a preceding period. (qtd. in 
Harvey 39) 
Many cultural theorists concur, viewing postmodernism as a 
form of periodization--a means of defining the ways of 
life in the latter half of the twentieth century. There 
is a general consensus among them that a significant so-
cial and cultural change occurred after the second world 
war, that this change began to take visible shape by the 
early 1960s, and that this change can be labelled "post-
modern."5 
The most influential explanation for this change is 
probably Jameson's notion that postmodernism arose with 
the onset of late capitalism, what he describes as a 
"vision of a world capitalist system fundamentally dis-
tinct from the older imperialism" (xix). For Jameson, 
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late capitalism is defined by the growth of transnational 
corporations, and 
its features include the new international division 
of labor, a vertiginous new dynamic in international 
banking and the stock exchanges (including the enor-
mous Second and Third World debt), new forms of media 
interrelationship • • • computers and automation, the 
flight of production to advanced Third World areas, 
along with all the more familiar social consequences, 
including the crisis of traditional labor, the emer-
gence of yuppies and gentrification on a now-global 
scale. ( xix) 
"To grant some historic originality to a postmodernist 
culture," writes Jameson, "is also implicitly to affirm 
some radical structural difference between what is some-
times called consumer society and earlier moments of capi-
talism from which it emerged" (55). The destruction of 
the colonial order, the spread of multinational corpora-
tions, the deindustrialization of the West and the growth 
of developing nations, the global reach of American popu-
lar culture, the ubiquity of television, the influence of 
non-linear scientific theories, and the rise of identity 
politics have combined to shatter the modern age, with its 
enlightenment-derived pursuit of a comprehensive and sys-
tematic understanding of the world. In its place has 
arisen a culture marked by fragmentation, heterogeneity, 
uncertainty, simulation, parody, and pastiche. 
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As such, postmodernism is considered a corrective to 
the harm caused by the enlightenment emphasis on reason 
and objectivity. In opposing the enlightenment paradigm, 
postmodernism is seen as providing space for individuals, 
groups, and beliefs that heretofore have been marginalized 
by the various metanarratives that comprise the Western 
tradition. Postmodernism, alleges Hutcheon, 
[has] become a most popular and effective strategy • 
• • of black, ethnic, gay, and feminist artists--
trying to come to terms with and to respond, criti-
cally and creatively, to the still predominantly 
white, heterosexual, male culture in which they find 
themselves. (37) 
Accordingly, many contemporary theorists find in postmod-
ernism itself a necessary counter-force (what Aronowitz 
and Giroux label "an emancipatory postmodernism" [19]) to 
the exclusionary politics of modernism/formalism and the 
mystified ideology of positivism. The discourse of post-
modernism is replete with a radical-sounding rhetoric con-
cerned with opposing tyranny and recognizing the marginal 
and the oppressed. As Hal Foster suggests, postmodernism 
"seeks to question rather than exploit cultural codes, to 
explore rather than conceal social and political affilia-
tions" (xii). Indeed, many postmodernists allege its po-
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litical potential: Jerry Varsava notes that postmodernism 
may "contribute in some measure to the formation of a more 
radically heterogeneous and democratic world" (188); 
Hutcheon asserts that postmodernism aims to "chang[e] con-
sciousness through art" (202); Aronowitz and Giroux 
define postmodernism as the "intellectual expression" of 
"radical democracy" ( 185). 
It is important to note, however, that postmodernism 
is not a global phenomenon. To the vast number of people 
who live in pre- rather than post-industrial conditions, 
who live in rural communities with subsistence-level agri-
cultural economies, the world has not been fragmented and 
simulated in startling new ways but remains stubbornly 
solid and painfully real. As of 1989, according to the 
Worldwatch Institute, 1.2 billion people lived in absolute 
poverty, and, writes Alan Durning, "Despite rapid urban-
ization and growing urban poverty in much of the world, 
four fifths of those in absolute poverty still live in 
rural areas" (139)--a fact not easily reconciled with 
Jameson's vision of "a world capitalist system fundamen-
tally distinct from the older imperialism" with "gentrifi-
cation on a now-global scale." 
I do not mean to suggest that living conditions have 
remained static; on the contrary, the postwar period has 
seen rapid urbanization and development throughout the 
Third World • But while this transformation has acceler-
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ated the globalization of capital, it has not led to a 
high-tech, postindustrial global economy. Instead, the 
Third World has undergone massive industrialization. Paul 
Kellogg details the extent of this transformation: 
Employment in manufacturing grew by 65 per cent in 
Turkey between 1960 and 1982, 179 per cent in Egypt 
between 1958 and 1981, 623 per cent in Tanzania be-
tween 1953 and 1981, 57 per cent in Zimbabwe .•• 
1970-BO, 212 per cent in Brazil 1970-82, 34 per cent 
in Peru 1971-1981 and an astonishing 2,500 per cent 
in South Korea between 1956 and 19821 On a world 
scale, this has meant in the 11 years between 1971 
and 1982, a 14.1 per cent rise in industrial employ-
ment. It is true that in this period "developed 
market economies" (North America and Western Europe 
in particular) experienced an industrial employment 
decline of 6 1/2 per cent. But "developing market 
economies" shot up by 58 per cent, and "centrally 
planned economies" by 16 per cent to more than make 
up the difference •••• On a world scale there are 
more industrial workers than at any time in history. 
(qtd. in Callinicos 125) 
Rather than a global world-view, postmodernism--with its 
defining assertion that the world has entered a postindus-
trial age--is a class-and region-specific phenomenon. For 
all its denouncing of totalization and championing of the 
local and the heterogenous, postmodernism can be read as a 
form of cultural imperialism that alleges global signifi-
cance for a bourgeois, primarily Western intellectual con-
ceit. 
Similarly, postmodern Vietnam War literature is 
strikingly ethnocentric. Although one of postmodernism's 
defining characteristics, according to Aronowitz and Gi-
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roux, is "its celebration of plurality and the politics of 
racial, gender, and ethnic difference" (61), it is pre-
cisely the postmodern elements of The Things They Carried 
that contributes to its solipsism. O'Brien's preoccupa-
tion with the reconstructive power of the imagination, his 
problematizing of unequivocal truth and a knowable real-
ity, rather than leading to a more expansive vision and a 
more considered portrait of the Vietnamese, leads to a 
concentration on "Tim trying to save Timmy's life." In 
attempting to challenge the concept of an autonomous sub-
ject, O'Brien writes a text that is obsessed with self; 
he details the uncertain effects of an unreal war upon an 
unknowable self but fails to examine its all too real ef-
fects upon the Vietnamese. As Philip H. Melling asserts, 
and as is buttressed by The Things They Carried, postmod-
ernists "have become fascinated with Vietnam as a place 
redolent with the modes of modern experience • at the 
expense of its moral or social contexts" (119). For post-
modernists, 
what the American experience in Vietnam reveals • • 
is a level of sophistication and enterprise that is 
far more intriguing and relevant to the world in 
which we live than the primitive ideology of an as-
piring third world country, or the social catastrophe 
that Vietnam has experienced in recent times. (Mel-
ling 119) 
Instead of celebrating difference, a postmodern text like 
The Things They Carried, with its literary and episterna-
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logical preoccupations, is uninterested in the wartime ex-
perience of the Vietnamese. 
There continues to be an urgent need to correct this 
omission due to the thoroughness with which the history of 
American militarism in southeast Asia has been repressed 
and revised in the last two decades to promote a milita-
rist, nationalist, and capitalist ideology. After a war 
or period of social crisis, history frequently is reinter-
preted and radical moments excised from a nation's cul-
tural memory. It is in the interest of ruling elites, 
after all, to deny the efficacy of and if possible even 
the existence of large-scale oppositional social movements 
and to revise troubling historical fact. Those with 
access to the means of cultural production (book publish-
ers, film companies, media conglomerates, etc.) are sig-
nificant forces behind such revision, promoting, .in the 
words of Michael Klein, "a process of organized forgetting 
[that] takes people's complex past away, substituting com-
fortable myths that reinforce rather than challenge the 
status quo" (19). 
What has been most revised in the recent historical 
record is how horribly destructive the war was for the 
Vietnamese. Even "On the rare occasions when the devas-
tating consequences of the war are noted," write Chomsky 
and Herman, "care is taken to sanitize the reports so as 
to eliminate the U.S. role" (83). Part of this role be-
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tween 1965 and 1969 was to unleash 4.5 million tons of 
aerial bombardment upon Indochina--about nine times the 
tonnage dropped in the Pacific during World War II (in-
eluding Hiroshima and Nagasaki). According to Herman, 
this amounted to "over 70 tons of bombs for every square 
mile of Vietnam, North and South " (qtd. in Chomsky 1969, 
291). By the end of the war, the u.s. had dropped 7 mil-
lion tons of bombs on Vietnam--more than twice the tonnage 
dropped on Europe and Asia during the second world war, or 
almost one 500 pound bomb for every Vietnamese (Zinn 469). 
Marilyn Young summarizes the consequences of the American 
war against Vietnam: 
in the South, 9,000 out of 15,000 hamlets, 25 million 
acres of farmland, 12 million acres of forest were de-
stroyed, and 1.5 million farm animals had been killed; 
there were an estimated 200,000 prostitutes, 879,000 
orphans, 181,000 disabled people, and 1 million widows; 
all six of the industrial cities in the North had been 
badly damaged, as were provincial and district towns, 
and 4,000 of 5,800 agricultural communes. North and 
south the land was cratered and planted with tons of 
unexploded ordnance, so that long after the war farmers 
and their families suffered serious injuries as they 
attempted to bring the fields back into cultivation. 
Nineteen million gallons of herbicide had been sprayed 
on the South during the war. (301-02)6 
While many Americans can give a rough estimate of 
U.S. casualties, they consistently underestimate Vietnam-
ese casualties. In a study conducted by the University of 
Massachusetts in 1992, Americans on average estimated 
100,000 Vietnamese deaths, missing the true figure by only 
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1,900,000 (Chomsky 1993, 280). Even more remarkable, when 
I taught Vietnam War literature to undergraduates, some of 
my students were surprised to learn not that 40 times as 
many Vietnamese as Americans died but that Vietnamese 
deaths outnumbered Americans at all. Such ignorance of 
the lethal consequences of U.S. militarism is due to a 
process of historical revision that has been ongoing since 
the end of the War. With its lack of interest in the 
plight of the Vietnamese, a novel such as The Things They 
Carried has in its small way furthered this process of 
forgetting. 
O'Brien moves beyond the world view of an American 
soldier once--in "The Man I Killed." Here he invents the 
biography of a slain Vietcong, imagining this soldier's 
rural upbringing, his interest in mathematics, his love 
affair with a university classmate, etc. This story 
stands out, not only in The Things They Carried but in 
Vietnam War novels generally, for its attempt to humanize 
an enemy soldier. O'Brien is particularly effective in 
revealing Americans' disregard for the lives of the Viet-
namese by juxtaposing this soldier's life with the insen-
sitive comments of American soldiers: 
He wanted someday to be a teacher of mathematics. At 
night, lying on his mat, he could not picture himself 
doing the brave things his father had done, or his 
uncles, or the heroes of the stories. He hoped in 
his heart that he would never be tested. He hoped 
the Americans would go away. Soon, he hoped. He 
kept hoping and hoping, always even when he was 
asleep. 
193 
"Oh, man, you fuckin' trashed the fucker," Azar 
said. "You scrambled his sorry self, look at that, 
you did, you laid him out like Shredded fuckin' 
Wheat. (140) 
Yet the reconstruction of this soldier's life is consis-
tently undercut by O'Brien's acknowledgment that it is all 
speculation: this Vietcong soldier was "a scholar, maybe. 
• • • He had been born, maybe, in 1946 in the village of 
My Khe" (139). All that is certain is that this soldier 
is dead. Although we are told of his life and family, we 
are simultaneously told that these details are fiction. 
O'Brien thus demonstrates that his true concern is not 
with the lives of the Vietnamese but with what such fanci-
ful reconstructions reveal about the imaginative process. 
Ultimately, this dead Vietcong soldier has no purpose 
and no existence beyond his literary expropriation by 
O'Brien. Even his death, which initially is alleged to 
have been caused by O'Brien, becomes grounds for speculat-
ing about the nature of truth: "I did not kill him," he 
writes, 
but I was present, you see, and my presence was guilt 
enough. • • • I remember feeling the burden of re-
sponsibility and grief. I blamed myself. And right-
ly so, because I was present. But listen. Even that 
story is made up (203). 
194 
Rather than providing him with a means to celebrate ethnic 
difference, then, O'Brien's postmodernism causes him to 
turn inward, to use the death of a Vietcong soldier as the 
basis for a questioning of empiricism and a celebration of 
the reconstructive power of the imagination. Instead of 
using this death to consider the massive suffering in-
flicted by the u.s. military in pursuit of American for-
eign policy aims, O'Brien uses it as a springboard to fur-
ther discussion of philosophical and aesthetic matters. 
Nowhere else does O'Brien individualize the Vietnam-
ese, except for a very brief description of "an old 
pappa-san [who] guide[ed] [them] through the mine fields" 
(36) and a girl who, amidst the rubble of her village, 
"danced with her eyes half closed, her feet bare" (153). 
This girl is the only living, individualized Vietnamese in 
The Things They Carried affected by the war. Her dance 
exemplifies the hysteria caused by war (her family has 
been burned to death). Her dance also suggests to O'Brien 
and his comrades the inexplicable character of the Viet-
namese--as one soldier explains, this dance is "Probably 
some weird ritual" (154). 
Otherwise, there are only the faceless Vietnamese 
O'Brien's platoon encounters in the course of their combat 
missions. They search villages, "frisking children and 
old men" (15), watch "a dozen old marna-sans [run) out and 
start ••• yelling" (164), and dig foxholes next to a 
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pagoda whose "monks did not seem upset or displeased" 
(133). Impersonal descriptions like these, broad strokes 
meant to suggest village life and to convey a sense of 
rural Vietnam, constitute the limits of O'Brien's investi-
gation of Vietnamese culture. As Frances Fitzgerald makes 
clear, though, the village is central to a peasant popula-
tion who 
lived in a society of particular people, all of whom 
knew each other by their place in the landscape. 
"Citizenship" in a Vietnamese village was personal 
and untransferable. In the past, few Vietnamese ever 
left their village in times of peace, for to do so 
was to leave society itself--all human attachments, 
all absolute rights and duties. (13) 
According to Fitzgerald, for the rural Vietnamese self-
identity was inseparable from identification with one's 
village. Yet in The Things They Carried O'Brien seems un-
aware of the importance of this communal existence; the 
villages encountered by his platoon are homogenous and 
their inhabitants generic. 
The Vietnamese in The Things They Carried belong to 
one of several categories. They are KIAs, "twenty-seven 
bodies altogether, and parts of several others •••• all 
badly bloated. Their clothing was stretched tight like 
sausage skins" (270-71) or an individual corpse, "an old 
man who lay face-up near a pigpen at the center of the 
village. His right arm was gone. At his face there were 
already many flies and gnats" (256). They are human re-
mains, "Stacks of bones--all kinds" with a poster pro-
claiming, "ASSEMBLE YOUR OWN GOOK!! FREE SAMPLE KIT!!" 
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( 119). They are ghosts "wiping out a whole Marine platoon 
in twenty seconds flat. Ghosts rising from the dead. 
Ghosts behind you and in front of you and inside of you" 
(231), "odd shapes swaying in the paddies, boogie-men in 
sandals, spirits dancing in old pagodas" (229). They are 
part of the countryside, "blend[ing] with the land, chang-
ing form, becoming trees and grass" (229). And the land 
itself is "some kind of soft black protoplasm, Vietnam, 
the blood and the flesh" (249). 
These descriptions convey something of the war's car-
nage, and they accurately present American soldiers' fear 
and wonder at the skills of experienced guerilla fighters. 
But these descriptions also repeat the dehumanizing and at 
times racist attitudes of American soldiers. Although 
O'Brien is clearly critical of these attitudes, his novel, 
because it has no normative contrast other than the one 
story "The Man I Killed," does little to correct these 
views, to humanize the generic and naturalized descrip-
tions of the Vietnamese so common in American novels of 
the war. 
In The Things They Carried the Vietnamese exist pri-
marily as a backdrop for what is truly important to O'Bri-
en--to explore how the imaginative reconstruction and re-
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consideration of trauma serves as the wellspring for lit-
erary creation. What O'Brien acknowledged about Going af-
ter Cacciato is true for The Things They Carried: 
I don't see it as a book about war •••• In part 
it's a book about writing a book •••• when I talk 
about imagination and memory, I'm talking about the 
two key ingredients that go into writing fiction. 
(qtd. in Schroeder 134-35) 
O'Brien's postmodern aesthetic leads him to concentrate on 
his own literary imagination. Ironically, considering the 
multicultm .. :al sympathies alleged of postmodernism, his in-
ability to convey anything specific and human about the 
Vietnamese repeats the cultural ignorance and ethnocen-
trism that dominated the attitudes of American military 
leaders and policy-makers and that has so narrowly defined 
American cultural memory of the war. O'Brien's interest 
in personal trauma and the individual's ability to orga-
nize experience into meaningful narrative results in a 
text that is solipsistic and culturally exclusive. The 
"they" of the book's title does not include the Vietnam-
ese. 
Ahistoricism 
As a representative postmodern text, The Things They 
Carried reveals the constraints that postmodern episternal-
ogy and its concomitant literary expression can impose 
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upon the presentation of historical fact. For example, in 
the story "On the Rainy River" O'Brien asks, 
Was it a civil war? A war of national liberation or 
simple aggression? Who started it, and when, and 
why? What really happened to the USS Maddox on that 
dark night in the Gulf of Tonkin? Was Ho Chi Minh a 
Communist stooge, or a nationalist savior, or both, 
or neither? What about the Geneva accords? What 
about SEATO and the Cold War? What about dominoes? 
(44) 
In the context of "On the Rainy River" these questions 
demonstrate the confusion about the war that existed circa 
1968. If The Things They Carried is any evidence, though, 
O'Brien is not much closer to answering these questions 
twenty years later. This indeterminacy is characteristic 
of much analysis of the Vietnam War. Timothy Lomperis, 
for instance, asserts that "with the facts of Vietnam in 
such a flux ••• eventually everyone will be wrong," and 
"the facts, in Vietnam, make liars of us all" (59). Con-
sequently, the only way O'Brien can address the geopoliti-
cal and historical issues raised by the war is to ask a 
series of rhetorical questions. The rapid-fire succession 
of these questions is meant to demonstrate the impossibil-
ity of ever explaining the war's history. Answers to 
questions such as these require facts that are knowable, 
history that is objective, and truths that are verifi-
able--all of which are brought into question by postmod-
ernism. Postmodernists object to Marxist historicism in 
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particular because it allegedly imposes a totalizing 
framework and ignores the discursiveness of historical 
knowledge. 
Rather than examine the Vietnam War through an ex-
planatory framework such as class analysis, postmodernists 
see such explanations as totalizing and reductionist con-
structs. Thus Paul Patton criticizes Marxism because it 
displays 
a refusal to accept the possibility of difference and 
discontinuity at the heart of human history, and a 
corresponding refusal to allow that there can be ir-
reducibly different perspectives, each in its own way 
critical of existing social reality (qtd. in Callini-
cos 84-85). 
Postmodernists write of the need to counter totality with 
heterogeneity and fragmentation, believing that other ap-
preaches merely replace one exclusive, elitist, hierarchi-
cal scheme with another. Rejecting the Enlightenment be-
lief in universal truths and individual reason, postmod-
ernists regard themselves as, in Christopher Norris's de-
scription, "strategists engaged in producing various sorts 
of discourse, from various (often contradictory) subject-
positions, without any claim to ultimate authority or 
truth~ (105). 
Yet if O'Brien's questions are to be taken seriously, 
we must have an explanatory framework that can choose be-
tween competing truth claims; specifically, we must have 
200 
some way of accounting for U.S. foreign policy during the 
cold war. We must be able first to recognize and second 
to explain the consistency with which the U.S. has 
thwarted political movements and overturned governments 
that did not endorse the interests of capital (as these 
interests were conceived of by corporate and policy 
elites). Or as Michael Parenti asks, 
Why has the U.S. government never supported social 
revolutionary forces against right-wing governments? 
Could it possibly do so? If not, why not? Why in 
the post-war era has the u.s. overthrown a dozen or 
more popularly elected left-reformist democracies> 
Why has it fostered close relations with just about 
all the right-wing autocracies on earth? (qtd. in 
Meyerson 68) 
The most logical and consistent explanation for this his-
tory is that the U.S. has pursued a policy based on the 
interests of global capital. Class analysis, therefore, 
is a vital tool for understanding the motivation behind 
U.S. foreign policy. However, this analysis requires the 
kind of totalizing scheme that Hutcheon declares (with un-
postmodern certainty) "postmodernism cannot and will not 
offer" (214).11 7 
This postmodern opposition to totality stems from, in 
Brenda K. Marshall's words, a "recognition that there is 
no 'outside' from which to 'objectively' name the pres-
ent," a recognition that in turn stems from "an awareness 
of being-within, first, a language, and second, a particu-
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lar historical, social, cultural framework" ( 3). As Terry 
Eagleton suggests, for poststructuralists 
There is no concept which is not embroiled in an 
open-ended play of signification, shot through with 
the traces and fragments of other ideas. It is just 
that, out of this play of signifiers, certain mean-
ings are elevated by social ideologies to a privi-
leged position, or made the centres around which 
other meanings are forced to turn. (Literary 131) 
In other words, all political positions, all historical 
analyses are discursive; there is no place outside of 
language from which a critique may be made--no discourse 
can adequately represent reality since reality is consti-
tuted by discourse. As Paul de Man argues, "the bases for 
historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written 
texts, even if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars 
or revolutions" (qtd. in Leonard 416). Or as Eagleton ex-
plains, 
Our language does not so much reflect reality as sig-
nify it, carve it into conceptual shape. The answer, 
then, to what exactly is being carved into conceptual 
shape is impossible to give. (Ideology 203) 
If reality is problematized because it is constituted by 
discourse, then O'Brien's questions can never be answered 
truthfully. For a true answer, according to the logic of 
poststructuralism, has merely been elevated to the status 
of truth by social convention and the dominant structures 
of power. As O'Brien explains, 
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by going through the process of having imagined some-
thing, one gathers a sense of the stuff that's being 
imagined •••• And that sense can't be pinned down 
to a message or a moral. (qtd. in Schroeder 140) 
Ideology critique, on the other hand, rests on the 
assumption that, however problematic and discursive, his-
tory is knowable and truth verifiable. Ideology critique 
has two main goals--first to identify human suffering and 
social injustice and second to explain what causes these 
to be reproduced consistently and on a large-scale. Ide-
ology critique, then, is based on the notion that some ex-
planations are better (because truer). Postmodernists ob-
ject to ideology critique for precisely this reason--be-
cause it presupposes an objective and authoritative posi-
tion from which the truthfulness of discourses may be as-
certained. For postmodernists all critique, because it is 
enmeshed in a web of signifiers, is implicated in the sys-
tern it critiques. Since there is no position outside dis-
course, and since discourse is determined by social ide-
ologies, there is no position that is not always already 
ideological. 
The notion, therefore, that dominant ideologies pre-
vail by hoodwinking the masses, by perpetuating a "false 
consciousness" about the true nature of social relations, 
is a particular object of scorn for postmodernists.8 
Eagleton summarizes postmodernist objections to the con-
cept of false consciousness: 
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the assumption that some of our ideas "match" or 
"correspond to" the way things are, while others do 
not, is felt by some to be a naive, discreditable 
theory of knowledge. For another thing, the idea of 
false consciousness can be taken as implying the pos-
sibility of some unequivocally correct way of viewing 
the world •.•• Moreover, the belief that a minority 
of theorist.s monopolize a scientifically grounded 
knowledge of how society is, while the rest of us 
blunder around in some fog of false consciousness, 
does not particularly endear itself to the democratic 
sensibility. (Ideology 10-11) 
There is little question about the intent of ideological 
critique--its goal is to oppose false consciousness by un-
covering truths about social relations that are disguised 
by prevailing ideological codes and myths. As Chomsky has 
argued, it is the responsibility of intellectuals "to seek 
the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and 
misrepresentation, ideology: and class interest through 
which the events of current history are presented to us" 
(American 324). 
In The Things They Carried O'Brien does not attempt 
to identify these hidden truths; instead, he suggests 
that truth is processive and paradoxical. He emphasizes 
the discursive construction of reality and focuses on how 
the individual consciousness is transformed through the 
literary imagination. Because of his postmodern sympa-
thies O'Brien fails to consider the larger cultural and 
political dynamics of the Vietnam War. He has declared 
that he views literature "as a way of jarring people into 
paying attention to things--not just the war but your per-
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sonal stake in the political wo:t·ld" (qtd. in Schroeder 
146). And he has suggested that his work "has been some-
what political in that it's directed at big issues" (qtd. 
in Schroeder 145). Unfortunately, these "big issues" do 
not include American imperialism, the slaughter of the 
Vietnamese people, the poisoning and deforestation of the 
Vietnamese landscape, or the continuing deprivation 
wrought by America's twenty year trade embargo; instead, 
O'Brien says his "concerns have to do \..rith abstractions: 
what's courage and hm.; do you get it? What's justice and 
how do you achieve it? How does one do right in an evil 
situation?" (qtd. in Schroeder 137). At times he criti-
cizes Americans' ignorance of and indifference toward 
Vietnam, writing that 
they didn't know Bao Dai from the man in the moon. 
They didn't know history. They didn't know the first 
thing about Diem's tyranny, or the nature of Vietnam-
ese nationalism, or the long colonialism of the 
French. ( 49) 
Unfortunately, there is nothing in The Things They Carried 
to correct this ignorance. By concentrating on what he 
directly experienced, O'Brien fails to examine the history 
of American involvement in Vietnam. Without this broader 
understanding, he cannot explain the killings he both wit-
nessed and took part in. Kiowa's death, for example, 
prompts him to write that "when a man died, there had to 
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be blame •••• You could blame the war. You could blame 
the idiots who made the war. You could blame Kiowa for 
going to it" (198). O'Brien continues, 
You could blame the enemy. You could blame the mor-
tar rounds. You could blame people who were too lazy 
to read a newspaper, who were bored by the daily body 
counts, who switched channels at the mention of poli-
tics. You could blame whole nations. You could 
blame God. You could blame the munitions makers or 
Karl Marx or a trick of fate or an old man in Omaha 
who forgot to vote. (198-99) 
Ultimately, the only certain cause of Kiowa's death, ac-
cording to O'Brien, is its direct cause: "In the field • 
• • the causes were immediate. A moment of carelessness 
or bad judgment or plain stupidity" (199). Yet some 
causes are more proximate and explanatory than others. 
Robert McNamara is more responsible for deaths in Vietnam 
than an old man in Omaha who forgets to vote. The board 
of directors of Dow Chemical are more blameworthy than 
people who switched channels at the mention of politics. 
O'Brien cannot make such seemingly obvious distinctions 
because he has accepted the postmodern view that struc-
tures and hierarchies are in and of themselves tyrannical, 
what Lyotard warns is "a return of terror • • • the real-
ization of the fantasy to seize reality" (Condition 82). 
For O'Brien, since history is complex and ambiguous and 
exists only within the process of remembering, it is al-
ways selectively constructed and revised. 
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While I believe that the details of historical 
experience to some degree are constructed and revised by 
individual memory, the broad outlines and important facts 
of this history are not. The revision of this larger his-
tory is due not to individual whim but to a political/ 
cultural process. Facts that may challenge myths and ide-
ologies useful for maintaining existing power relations 
are under constant pressure to be revised or forgotten. 
At a time when the Vietnam War has been reconstructed as a 
lesson in patriotism and Vietnamese cruelty,9 there re-
mains more than ever a need for its accurate historical 
rendering.lO Popular memory of the Vietnam War has been 
shaped to erase a history that might otherwise challenge 
belief in the benign nature of U.S. foreign policy and 
might reveal the radical potential of mass social move-
ments.!! Herman and Chomsky explain how, in the wake of 
the Vietnam War, government, corporate, and media elites 
in the u.s. were faced with the need to overcome 
the dread "Vietnam syndrome." .•• This was part of 
a larger problem, the "crisis of democracy" perceived 
by Western elites as the normally passive general 
population threatened to participate in the political 
system, challenging ~~stablished privilege and power. 
A further task was to prevent recovery in the societ-
ies ravaged by the American assault, so that the par-
tial victory already achieved by their destruction 
could be sustained. (236-37) 
O'Brien cannot promote the historical accuracy needed to 
counter this revisionism because prevailing modes of lit-
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erary evaluation discount such historicism and because, 
according to the tenets of postmodernism, belief in his-
torical accuracy is not merely impossible but tyrannical" 
Despite its frequent criticism of the absurdity and 
inhumanity of the Vietnam War, then, The Things They Car-
ried does not significantly challenge prevailing ideologi-
cal myths about the war. O'Brien's preoccupation with the 
ways experience is structured and given meaning by the 
imagination and his refusal to consider the larger issues 
raised by the war are due to his acceptance of a postmod-
ern epistemology, as well as a belief that because his-
torical fact is always discursive, it is never fully know-
able. His solution to postmodernism's problematizing of a 
knowable reality and an individual subject is to see both 
the real and the self as provisional and processive. In 
other words, while there is no certain reality because it 
is forever mediated, this mediation, for O'Brien, is real. 
"The life of the imagination," he says, "is real--it's as 
fucking real as anything else" (142). Thus in The Things 
They Carried O'Brien intends to write true war stories but 
does not contextualize his experience, does not provide us 
with any deeper understanding of the causes and conse-
quences of this war, does not see beyond his individual 
experience to document the vastly greater suffering of the 
Vietnamese, and does little to counter the view that the 
war was an American tragedy. 
Notes 
1. From Les Vrais et les Faux Secrets du Pentagons 
(qtd. in Burchett 60); The Things They Carried 104. 
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2. The term "postmodernist," which I use throughout 
this chapter, is somewhat misleading since it alleges a 
unified body of thought and does not recognize the some-
times significant divergence of opinion among contemporary 
critical theorists. However, since these theorists draw 
upon several central conceits and broadly concur in their 
opposition to totality and their recognition of the pri-
macy of discourse, my reference to "postmodernists" does 
convey the main premises which undergird postmodernism and 
which link writers as different as Jameson and Lyotard. 
3. Ironically, realist fiction is thought incapable 
of conveying the reality of the Vietnam War. According to 
Klinkowitz, the realism of Bobbie Ann Mason and Jayne Anne 
Phillips (in In Country and Machine Dreams respectively) 
misrepresents the war by implying that "Vietnam was really 
like any other war in the literary canon from the Iliad 
through War and Peace" ( 156) • Likewise, Philip Beidler 
faults James Webb's A Country Such as This for "working 
literarily against the tendencies of Vietnam fiction as a 
rapidly evolving post-modern genre" (74). Ringnalda goes 
so far as to suggest that no "narrative [can] ultimately 
connect the reader • • • to the Vietnam War" ( 69) • 
4. It is interesting to note the similarity between 
O'Brien's view that narrative can stitch past and present 
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to make whole his fragmented self, with Jameson's notion 
that postmodernism is marked by "schizophrenic writing." 
According to Jameson, 
when the links of the signifying chain snap, then we 
have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of dis-
tinct and unrelated signifiers. The connection be-
tween this kind of linguistic malfunction and the 
psyche of the schizophrenic may then be grasped by 
way of a twofold proposition: first, that personal 
identity is itself the effect of a certain temporal 
unification of past and future with one's present; 
and, second, that such active temporal unification is 
itself a function of language, or better still of the 
sentence •••• With the breakdown of the signifying 
chain, therefore, the schizophrenic is reduced to an 
experience of pure material signifiers, or, in other 
words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in 
time. ( 26-27) 
5. For Jameson, "the economic preparation of postmod-
ernism .•• began in the 1950s. • .• [but) the psychic 
habitus of the new age ••• [was] achieved more properly 
in the 1960s" (xx). Hal Foster asserts, "The crisis of 
modernity was felt radically in the late 1950s and early 
'60s, the moment often cited as the postmodernist break" 
(xiii). Madan Sarup notes, "The concept of postmodernism • 
• seems to be connected with the appearance, between 
the 1950s and the 1960s, of a new social and economic or-
der" (131). And while placing the emergence of a full-
blown postmodernism between 1968 and 1972, David Harvey 
identifies its roots in "the anti-modern movement of the 
1960s" (38). 
tics: 
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6. Herman and Chomsky cite nearly identical statis-
In the South, 9,000 out of 15,000 hamlets were 
damaged or destroyed, along with some twenty-five 
million acres of farmland and twelve million acres of 
forest. One-and-a-half million cattle were killed, 
and the war left a million widows and some 800,000 
orphans. In the North, all six industrial cities 
were damaged (three razed to the ground) along with 
twenty-eight of thirty provincial towns (twelve com-
pletely destroyed), ninety- six of 116 district 
towns, and 4,000 of some 5,800 communes. Four hun-
dred thousand cattle were killed and over a million 
acres of farmland damaged. Much of the land is a 
moonscape, where people live on the edge of famine, 
with rice rations lower than those in Bangladesh. 
(239) 
7. Underlying the postmodern critique of Marxist his-
toricism is a radically skeptical and anti-foundational 
epistemology. In presenting evidence to counter postmodern 
indeterminacy I do not rely on a postivist epistemology. 
Instead, my understanding of historical explanation is de-
rived from a sophisticated realism of the kind offered by 
Richard Miller. For Miller, 
A hypothesis is confirmed if there is a good argument 
for an account of why the data are as they are that en-
tails the approximate truth of the hypothesis as 
against the basic falsehood of its rivals. (emphasis 
added, 295) 
For detailed explanations of this realist epistemology see 
Miller, Analyzing Marx (especially pp. 221-313) and Gre-
gory Meyerson, "Deconstruction, Moral Realism and Emanci-
pation." 
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8. To oppose postmodernism's anti-elitist rhetoric by 
positing a notion of false consciousness, is to reproduce 
the very non-egalitarian social relations and exclusionary 
discourse that postmodernism seeks to overturn. Belief in 
expert knowledge and a privileged access to the truth, in 
this light, can be connected to Stalinist terror. Thus 
Aronowitz and Giroux call for an "attack on those intel-
lectuals who would designate themselves the emancipatory 
vanguard, an intellectual elite who have deemed themselves 
above history" (68-69). Likewise, James Scott sees "the 
notion of ideological consent from below" as comforting to 
"the Leninist left" since "it offers a role for the van-
guard party and its intelligentsia, who must lift the 
scales from the eyes of the oppressed" (86, note 39). 
Ideological critique is also thought irrelevant because 
capitalism is so all encompassing that "even if there were 
a bona fide, certified-authentic vanguard out there, who's 
to say," asks Michael Berube, "that its cultural work 
would be more important than--or even distinguishable 
from--the kinds of stuff we find in what we still call 
'mainstream media'?" (121). Or as Kirk Vardenoe and Adam 
Gopnik write, 
in the age of Joe Isuzu, a hardened knowingness about 
the value-emptied amorality of media culture was, far 
from being the preserve of a small cadre of vanguard 
thinkers, the sour, commonplace cynicism of the whole 
commercial culture (qtd. in Berube, Public Access 
121). 
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Lyotard deconstructs the very notion of ideological cri-
tique, suggesting that those critics who seek to identify 
the truth are the real victims of false consciousness. 
Those who perpetuate the promise of emancipation 
in ways other than a minimal resistance to every to-
talitarianism, who have been imprudent enough to 
nominate the just cause in conflicts between ideas or 
pm11ers--the likes of Chomsky, Negri, Sartre, 
Foucault-- have been tragically deceived. (Explained 
96) 
9. Perhaps the most prominent reconstruction of the 
war is seen in the belief that the Vietnamese continue to 
hold Americans captive. H. Bruce Franklin has shown how 
this national obsession with POWs and MIAs initially was 
constructed by the Nixon administration in 1970 "to con-
tinue the war for four years. • • • It was both a booby 
trap for the anti-war movement and a wrench to be thrown 
into the works of the Paris peace talks" (74). Franklin 
goes on to show how the MIA myth was perpetuated by the 
right to further its political agenda. So skillfully was 
this issue exploited that, according to Franklin, 
by the end of [1970] ••• the Steve Canyon cartoon 
strip was featuring POW/MIA relatives in its daily 
sagas, ABC had presented a POW/MIA special, President 
Nixon had changed the name of Veterans Day to Pris-
oner of War Day, the Ladies' Home Journal had pub-
lished an article with a tear-out letter for readers 
to mail, and the U.S. Post Office •.• had issued 
135 million POW/ MIA postage stamps. (54). 
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As was demonstrated by recent news accounts of a Russian 
translation of a Vietnamese document alleging a secret 
prison system holding hundreds of Americans, the POW/ MIA 
myth continues unabated. 
10. Consider too that in their 1979 examination of 
the portrayal of the Vietnam War in history textbooks, 
William L. Griffin and John Marciano conclude that these 
texts 
exclude, even as a valid thesis for examination, the 
position that the conflict was a logical extension of 
imperialist policies that first brought the United 
States to China, to the Philippines and Korea; that 
our efforts in Vietnam were simply a continuation of 
earlier French colonialism. • (and] nowhere is it 
suggested that the Vietnamese who fought against the 
United States were principled and dedicated. (170-71) 
According to Griffin and Marciano, these textbooks dis-
cussed the Vietnam War "without calling into question a 
single fundamental premise surrounding the conflict" 
(171). 
11. For a discussion of the success of one mass so-
cial movement--the anti-war movement--see Zinn, A People's 
History of the United States, Chapter 18. 
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Conclusion 
The Americans destroyed our land. Every family has loved 
ones who were killed and every family suffered big losses 
in the war. With all the American soldiers did to the 
Vietnamese people, how can we not hate them? They bombed 
so much. Even now people get killed from unexploded 
bombs •••• People still suffer from the toxic chemicals 
the Americans dropped. Babies are born deformed. And 
they left children, the Amerasians •••• We don't like to 
remember the war, but sometimes we sit down like this, and 
we remember very clearly. 
--Nguyen Than Khiem, 1993 
We have finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome. 
--George Bush, 19901 
Few recent cultural myths have had as little eviden-
tiary support and yet been so persistently believed as the 
notion that the Vietnamese government holds American ser-
vicemen secretly captive.2 In part this myth has per-
sisted because it has been promoted by the commercial cul-
ture. Several successful Hollywood features--Rambo, Miss-
ing in Action, and Uncommon Valor--centered around at-
tempts to rescue long-suffering American prisoners of war. 
Less well known are the series of popular novels written 
about this myth, notably Jack Buchanan's M.I.A. Hunter, 
Eric Helm's Vietnam: Ground Zero, and J.C. Pollock's Mis-
sian M.I.A. The latter opens with an introduction by Gen-
eral John Singlaub asserting that "It is a shocking and 
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tragic fact that today more than 2,490 American servicemen 
remain unaccounted for from the Vietnam War."3 
Singlaub goes on to declare that Vietnamese refugees, 
in "scores of eyewitness accounts," have spoken of "groups 
of emaciated Americans, some in chains, being led under 
heavy guard along jungle trails or through villages to un-
known destinations" (9). Likewise, a national mailing 
campaign circa 1983 (available on audiotape narrated by 
Charlton Heston) declared that, 
Starved and clad only in filthy rags, American sol-
diers and airmen are kept chained in tiny bamboo 
cages . • • made to work like animals pulling heavy 
plows . • • forced to toil from daybreak to nightfall 
in steaming jungle heat. (qtd. in Franklin 121) 
Whereas during the war it was opponents of the South Viet-
namese government who on Con Son Island were confined in 
tiger cages, "usually bolted to the floor, handcuffed to a 
bar or rod, or put in leg irons" (Emerson 344), now it is 
Americans who are imprisoned and chained.4 And whereas a 
U.S. policy of forced urbanization, deforestation, and 
massive air attacks resulted in, according to William s. 
Turley, "a near famine condition among the poor" in post-
war Vietnam (qtd. in Chomsky and Herman 96) and led to 
desperate attempts by the Vietnamese to revitalize their 
nation's agricultural base, in the POW/MIA myth it is 
American servicemen who continue to toil in the rice pad-
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dies and jungles of Vietnam. The POW/MIA myth, then, 
functions as ideology, inverting reality and transforming 
victimizers into victims. Domestically, it has served to 
obscure the destructive legacy of u.s. militarism in Indo-
china, transforming America's brutal war against a third-
world national liberation movement into a nefarious Orien-
tal plot to enslave Americans. The actual situation in 
Vietnam, with under-fed and ill-housed peasants attempting 
to reconstruct a society devastated by U.S. militarism and 
punished by a U.S. trade embargo, becomes a mythic tableau 
where emaciated Americans are enslaved by sadistic Orien-
tal overseers. 
This myth has been used to hinder normalization of 
relations with and thereby further punish Vietnam. The 
tragic absurdity of this situation is documented by Neil 
Sheehan, who explains that by 1992 the U.S. was spending a 
hundred million dollars a year on POW/MIA efforts. Shee-
han rightly declares it bizarre and "perhaps even morally 
obscene" for the U.S. 
to spend so much money searching for bones in a coun-
try where children die for want of antibiotics, and 
thousands of amputees from the war • • • hobble on 
crutches or go armless, because they cannot afford 
prosthetic devices. United States aid to Vietnam for 
prosthetic devices in fiscal 1991 was a million dol-
lars--less than the cost of retrieving a single re-
mains. ( 46) 
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As widespread as this myth is within popular culture, 
though, it is absent from "serious" literature about the 
war. Rather than promoting a myth of continuing Asian 
cruelty, this literature criticizes American military 
policy and the atrocities committed by u.s. troops. But 
in so doing it too concentrates on American suffering. As 
Peter Marin notes, American authors have been unwilling 
"to confront directly the realities of the war, or to have 
considered it at least in part from the Vietnamese point 
of view • • • in terms of their suffering rather than 
ours" (qtd. in Martin 10-11). In its erasure of the Viet-
namese and its emphasis on American suffering even criti-
cally acclaimed Vietnam War literature reinforces the 
notion that American veterans--indeed, all of American 
culture--remains imprisoned by the war. 
This concentration on the Americanness of the Vietnam 
War, relying as it does on the individual experiences of 
Gis, fails to consider significant historical and geopo-
litical issues. Vietnam War novels do not often attempt 
to explain the war in terms of imperialism and class ex-
ploitation. And if anti-communism is raised in these 
novels it is merely to show the ludicrousness of estab-
lishment rationales for the war, rather than to demon-
strate how consistently the u.s. has opposed anti-capital-
ist liberation movements. In failing to address these 
issues, Vietnam War authors leave much of the war and the 
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suffering it caused unexplained. As James C. Wilson 
notes, 
American officials did their best to deny history • . 
• and the news media simply ignored it. Similarly, 
very few Vietnam writers make use of this historical 
"key" in their efforts to unlock the meaning of Viet-
nam. (54) 
No wonder, then, that the conspiracies asserted by the 
likes of Buchanan, Pollock, Helm, and Singlaub have gained 
wide acceptance.5 Concentrating on two critically praised 
works (Philip Caputo's autobiographical narrative A Rumor 
of War and Bobbie Ann Mason's minimalist postwar novel In 
Country), I will show what is underemphasized and often 
missing from American literary accounts of the war--a rec-
ognition of the large-scale suffering of the Vietnamese 
and an understanding that the war was part of a systematic 
effort by the u.s. to counter anti-capitalist social move-
ments. With such viewpoints omitted and with an emphasis 
on the plight of American veterans, even acclaimed texts 
like these contribute to a revisionist climate in which 
movies like Rambo and books like M.I.A. Hunter flourish, a 
climate in which the war can be read as an exercise in on-
going American suffering. 
The War Within 
In A Rumor of War Caputo is more concerned with the 
plight of the Vietnamese than is O'Brien in The Things 
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They Carried. Caputo alludes to the long legacy of war in 
Vietnam, describing how "legions of maimed soldiers," 
Vietnamese combat veterans, "a man missing an arm or a leg 
or an eye, some forgotten victim of some forgotten battle, 
would hobble up holding out a faded fatigue cap" (131). 
Caputo also points to the desperate poverty in which many 
Vietnamese live. An old woman is described as "a sack of 
bones covered by a thin layer of shriveled flesh" (85); 
children "have distended bellies and ulcerous skin" (101); 
a young woman nurses "an infant whose head was covered 
with running sores" (83). Caputo shows the social de-
struction caused by the American presence, from huts 
"built entirely of flattened beer cans" to children with 
"decades of wisdom in their eyes and four-letter words on 
their lips" (101) to an old farmer selling "photos of 
Vietnamese whores and American soldiers making love in 
various positions" .(227). 
As in most Vietnam War narratives, the Vietnamese we 
learn the most about are prostitutes. Even before arriv-
ing in Vietnam, Caputo reads "that sixty prostitutes had 
migrated from Saigon to Danang 'in anticipation of a ru-
mored landing of U.S. Marines'" (37). In his subsequent 
descriptions of these women, Caputo occasionally ap-
proaches the exoticizing of Greene, describing a Chinese 
bargirl (with "ao-dai • folded neatly on a chair") as 
"a beautiful girl, more full-figured than a Vietnamese, 
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but with the same long, straight black hair" ( 136). And 
he writes of "A group of young girls [who] glided by, pro-
vocative creatures in their silk trousers and filmy ao-
dais" (51). Generally, though, his descriptions are not 
filtered through an exotic lens but through a plain prose 
that conveys the harsh reality of prostitution in Vietnam. 
His description of a brothel is far removed from Greene's 
luxurious "House of Five Hundred Women." Caputo tells of 
a large stifling room with a dirt-encrusted floor; 
half-naked whores lounging on straw beds and lan-
guidly waving wicker fans at the clouds of flies that 
buzzed around their heads. (134) 
Rather than the alluring Asian beauties Greene writes of, 
Caputo points to "a bony creature of indeterminable age 
[who] lay on her back, staring at the ceiling with opium-
glazed eyes" (134) and another woman whose "mouth was a 
smear of lipstick • • • red circles were painted on her 
cheeks" (134). There is little of Phuong or of "provoca-
tive creatures" in white silk trousers here. 
But Caputo's main concern in A Rumor of War, like 
most veteran-authors, is his own wartime experience. The 
Vietnamese function as a backdrop against which his 
autobiograpical narrative unfolds. Since he seeks to 
convey his own experience of the war--and since like most 
American soldiers his encounters with Vietnamese were 
fleeting--Caputo does not have a single, identifiable 
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Vietnamese character in his text, not even as stereotyped 
a character as Phuong. Nor does Caputo do much to convey 
a sense of the lives and experiences of enemy soldiers. 
Instead, like O'Brien, he speaks of ghost soldiers. 
"We're fighting phantoms" (55), he writes, "a whole divi-
sion of phantoms" (59), "phantoms [who] had pulled off an-
other vanishing act" (89). The VietCong are "invisible 
friends" (86), "an invisible enemy" (xv), "a chimera" 
(95), "wraiths" (103), "djinns" (139). Regardless of how 
accurately Caputo here may convey the mixture of awe and 
fear in which American soldiers viewed the Viet Cong, this 
conceit, in the course of a text that foregrounds the 
American perspective and marginalizes the Vietnamese, re-
writes the actual history of the war. The experience of 
the Viet Cong, their own heroism and suffering and terror, 
is reduced to a spectral presence flitting in and out of 
the jungle. 
In addition, like Phuong (who Greene compared to, 
among other things, a dog and a plant) the Viet Cong in A 
Rumor of War are mistaken for natural objects. To inexpe-
rienced American soldiers, "listening to things--men? 
animals? snakes?--crawling in the underbrush" (91), 
"bushes began to look like men" (54); the VietCong 
"evaporated like the morning jungle mists" (89); at times 
"it was as if the trees were shooting" (86). Indeed, it 
often is impossible to distinguish the Viet Cong from 
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jungle animals: "the Bengal tiger stalked and the cobra 
coiled beneath its rock and the Viet Cong lurked in 
ambush" (77). However accurately these descriptions may 
convey the perceptions of American soldiers, they still 
naturalize the Viet Cong; in so doing, a form of warfare 
necessitated by America's daunting technological superior-
ity is transformed into a native skill.6 The need of the 
Viet Cong to operate surreptitiously or else to be, in 
Caputo's words, "naked against the blast and splintering 
steel of one-hundred-pound shells" (110), is made into a 
natural advantage. As Wilson notes, Caputo's depiction of 
the Vietnamese--and, I would add, the depiction of Viet-
namese by almost all Vietnam War novelists and mem-
oir-writers--"fails to take into account that sense of the 
other on which morality depends" (63).7 This erasure and 
naturalizing both ignores Vietnamese suffering and jus-
tifies it. 
To justify his own role in the murder of two Vietnam-
ese civilians, Caputo argues that the atrocities committed 
by American troops resulted from three bitter forms of 
warfare (civil war, jungle war, and revolution); from the 
stress of guerilla war; from "an overpowering greed for 
survival" (xvix); from General Westmoreland's strategy of 
attrition; and from "the conditions imposed by the cli-
mate and country" (xix).8 Nonetheless, despite his at-
tempt to establish a complex causality for American atroc-
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ities, Caputo frequently falls back on a belief straight 
out of Conrad 1 suggesting the atrocities committed by U.S. 
troops in Vietnam were due to an innate human evil that 
was liberated by the removal of civilizing prohibitions. 
As Andrew Martin explains, "What is eventually made clear" 
in A Rumor of War "is that the disintegration of American 
ideological and cultural assumptions in Vietnam could, and 
often did, produce savagery among what had once been 
'good, solid kids'" (82-83). "Lacking restraints, 
sanctioned to kill, confronted by a hostile country and a 
relentless enemy," Caputo writes, "we sank into a brutish 
state" (xx). 
But American soldiers are not initially violent or 
cruel. Far from it. They are gloriously innocent, 
"march[ing] into Vietnam, swaggering, confident, and full 
of idealism" (328). Since there is no analogous innocence 
among the Vietnamese (on the contrary, from teenaged pros-
titutes to war-weary children, the Vietnamese are far too 
experienced) and since innocence has so frequently been 
associated with the u.s., it is difficult not to read this 
as an inherently American quality. American soldiers, 
Caputo tells us, went to Vietnam "full of illusion" and 
with "a missionary idealism" (xiv), believing in "their 
ingrained American idealism" (129) that "whatever we did 
was right" (66). 
Caputo's belief that "an arrogance tempered • • . 
American innocence" (128-29) mirrors Greene's criticism of 
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the mortal innocence of American foreign policy, as per-
sonified by Alden Pyle. Unexamined by both Greene and 
Caputo, however, is the notion that the intentions behind 
u.s. policy were benign. This American innocence suggests 
Vietnamese guilt, as Caputo makes clear when explaining 
how the Vietnamese had conducted "Twenty years of terror-
ism and fratricide [that) had obliterated most reference 
points from the country's moral map long before we ar-
rived" (xviii). Caputo overlooks the integral role the 
U.S. played in this obliteration by supporting the French 
military effort and thwarting the Geneva Accords. Consid-
ering that the widespread popular support of the Viet Minh 
and the NLF caused the u.s. to prop up a series of unpopu-
lar and authoritarian South Vietnamese regimes (first 
through economic and military aid, then through the com-
mitment of soldiers like Caputo), it is a gross distortion 
to view the conflict in Vietnam as a fratricidal war into 
which innocent Americans intervened. 
Even though he repeatedly identifies American atroci-
ties, describing, for instance, how "High explosive bombs 
blasted houses to fragments [and] napalm sucked air from 
lungs and turned human flesh to ashes" (4), and even 
though he declares such actions to be an integral part of 
U.S. policy, Caputo suggests these atrocities stem from an 
emotional and physical climate that exacerbates man's in-
nate savagery. In this climate, American soldiers quickly 
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lose their innocence and recognize they are fighting "a 
war for survival waged in a wilderness without rules or 
laws," a war where they feel "only contempt for those who 
sought to impose on [their] savage struggle the mincing 
distinctions of civilized warfare" ( 217). 
Like the Congo, the Vietnamese bush "was one of the 
last of the dark regions on earth" (105): "It was abso-
lutely black. It was a void. • . • the source and center 
of all the darkness in the world" ( 225). This void "awak-
ened something evil in us, some dark, malicious power that 
allowed us to kill without feeling" ( 309). Considering 
the similarity between such notions and Heart of Darkness, 
it is little wonder that Caputo and his men "hear drums 
beating in the distance. a chilling sound that 
seemed the essence of all that was frightening and myste-
rious about the jungle" (124) or that against this dark 
power, "rockets and machine guns were merely technological 
equivalents of the gourds and rattles natives use to chase 
away evil spirits" ( 81). 9 
But even if one ignores the Conradian determinism in 
A Rumor of War, several problems persist in Caputo's argu-
ment that the atrocities committed by American soldiers 
were due to the nature of the war, to the climate and the 
country, to the absence of civilized restraints, to a 
policy of attrition, etc. While correct in placing blame 
on "the war in general and U.S. military policies in 
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particular" (313) (i.e., the "policies of free-fire zones, 
in which a soldier is permitted to shoot at any human 
target ••• and body counts" [310]), Caputo does not ad-
dress what caused these particular policies. The atroci-
ties committed by American soldiers, including the kill~ 
ings for which Caputo himself was responsible, are blamed 
upon a larger atrocity--the war itself--without an exami-
nation as to why the U.S. conducted the war so inhumanely. 
These policies, since they were conceived of and approved 
by military and political leaders far from the field, 
cannot be attributed to the climate or to the emotional 
stress of guerilla warfare. Why, then, did the U.S. 
implement a strategy of near genocide that included a sys-
tematic campaign of terror and assassination (the Phoenix 
Program)? the use of chemical defoliants, napalm, and 
white phosphorous? repeated bombings of civilian targets? 
free-fire zones and strategic hamlets and body counts? 
Many arguments have been made to answer this ques-
tion. Some find culpability in an American national char-
acter shaped by the dispossession and genocide of Native 
Americans.lO Others argue it was racism that engendered 
such brutal policies toward Asians. Some fault male 
psycho-sexual development. And still others attribute 
U.S. policies to ignorance, incompetence? and political 
interference. I find three central explanations for the 
brutality of U.S. military policy in Vietnam. First, the 
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cold war military buildup demanded the use of advanced 
weaponry. The development of and expenditures for these 
weapons created a momentum that almost required their use 
and in turn created a demand for newer and even deadlier 
weapons. The destructiveness of U.S. military policy, 
therefore, was determined in part by the profitability of 
the war for American corporations. Second, because it was 
fighting an enemy for whom there was broad public support 
and upholding a government with which there was little 
public sympathy: the U.S. resorted to a policy based on 
terror. Unable to win hearts and minds, the U.S. had to 
terrorize them. Third, the inhumanity of U.S. military 
policy served as a warning to movements of social libera-
tion and economic justice the world over. As Jean-Paul 
Sartre explains, 
The Americans want to show others that guerilla war 
does not pay: they want to show all the oppressed 
and exploited nations that might be tempted to shake 
off the American yoke by launching a people's war •• 
. • they want to show Latin America first of all, and 
more generally, all of the Third World. To Che 
Guevera who said, "We need several Vietnams," the 
American government answers, "They will all be 
crushed the way we are crushing the first." (540) 
In A Rumor of War Caputo's central concern is with 
the cause of American atrocities. However, he spends 
little time addressing the large-scale destruction wrought 
by American military policy. Instead, he focuses on the 
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criminal acts of individual American soldiers, including 
himself. His failure to consider how this policy was 
shaped by the interests of capital and his focus on indi-
vidual American suffering are consistent with the liberal 
critique of the war that has dominated Vietnam War litera-
ture and has helped erase the horror of the war from Amer-
ican cultural memory. 
The War at Home 
In In Country Bobbie Ann Mason is concerned not so 
much with the war but with how it has been remembered and 
revised within American culture. Set in rural Hopewell, 
Kentucky in the summer of 1984 and focusing on 17-year-old 
Sam Hughes's attempt to understand a war that killed her 
father, Dwayne, and traumatized her Uncle Emmett, In Coun-
try does not consider the plight of the Vietnamese. But 
Mason does document the racist attitudes of American Gis. 
More than a decade after the war, one veteran still rails 
about those "sneaky ••• little bastards" who like "prai-
rie dogs •••. run around inside [their] tunnels" (135). 
And Sam learns from her father's diary what he thought of 
the Vietnamese--they were prey, like deer and rabbits, who 
could attack like panthers (203). Similarly, Sam imagines 
that to Emmett "the fleas [infesting his home] were the 
Vietnamese," which in turn makes her wonder how often she 
had "heard the enemy soldiers compared to ants, or other 
creatures too numerous to count" (209).11 
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This kind of racism serves an important function dur-
ing war, dehumanization being the first step toward bru-
talization. To American soldiers, the Vietnamese were not 
human beings; they were gooks. As Lieutenant William 
Calley ackowledged, "We weren't in My lai to kill human 
beings really. We were there to kill ideology that is 
carried by--I don't know. Pawns. Blobs. Pieces of flesh" 
(qtd. in Drinnan 456). Corporal John Geymann explained 
how the Marine Corps facilitated this dehumanization by 
passing out pictures of mutilated bodies, showing 
this is what we do to the gooks, this is what's fun 
to do with the gooks. When somebody asks, "Why do 
you do it to a gook, why do you do this to people?" 
your answer is, "So what, they're just gooks, they're 
not people. It doesn't make any difference what you 
do to them; they're not human." (qtd. in Vietnam 
Veterans 5) 
Likewise, Dwayne repeatedly dehumanizes the Vietnamese, 
writing that "Dead gooks have a special stink" (203) and 
longing to create "gook puddin" (204). Dwayne is so in-
ured to the deaths of Vietnamese that when viewing a 
corpse he becomes absorbed in the abstract facts of human 
anatomy. He is "interest[ed] to see the body parts broken 
down." Rather than recognizing this body as once a living 
human being, Dwayne declares, "It had a special stink" 
(emphasis added, 203). 
Mason does not discuss how the military establishment 
encouraged racism toward the Vietnamese. She does, how-
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ever, suggest that these attitudes grew out of a culture 
where racism was common. Dwayne writes that his fellow 
soldier Eddie is "solid black but he's okay. I never knew 
a nigger that quiet. He's not a show-off" (202). In his 
next diary entry Dwayne declares, "if I saw a gook and 
didn't have any ammo, I'd take a cig. and twist it in his 
eyes and burn 'em out" (202). By juxtaposing these pas-
sages, Mason demonstrates how easily Dwayne's racism to-
ward African-Americans is shifted to the Vietnamese, and 
she suggests how racism in the u.s. contributed to the 
brutal conduct of American soldiers in Indochina. Mason 
also shows that this racism persisted--Sam overhears a 
man's joking question as to how one is to know "if a nig-
ger's born a blue baby" (96), and she listens to a late-
night radio talk show where "college students called in 
their opinions on world issues. Several of them called up 
in favor of the Ku Klux Klan, denying it was violent," 
while most of the others insisted the callers "'have a 
right to their opinion'" (151). The racist culture that 
shaped Dwayne and his fellow soldiers and that aided them 
in dehumanizing the Vietnamese, Mason reveals, persists in 
Hopewell nearly twenty years later. 
And it is this--the notion that little was changed by 
the war (except for the lives of veterans and their fami-
lies) that is the central focus of In Country. The same 
kind of patriotism and adolescent alienation that sent Ca-
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puto off to war causes Sam's boyfriend Lonnie to declare, 
"if America needs defending, then I couldn't stand back, 
could I?" Such beliefs have prevailed in Hopewell for 
generations, as Lonnie's father makes clear, saying, "My 
daddy and his daddy both fought, and I felt like I missed 
out on something important" (86). While recognizing the 
continuity of military service within a community like 
Hopewell, though, Mason shows how this militarism is pro-
moted by American culture. 
Frequently in In Country Mason shows how the war has 
been reinterpreted through its representations in popular 
culture. In fact, Sam's perceptions regularly are fil-
tered through popular entertainment. Her trip to Washing-
ton with Emmett and her grandmother to see the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial reminds her "of that Chevy Chase movie 
about a family on vacation" (4). Her drunken sexual fum-
blings with veteran Tom Hudson (to whom she is attracted 
because of his likeness to Bruce Springsteen) was "like a 
familiar scene in a movie, the slow-motion sequence with 
the couple rolling in the sheets" (126). And Emmett's 
tale of being left for dead amidst a pile of corpses is 
"familiar •.•• [like] something ••• in a movie on TV" 
(223). 
Generally, Sam's historical knowledge is framed by 
commercial culture. Watergate "was a TV series one sum-
mer" (67). And the 1960s are apprehended almost exclu-
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sively through popular music.12 Sam listens to 60s music 
as if it will unlock the secrets of that era and of the 
war: "The radio played several sixties songs, and she 
listened to all the words, trying not to lose any" (140). 
At one point she hears a previously unreleased Beatles' 
song, "Leave My Kitten Alone," and feels '.'it was eerie, 
like voices from the grave •••• the energy of the six-
ties, like desire building and exploding" (51-52). "Sam 
had to find that record," Mason writes, "She wanted to 
play it for everyone she loved. It was a fresh message 
from the past, something to go on" (125). It is primarily 
through such cultural products that Sam attempts to under-
stand the war, to make sense of her father's death and 
Emmett's suffering, and to construct her own identity. 
One difficulty Sam has in reconstructing the war is 
that it has been so thoroughly commodified. Thus Mason 
tells us that Sam wishes "she had camouflage pants •••• 
They were in style" (91). And we see Emmett and girl-
friend Anita play a video game, Chopper Command, "Their 
laughter • mingl[ing] with the bursts of electronic 
gunfire" (102). But the most significant commercial re-
construction of the war in In Country is the TV show 
M*A*S*H, which Sam and Emmett watch nearly every evening. 
The very perception of her father's death, for Sam, is 
connected to this sitcom. Mason writes that after watch-
ing the episode in which Colonel Blake died, Sam "went 
around stunned for days." To Sam, Colonel Blake's death 
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was more real ••• than the death of her own father. 
Even on the repeats, it was unsettling. Each time 
she saw that episode, it grew clearer that her father 
had been killed in a war. (25) 
Likewise, because Emmett notes that Frank Burns is like 
his C.O. in Vietnam and because "That was about all Emmett 
would say about Vietnam" (25), Sam views M*A*S*H for what 
it may reveal about the war. Sam is critical of the show, 
recognizing that "On M*A*S*H sometimes, things were too 
simple" (83), yet when Emmett seems on the verge of emo-
tional collapse, Sam "thought he was going to come out 
with some suppressed memories of events as dramatic as 
that one that caused Hawkeye to crack up in the final epi-
sode of M*A*S*H" (222). Mason dramatizes Sam's persistent 
and often frustrated attempts to escape popular recon-
structions of the war. At the same time she shows how 
pervasive is the commodification of history within Ameri-
can culture, a culture, writes Philip Melling, "in which 
the narratives of the market provide the sole inspiration 
for the myths of the community and a major resource for 
its social conversation" ( 154). 
Mason shows how popular culture and prevailing ide-
ologies converge to promote elite interests, in this case 
historical revisionism and remilitarization. From the 
opening sentence of the book's main narrative, Mason sug-
gests how popular culture circa 1984 mirrored and exacer-
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bated the jingoism and triumphalism of Reagan's America. 
"It was the summer," she writes, 
of the Michael Jackson Victory tour and the Bruce 
Springsteen Born in the U.S.A. tour .••• At [Sam's] 
graduation, the commencement speaker, a Methodist 
minister, had preached about keeping the country 
strong, stressing sacrifice. (23) 
Sam notes these details because they suggest the resurgent 
militarism of 1980s America. In the minister's stress on 
sacrifice she hears not a commonplace Christian sentiment 
but a harbinger of wartime loss in pursuit of Reagan-era 
foreign policy goals. We see here one of the strengths of 
Mason's narrative--her use of a limited third-person 
point-of-view that allows us to read the culture through 
Sam's eyes. Mason sketches in the background clutter of 
America culture that a bright 17-year-old would be aware 
of but would be unable, in first-person narration, to ex-
plain with any clarity. The piece-meal understanding con-
veyed through In Country reflects the fragmented nature 
both of an adolescent consciousness and a mass-mediated 
culture. 
To achieve an understanding of the war, Sam must 
struggle against not only its cultural reinterpretation 
but a widespread desire to repress and deny this history. 
Throughout Sam's life, her mother, Irene, has refused to 
talk about the war. When years earlier they received a 
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copy of Newsweek with a cover picture of a Vietnamese 
woman carrying a dead baby, Irene "snatched it out of 
Sam's hands and ripped the cover off and burned it" (169). 
Irene's excuse for refusing to discuss this history is 
that she "can't live in the past. It was all such a stu-
pid waste. There's nothing to remember" (168). To which 
Sam declares, "You want to pretend the whole Vietnam War 
never existed" (167). Likewise, dezpite much evidence to 
the contrary, including Sam's comment that "it was a stu-
pid war • fifty-eight thousand guys. • died fo~ 
nothing," Dwayne's mother (called "Mamaw" by Sam) finds 
comfort in the belief that "Dwayne was fighting for a 
cause •••• he believed in his country, and he was ready 
to go over there and fight" (197). And when Sam's conver-
sation turns to Lonnie's desire to join the military, his 
mother says, "I can't bear to think about boys going off 
to war," at which point she shifts topics, telling Sam, 
"I've got to show you this spice rack I'm giving Jennifer" 
(86). Whereas Sam's mother denies the past in order to 
forget her tragedy and to protect her daughter, Lonnie's 
mother does so because of what it portends for her son's 
future. In both cases, these women actively repress the 
suffering associated with the Vietnam War. 
Whatever lessons might have been learned from the war 
thus are frequently ignored by the citizens of Hopewell. 
As Tom explains, 
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You migh·t as well just stop asking questions about 
the war. Nobody gives a shit. They've got it 
twisted around in their heads what it was about, so 
they can live with it and not have to think about it. 
(79) 
Set in the year of the Los Angeles Olympics, the Statue of 
Liberty centennial, and Reagan's "morning in America" cam-
paign, In Country demonstrates how thoroughly the history 
of the war has been twisted by nationalist myth and ritual 
to promote support for future U.S. military interventions. 
With diligence and a willingness to challenge conven-
tional belief, however, someone like Sam can learn much 
about the war that does not easily cohere with the reign-
ing mythos. A 17-year-old with limited access to informa-
tion, Sam is able to place the war within the context of 
anti-colonialism, linking "old colonial countries like 
Ceylon and the Belgian Congo. Vietnam and Indochine" 
(51). She knows about the domino theory (102), the Phoe-
nix Program (107), and My Lai (78). In a discussion with 
one veteran's wife, she even learns that "some of the 
[veterans] cut off the ears of the enemy for souvenirs" 
( 123) • 
Lonnie has access to much the same information. In 
his contact with Emmett particularly Lonnie learns that 
the U.S. exposed servicemen to defoliants then denied them 
compensation and treatment. But Lonnie does not seek to 
learn about the war; nor does he draw conclusions from 
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Emmett's physical and emotional suffering. Sam recognizes 
that Lonnie had "admiration for Emmett because he had been 
to war, not because he had become a hippie and turned 
against the war." Lonnie, Sam realizes, "was just like 
all the other kids at school. In her history class last 
year, 90 percent voted in favor of the invasion of Grena-
da. They were afraid of the Russians" (88). unlike her 
classmates, Sam--because of her study of history and her 
personal experience with the human consequences of Ameri-
can militaricm--is attuned to the hollowness of national-
ist rhetoric and is critical of government motive. 
recognizes that "Reagan wants to go to war" (18). 
She 
And 
when Lonnie declares his willingness to defend America, 
Sam asks, "Would you rather go to Lebanon or Nicaragua?" 
(185). 
Sam likewise is aware of the connection between war 
and class exploitation. Throughout the novel we see the 
characters' class consciousness. Dwayne's mother, Mamaw, 
admits, "I'm still so embarrassed, spilling dirt on 
Irene's nice floor. I guess she thought I was just a 
country hick, dragging in dirt" (6). Lonnie's parents are 
excited because his brother is "marrying that hoity-toity 
girl from Bowling Green •••• [whose] daddy has a Jerry's 
franchise" (69). Sam tells Emmett not to tape plastic on 
the windows because that "is what poor people do" (108). 
Mamaw's daughter, Donna, raves about her sister-in-law who 
"has everything you can name. • • • a video-cassette re-
corder and a bedroom suit that cost a thousand dollars. 
She doesn't think a thing about eatiug out" (195). 
In addition, we see the limited economic and educa-
tional opportunities available to the residents of 
Hopewell: 
Emmett did most of his shopping at yard sales. All 
their stuff was junk. She felt empty and disap-
pointed. Lonnie didn't have a job, and he wasn't 
going to college. Sam had worked at the Burger Boy 
after school for two years. (29) 
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Laid off his job at a farm equipment plant and having quit 
his job as a bag boy at Krogers, Lonnie now has only vain 
ambitions to "have my own business someday. • some-
thing outdoors, \'lhere I'm my own boss" (27). Decent jobs 
for working-class kids like Lonnie--at a nearby chemical 
plant and a cookie factory--are unavailable. These cir-
cumstances make Lonnie especially vulnerable to the allure 
of the military, as his mother plainly recognizes, declar-
ing, "If you don't get a job, you'll end up in the Army, 
and I'll worry myself sick" (86)e 
The poverty and lack of opportunity in Hopewell, 
along with an ignorance born of social isolation and cul-
tural homogeneity, have made military life attractive to 
generations of young men like Lonnie. Emmett, for in-
stance, knew little "when he went into the Army. He 
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thought it would be just like killing squirrels •••• He 
was just a country boy" (171), while Dwayne "was a mama's 
boy. • He was a good boy" (196). As Irene explains to 
Sam, "You look at those names [on the Vietnam Veterans Me-
morial] and tell me if they're not mostly country boy 
names. Boys who didn't know their ass from their elbow" 
(236). Hopewell "had sent dozens of boys to the war. One 
class had three killed in just two months" ( 112) .13 
Christian Appy's demographic study of American armed 
forces in Vietnam confirms Mason's observations. Accord-
ing to Appy, among American troops in Vietnam there was a 
"disproportionate number of soldiers from rural towns" 
(23). "Vietnam," Appy writes, "more than any other Ameri-
can war in the twentieth century, perhaps in our history, 
was a working-class war" (Appy 6). Through economic de-
pendence, nationalist propaganda, educational deficien-
cies, and heroic tradition, boys like Lonnie, Emmett, and 
Dwayne are made victims of America's imperial ambitions. 
Considering all these pressures to serve, Mamaw is correct 
when she responds to Sam's suggestion that Dwayne could 
have gone to Canada by declaring, "People don't have 
choices like that" ( 197). 
More than the other books I have examined, In Country 
depicts the war as a form of class exploitation. Mason is 
insightful when discussing how the lessons of this war 
have been revised to accord with a resurgent nationalism. 
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For all its strengths, however, In Country is a novel that 
documents the suffering of American servicemen and their 
families without serious consideration for the Vietnamese. 
Both the strengths and the limitations of In Country are 
revealed by Mason's treatment of Agent Orange. Mason de-
tails Emmett's side-effects--chloracne, severe headaches, 
depression. She shows how it has affected other veterans: 
one man had "a place . on [his] leg, all brown and 
funny" ( 4 7 ) ; another "had every symptom in the book • 
• Nausea, the runs, jaundice, chloracne. His muscles 
twitch and he can't sleep and he's lost weight. " And she 
shows how exposure to Agent Orange can lead to birth de-
fects, describing a child who needs surgery to "rerout her 
intestines somehow to keep 'em from twisting so bad" 
(111). Mason also discusses the government's continuing 
refusal to acknowledge the harm caused by Agent Orange. 
Nonetheless, her concentration on the consequences of 
American servicemen's accidental exposure to Agent Orange 
ignores the more widespread and severe consequences expe-
rienced by the Vietnamese. These consequences were iden-
tified by Dr. Tom That Tung, head of a team of North Viet-
namese physicians investigating the "clinical effects of 
the use of herbicides and defoliants on the civilian popu-
lation" (Dm{ 182). Statistics compiled over a twenty year 
period by Dr. Tung reveal that 
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1. In 1953 there was about a 1 per cent still-birth 
rate in Vietnam. By 1967 it had more than doubled. 
2. In 1953 miscarriages ran at 1 per cent. In 1967 
they reached 15 per cent. 
3. In 1953 there was no recorded evidence that a 
child without a brain had ever been born in Vietnam. 
In 1967 one in every one hundred children suffered 
this fate. 
4. In 1953 there was a 1 per cent unformed foetus 
rate. By 1967 this had risen to 5 per cent. (Dux 
188-89). 
Besides causing such ghastly human suffering, the spraying 
of defoliants devastated the ecology of Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese government has estimated that spraying occurred 
on over 70 per cent of coconut orchards and 60 per cent of 
rubber plantations and has destroyed about 44 per cent of 
all forests and 43 per cent of the country's rice crops 
(Dux 196). In In Country this history is absent and, in 
fact, has been transformed into a lir.9ering American prob-
lem. Agreeing with a bumper sticker she sees that reads, 
"SPRAYED AND BETRAYED" (46), Sam is outraged that "the 
United States poisoned its own soldiers" (87). 
The most significant problem with In Country, how-
ever, is its conclusion. Here Mason takes Sam, Emmett, 
and Mamaw to Washington to find the names of their loved 
ones on the wall. Mason chooses these characters because 
they represent the three generations--veterans, veterans' 
parents, and veterans' children--most affected by the war. 
At the memorial Mamaw is able to make a final gesture of 
devotion and departure--"She touches [Dwayne's] name, run-
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ning her hand over it, stroking it tentatively, affection-
ately" (243). Ultimately, she is comforted and tells Sam, 
Coming up on this wall of a sudden • . • it was so 
awful, but then I came down in it and saw that white 
carnation blooming out of that crack and it gave me 
hope. It made me know [Dwayne's] watching over us. 
(245) 
Sam, too, achieves a sense of purpose at the wall. She 
finds her own name--Sam A. Hughes--touches it, and recog-
nizes "How odd it feels, as though all the names in Amer-
ica have been used to decorate this wall" (245). Sam is 
beginning to realize she is not alone in her suffering; 
she is one of many victims of the war. 
Emmett also begins to move out of the shadow of the 
war. 'fhe very trip to Washington energized him: "He was 
so definite about it •••• Sam had never seen him swing 
into action like that" (230). Throughout the novel Mason 
uses Emmett's obsession with repairing a leaky basement to 
suggest his instability. "My basement's flooded and my 
foundation's weak," Emmett admitted, "And my house might 
fall down while I'm here" (110). Therefore, it is sig-
nificant that at the memorial we see a workman "patching 
up a hole or something," which causes Sam to remember the 
Beatles lyric "Fixing a hole where the rain gets in [to 
stop my mind from wandering]" (241). Thus according to 
the book's figurative logic, this trip to the wall is 
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therapeutic; it helps Emmett recover, helps him maintain 
his mental and emotional stability. Like all pilgrimages, 
this trip offers a ritual and communal healing. In fact, 
the wall offers hope to all Vietnam veterans. So when Sam 
wishes Tom could be with them, the usually laconic and 
cynical Emmett replies, "He'll make it here someday. 
Jim's coming too. They're all coming one of these days" 
( 241) • 
The novel ends with an almost allegorical coming to-
gether of three generations of Americans who recognize 
their shared suffering, their shared humanity. Through 
this communal ritual, through confronting the human costs 
of and recognizing our connection to the war and to each 
other, Mason suggests, America may begin to heal its 
wounds and move forward. As Thomas Myers notes, the trip 
to Washington is "a necessary rite that links generations, 
engenders expiation and understanding, and begins to write 
a meaningful peace" (224). Like the memorial itself, 
though, Mason's conclusion is equivocal. Despite many 
signs of affirmation and resolution, the novel concludes 
with Mamaw asking, "Did we lose Emmett?" To which Sam re-
sponds by pointing to Emmett "studying the names low on a 
panel. He is sitting there cross-legged in front of the 
wall, and slowly his face bursts into a smile like flames" 
(245). This passage may be read optimistically. A con-
templative Emmett smiles brilliantly, as if enlightened, 
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gaining wisdom and peace after long suffering. But this 
passage also conveys Emmett's continued distress. He may 
be smiling, but it is a destructive, consumptive smile 
that evokes Buddhist monks' self-immolation. On this 
reading, the conclusion of In Country refigures Vietnamese 
sacrifice, transforming a monk's ultimate protest against 
the American invasion into the post-war suffering of an 
American invader. Ultimately, we are left with Mamaw's 
question--did we lose Emmett (and countless other veter-
ans)? Despite differences in political sensibilities, 
there is a rough similarity between Mason's final concern 
and the concerns of Singlaub, et al. We remain focused on 
American suffering, on the loss of American servicemen, on 
the fracturing of American society. 
Mason's conclusion, therefore, contributes to the re-
vising of the war as an American tragedy. There is little 
evidence in either In Country or A Rumor of War of the 
devastation experienced by the peoples of Indochina at the 
hands of the U.S, little recognition that were a monument 
built to list the names of the Vietnamese, Laotians, and 
Cambodians killed in the war, it would be 40 times longer 
than the Vietnam Memorial. Had the U.S. lost the same 
portion of its population, the memorial would list not 57 
thousand but 8 million names (Appy 17). 
As with Vietnam War novels and memoirs generally, 
American literary culture, in its responses to A Rumor of 
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War and In Country, has been unconcerned with these impor-
tant (and ideologically useful) omissions and misrepresen-
tations. Reviewers and critics have reinforced a liberal 
interpretation of the war as a singularly American calam-
ity. Myers uncritically notes that "Caputo's Vietnam is 
less a military or political struggle than it is an Ameri-
can tragedy" (90). What makes the war especially tragic 
is that it sprang from good intentions. Thus to Theodore 
Solotaroff, "Caputo has revealed the broken idealism and 
suppressed agony of America's involvement." Solotaroff 
goes on to describe the war as a "nightmare of horror and 
waste," while to William Styron, Caputo is "a decent man 
sunk into a dirty time" (6). It is not coincidental that 
Solotaroff and Styron use imagery identical to O'Brien's 
in The Things They Carried. Since their criticism of the 
war is similarly constrained by a liberal ethos that main-
tains a benign motivation behind u.s. policy, they see the 
war ahistorically as waste and horror, the product not of 
U.S. imperialism but of "a dirty time." 
This ahistoricism and ethnocentricism is apparent as 
well in the critical reception of In Country. Mason's at-
tempts to address some of the political/historical issues 
raised by the war are either attacked or ignored by crit-
ics. Thus Michiko Kakutani declares Emmett's possible 
contamination with Agent Orange "a blunt, obvious metaphor 
for the insidious consequences of Vietnam." Ignoring the 
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all too real suffering of veterans, Kakutani focuses on 
the metaphorical nature of E~~ett's exposure, thereby dem-
onstrating the persistence of formalist ahistoricism 
within mass media literary culture. Seeking stylistic and 
narrative originality, Jonathan Yardley likewise complains 
of the book's "dreary familiarity." Ignoring her consis-
tent critique of the exploitation of notions like heroism 
and sacrifice, he asserts that Mason presents at least one 
indisputable point--"that the honor [veterans] have lately 
received is long overdue." 
A more subtle demonstration of the consensus ideology 
that typifies American literary culture can be found in 
the academic responses to Mason's novel, many of which 
have focused on feminist interpretations. Rather than 
read In Country as a critique of the commodification of 
history or of the persistence of class exploitation within 
rural America, Katherine Kinney declares it "a novel ex-
plicitly about a woman trying to comprehend an experience 
which 'men say' she by definition of her gender cannot un-
derstand" (40). To Kinney, Mason deconstructs the gen-
dered conception of war, revealing "the simultaneous ex-
istence of difference and sameness" and "illustrat[ing] 
that self and other, male and female are not static, abso-
lute terms but multiple, interactive constructions" (47). 
And to Susan Jeffords, In Country "confirms collectivity 
as a function of the masculine bond" (62), while Sam's 
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character "embodies challenges to a masculine collectivity 
from women" (64). For Milton J. Bates, however, In Coun-
try reaffirms, "with a dose of conscious irony, a version 
of the feminine mystique" (29). Unlike Kinney and Jef-
fords, Bates faults In Country for "not us[ing] war to 
challenge conventional notions of manhood and womanhood" 
and for failing to "question the assumption that women are 
by nature the nurterers of life and the men the takers of 
life" (55). Sexual politics, particularly the connection 
between war and masculinity, is an important concern in In 
Country, but the fact that literary critics have consis-
tently discussed this issue without addressing the novel's 
examination of class exploitation (and its omission of the 
Vietnamese) is evidence of the ideological limitations im-
plicit within contemporary academic literary criticism. 
In the writings of novelists and autobiographers, 
critics and reviewers, an entire body of history--the 
Vietnamese experience--has been excised from literary rep-
resentations of the war. To read a rare account of this 
experience, such as Martha Hess's oral history Then the 
Americans Came, is to discover just how destructive the 
war was for the Vietnamese and how misleading its literary 
retelling has been. In the tales recounted by Hess we 
hear of the destruction of villages and the obliteration 
of whole sections of urban communities, of families who 
lost eight and ten and twelve members, of countless hours 
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and days spent underground to escape American bombings, of 
the many rapes co~~itted by American troops, of disfigure-
ment and amputation, of a persistent lack of food and 
medical supplies, of the slaughter of farm animals and 
unarmed peasants. And we hear repeated questions, like 
these asked by Cau Ngoc Xuan, questions that Vietnam War 
literature has rarely addressed: 
Why did the Americans come to destroy us and make 
war, and why don't they help now to rebuild our coun-
try? • • • Why did the &nericans come here to destroy 
homes and kill people? • • • • if I came to your land 
to destroy and burn your houses, how would you feel? 
(qtd. in Hess 43) 
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Notes 
1. Bush qtd. in Wiegman 174; Nguyen Than Kiem qtd. 
in Hess 
2. For an influential telling of this myth see Monika 
Jensen-Stevenson and William Stevenson, Kiss the Boys 
Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Own POWs in 
Vietnam. For a detailed history and refutation, see H. 
Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmakinq in America. 
3. These figures grossly overestimate the number of 
missing American servicemen. As H. Bruce Franklin ex-
plains, after the 1973 Peace Agreement, 
all but 53 men • • • were either released or reported 
to have died in captivity. In the next three years, 
intensive analysis of these remaining cases resolved 
all but a handful •.•• In the ensuing years, ex-
haustive case-by-case investigation together with the 
absence of contradictory evidence, has led the De-
partment of Defense to make a presumptive finding of 
death for every single person in the combined POW/MIA 
total except one •••• [who] is merely "listed as a 
prisoner of war as a symbolic gesture of the Adminis-
tration's commitment to this issue." (14) 
Besides fabricating "a shocking and tragic fact" about 
Americans missing in action, Singlaub and other proponents 
of the MIA myth are oblivious to the Vietnamese who remain 
missing--a number estimated at 300,000 (Hess 9). 
4. Truong My Hoa details her experience in Con Son: 
I was imprisoned in Con Son from 1964 to 1975. 
I attended meetings and went to demonstrations to 
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demand freedom and democracy. The South Vietnamese 
arrested me when I was nineteen, and I was thirty by 
the time I was released. • • • We were beaten and 
tortured. They had all kinds of sexual torture for 
women. And we were so hungry. • • • And flies, flies 
everywhere. Con Son was filthy and cold, a stone 
prison on a cold, windy island. • • • We had one set 
of clothing a year. We never went outside, never 
bathed. We tore rags off our clothing for our men-
strual periods, so that we were left with practically 
nothing to cover our bodies. There were all kinds of 
disease--dysentery, typhoid, cholera, malaria small 
pox. (qtd. in Hess 85) 
5. Neither Buchanan nor Singlaub, however, has ne-
glected geopolitics. In the M.I.A. Hunter series Bucha-
nan's hero journeys to Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, Libya, 
Miami, and Watts. A long-time cold warrior, Singlaub was 
head of the World Anti-Communist League and chairman of 
the U.S. Council for World Freedom, which was chartered in 
1981 to aid "freedom fighters around the world," in par-
ticular the Nicaraguan contras (Kornbluh 32). 
6. Like O'Brien in "The Man I Killed," Caputo human-
izes the Viet Cong only after they are dead. He goes 
through their personal effects, "a small packet of letters 
and photographs •.•• several wallet-sized pictures of 
girl friends or wives." Only at this moment and only tem-
porarily does Caputo "realize that the Viet Cong were 
flesh and blood instead of •.• mysterious wraiths" 
(117). 
7. Not surprisingly, when viewed though American sol-
diers' cultural/historical reference, this primitive enemy 
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with a close and almost mystical union with nature; lS 
linked to Indians. Viet Cong-controlled territory, to Ca-
puto, is "Indian countryn (102), "true Indian country" 
(104) 0 (Caputo's second book likewise is titled Indian 
Country.) Upon arriving in Vietnam with his fellow rna-
rines, Caputo writes, "The wagon train was surrounded and 
the cavalry had come to the rescue" (53). Richard Slatkin 
demonstrates the prevalence of the frontier myth in Viet-
nam War discourse, pointing, among many other examples, to 
a Saturday Evening Post article comparing the strategic 
hamlet program with the "stockade idea our ancestors used 
against the Indians"; to Maxwell Taylor defending this 
program by declaring that "It is very hard to plant corn 
outside the stockade when the Indians are still around" 
(qtd. in Gunfighter 495); to one veteran's assertion that 
cutting off the ears of dead Viet Cong was "like scalps, 
you know, like Indians. Some people were on an Indian 
trip over there" {qtd. in Fatal 17). Similarly, Richard 
Drinnan points to the names of American air and ground op-
erations: "'Rolling Thunder'; 'Prairie'; 'Sam Houston'; 
'Hickory'; 'Daniel Boone'; and 'Crazy Horse'" ( 450). 
Frances Fitzgerald explains the process by which Americans 
saw the Vietnamese as Indians and themselves as cowboys: 
The Americans were once again embarked upon a heroic 
and (for themselves) almost painless conquest of an 
inferior race. To the American settlers the defeat 
of the Indians had seemed not just a nationalist vic-
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tory, but an achievement made in the name of human-
ity--the triumph of light over darkness, of good over 
evil, of civilization over brutish nature. Quite un-
consciously, the American officers and officials used 
a similar language to describe their war against the 
NLF. (491) 
8. Nearly identical points were made by Major General 
Thomas J.H. Trapnell, Jr. as early as 1954. To Trapnell 
The battle of Indochina is an armed revolution which 
is now in its eighth year. It is a savage conflict 
fought in a fantastic country in which the battle may 
be waged one day in waist-deep muddy rice paddies or 
later in an impenetrable mountainous jungle. The sun 
saps the vitality of friend and foe alike, but par-
ticularly the European soldier. (qtd. in Drinnan 405) 
9. In Heart of Darkness Conrad makes a similar point 
about the inefficacy of Western technology. "In the empty 
immensity of earth, sky, and water," he writes, was a 
French man-of-War, 
incomprehensible, firing into a continent. Pop, 
would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame 
would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would 
disappear, a tiny projectile would give a fuitile 
screech--and nothing happened. Nothing could happen. 
(41) 
Behind Conrad and Caputo's talk of futile screeches and 
gourds and rattles, of course, lay the brutal record of 
the colonial powers in Africa and the devastation of the 
American war in Indochina. 
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10. Richard Drinnan sees the frontier myth, with its 
genocidal and racist ethos, as a determining factor in the 
history of American foreign policy. To Drinnan, at each 
new frontier 
[white settlers'] metaphysics of Indian-hating under-
went a seemingly confirmatory "perennial rebirth." 
Rooted in fears and prejudices buried deep in the 
Western psyche, their metaphysics became a time-
tested doctrine, an ideology, and an integral compo-
nent of U.S. nationalism. (463-64) 
11. Westmoreland made a similar comparison when jus-
tifying American military policy in Vietnam. He asserted 
that 
If you crowd in too many termite killers, each using 
a screwdriver to kill the termites, you risk collaps-
ing the floors or the foundation. In this war we're 
using screwdrivers to kill termites because it's a 
guerilla war and we cannot use bigger weapons. We 
have to get the right balance of termite killers to 
get rid of the termites without wrecking the house. 
(qtd. in Fitzgerald 460) 
Similarly, Fitzgerald explains how, 
According to the official rhetoric, the Viet Cong did 
not live in places, they 'infested areas'; to 'clean 
them out' the American forces went on 'sweep and 
clear' operations or moved all the villagers into 
refugee camps in order to 'sanitize the area.' (492) 
12. Among the 60s era musicians mentioned in In Coun-
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try are Junior Walker and the All Stars, Sam the Sham and 
the Pharoahsr the Mamas and the Papas, the Doors, the 
Beatles, the Kinks, the Animals, Marvin Gaye, Bob Dylan, 
Grace Slick, Mick Jagger, John Lennon, and Donovan. 
13. It is interesting to compare this loss with the 
casualties suffered by the Vietnamese (and overlooked by 
Mason and other Vietnam War writers). Here are several 
Vietnamese describing the war's deadly consequences: 
I had one friend--ten people in her family, eight 
died. • • • Some days, twelve, thirteen, fourteen 
people were killed. • • • There were fourteen people 
in my family, and now there are only four •••• Six 
people were killed in one family, and they couldn't 
even find the pieces •••• In one family a mother 
and her four children were killed. Only their 
father--he had no legs because he was wounded during 
the French time--was away from the house. (qtd. in 
Hess 25-49) 
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